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The Caspian Sea Legal Regime,
Pipeline Diplomacy, and the Prospects
for Iran's Isolation from the Oil and
Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran's
Legal Options with its Geopolitical
Realities
ABSTRACT

The signing of the "deal of the century" in Bahu creating
one of the first major Caspian energy consortiums between
Azerbaijan and western oil companies signaled the beginning of
a new era in world energy politics. The discovery of potentially
huge oil and gas reserves in the newly-independent states of
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan opened the door for
western oil companies rushing to gain a competitive foothold in
the new energy market. For Asia and the West this discovery
provides a golden opportunity to ensure market stability
through diversificationof energy export routes. For the United
States and its politicalallies, however, the Caspianregion holds
the key to the realization of a long-term strategic agenda. By
establishing its presence in the region, Washington could. 1)
weaken the influence of the Persian Gulf states and prevent the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) from
monopolizing the production and distribution of world energy
reserves; 2) create a controlled environment ensuring that the
flow of petro-dollarswill lead to political and economic reform
in Central Asia and the Caucuses; and 3) undermine the
historicaldominance of the Russian Federationand the Islamic
Republic of Iran not only in the Caspian Sea region but in
Eurasiaand CentralAsia.
The political and economic changes brought about by the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the reemergence of the Caspian
region as a focal point of geopolitical importance have broad
implications for the new government in Tehran. On the one
hand Iran clearly finds itself in a tough and unfamiliar
neighborhood. It seems to have lost the game of political and
cultural influence over the newly-independent states to Turkey,
which claims common ethnic and linguistic bonds with its
Turkic brethren in the east. It has failed to play the religious
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card effectively-both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and even
Shi'ite Azerbaijan have looked to secular Turkey as the model of
governance and reform. On the economic front the discovery of
vast reserves in the Caspian has done little to increase the
prospects for Iran's share of the world hydrocarbon marketrelatively small oil and gas capacity has been found in the deep
waters off Iran's coastline. Finally, Washington has actively
engaged in a political and economic campaign to isolate Iran by
allying itself with Turkey and the newly-independent states and
continues to discourage the establishment of economic relations
with Tehran. In this regard the imposition of unilateral trade
sanctions on Tehran, the most important of which seeks to
disrupt the country's economy by discouraging foreign
involvement in the development of its oil and gas sector, have
far-reaching legal implications for Iran's involvement in the
Caspianenergy scene.
Iran'sgeopoliticalsituation, however, affords it the distinct
advantage of being the only land-bridge route linking the
CaspianSea to the oil-richPersian Gulf. The importance of this
cannot be overemphasized because the key to unlocking the
Caspian's wealth lies in finding sustainable export routes that
will carry the land-locked states' oil and gas to the open seas.
Iran represents one of the shortest and arguably the most
efficient routes not only because of its location but because of its
advanced transportation and infrastructural capacity.
Therefore, Iran's ability to take advantage of its position in the
region will largely determine whether it will be able to frustrate
the ultimate policy agenda of Washington. More importantly, it
will ensure Iran increasedparticipationin the world's oil and
gas market and allow it to use the Caspian Sea as a
springboard to strengthen its own regional and international
policy goals.
It is in this context that the legal implications of energy
exploration, production, and transportationin the Caspian Sea
will be discussed. This study will seek to address competing
notions of a Caspian Sea legal regime as they relate to Iran's
geopolitical interests. In this sense the study is not simply an
analysis of the status of such ownership rights in the Caspian,a
subject that has been enthusiasticallyaddressedby several legal
scholars. Rather, it is a multi-faceted approach to exploring
Iran's legal options regarding the establishment of such a
regime given Tehran's political and economic interests and
advantages in the region.
The author's main argument is that although legal issues
surrounding the "Great Game" in the Caspianoften take a back
seat to geopolitical diplomacy between the major participants,
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Tehran must effectively incorporate international legal
arguments into a far-sighted diplomatic strategy aiming to
develop and bolster its transportationand distribution role in
the Caspian region. Until now Tehran's ineffective and
misguided use of legal strategies has only weakened its bid to
retain legitimacy in the region. This is so because Tehran has
sought only to force a "legal veto" on any offshore development
in the Caspian Sea that could potentially endanger its
geopolitical interests in the region. Instead Tehran should
employ a two-pronged legal strategy that aims to secure its
traditional interests in the region while ensuring that any
formation of a legal regime defining ownership rights in the
Caspianwill ultimately accommodate its competitive advantage
in the transportationsector.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Until the last decade or so the issue of a Caspian Sea legal
regime received little to no attention in the scholarship of the
international legal community.' In fact the term "legal regime" was
rarely ever used in reference to the world's largest inland body of
water. 2 This seems rather odd given the historical and economic
importance of the Caspian Sea to the two states that controlled its
waters until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.3

A rough

historical survey of the region in the last century or so, however,
reveals that after the battle for empire in Central Asia between Great
Britain and Russia was settled in favor of the former, the region
slowly entered a period of relative isolation that was eventually
capped off with the consolidation of the Soviet Union.4 For more than
fifty years the Caspian's remote and landlocked location ensured the

1.
In preparation for this study the author had a general discussion with
Professor Jonathan Charney, an expert on the laws of the sea at Vanderbilt University
Law School. Professor Charney referred to the legal status of the Caspian Sea as the
"black hole" of international law, emphasizing the surprising lack of in-depth legal
scholarship regarding rules governing legal relationships between the lake's littoral
states. This characterization was corroborated by the scant availability of published
legal analysis regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
2.
A review of texts and periodicals (herein cited) addressing the status of the
Caspian prior to 1991 revealed no sources using this term. All pre-1991 sources used
refer to the status of the Caspian within the context of the Soviet-Iranian Bilateral
Treaties. For a discussion of the Soviet-Iranian Bilateral Treaties, see infra Part IV.
3.
See, e.g., David Aubrey, The Caspian Environment Programme Gets
Underway, Panel Discussion, Held Oct. 30, 1998, at http://www.sipa.columbia.edul
RESOURCES/CASPIAN/env_pl2.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw). The Caspian has especially been important for the communities
(approximately eleven million inhabitants are distributed around the Caspian
shoreline today) that abut its shores and have for years depended upon its resourcerich waters for sustenance, and for the overall economic prosperity of the littoral states
that managed to monopolize its commercial trade routes. Id. The Sea is also home to
the famous Caspian sturgeon from which an overwhelming majority of the world's most
expensive and sought after beluga caviar is extracted. See infra notes 56-60 and
accompanying text (providing a description of the environmental problems that plague
the world's largest inland body of water, including pollution and over-fishing, which
have contributed to a dramatic decline in the Caspian's sturgeon population).
4.
The Nineteenth Century battle for empire between England and Russia in
Central Asia is often referred to as the "Great Game." Stuart Parrot, Central Asia:
Powers Replay Great Game, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Feb. 3, 1998, at
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/02/F.RU.980203143840.html (copy on file with
the Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw). Central Asia was seen as a strategic
geopolitical region linking Far East trade routes to the Middle East and Europe. See
id.
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Soviet Union's (and to a lesser extent Iran's) hegemony over the lake's
5
resources and navigational systems.
All that has changed with the interplay of two significant events
in the last decade: the collapse of the Soviet empire and the discovery
of vast oil and gas deposits in the three new succession states
bordering the Caspian Sea. 6 In 1991 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan entered the international community as fledgling
states desperate for foreign capital and integration into the world
economy after years of domination under a closed political and
economic system.7 Soon thereafter, the discovery of rich hydrocarbon

5.
See Graham Fuller, Geopolitical Dynamics of the Caspian Region, at
http'Jourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/322.htm (last visited on Feb. 5,
2000) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law) (referring to
Russia and Iran's geopolitical importance to the Caspian region).
6.
Although 1989 is the year associated with perestroika and the collapse of
the Communist system in Russia, the Soviet Union, a conglomerate of Socialist
Republics retaining distinct ethno-linguistic identities separate from Russia, formally
disintegrated in 1991.
See generally ANATOLY M. KHAZANOV, AFTER THE USSR,
ETHNICITY, NATIONALIsM, AND POLITICS IN THE COMMONVEALTH OF INDEPENDENT
STATES 3-51 (1995). From 1989-1990 Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, Ukraine,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, and Georgia all declared their sovereignty. See GRAHAM SMITH, THE POSTSOVIET STATES 39 (1999). The remaining republics were held together by the Russian
Federation which exists to this day and includes the troubled non-Russian Caucus
republic of Chechnya. See KHAZANOV, supra at 39-48. Three of the newly-independent
states (NIS), Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan became Caspian littoral
states. See ATLAS OF THE WORLD 89 (Oxford 5th ed. 1997) (1978). Azerbaijan lies in the
Caucuses and is bordered by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the south, Armenia to the
west, Georgia to the northwest, the Russian Federation to the north, and the Caspian
Sea to the east. See id. Kazakhstan is the largest of the former Soviet Republics in
terms of square mileage, and lies to the south of the Russian Federation, north of
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and west of China and the Far East. See
id. at 56. See also generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., Culture, Chaos and Capitalism:
Privatizationin Kazakhstan, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 909 (1998), for an informative
overview of Kazakhstan's struggles for economic reform and liberalization.
Turkmenistan is the most southerly situated littoral state. See ATLAS OF THE WORLD.
supra, at 56. It borders Iran to the north, Afghanistan to the northeast, and
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to the south. See id. For purposes of this study the other
significant Central Asian state is Uzbekistan, which is not a Caspian littoral state but
like its southern neighbor, Turkmenistan, contains significant natural gas reserves.
See UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CASPIAN SEA REGION,
infra note 41 (outlining the United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA)
estimates that Uzbekistan's total gas reserves (including proven and possible reserves)
are anywhere between 109-123 Tcf.) The other two Central Asian NIS are Tajildstan
and Kyrgyzstan. With regards to the "discovery" of oil and gas reserves in the region,
the findings are in reality a re-discovery since the existence of deposits has been knovm
for centuries. See infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
7.
See generally TOURAJ ATABAKI & JOHN O'KANE, POST-SOVIET CENTRAL
ASIA (1988). For a comparative analysis of the differing privatization efforts of the
newly-independent Central Asian states and their struggle to attract foreign capital,
see generally Philip M. Nichols, Creatinga Market Along the Silk Road: A Comparison
of PrivatizationTechniques in CentralAsia, 29 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL 299 (1997).
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deposits on their land and offshore territories provided them with a
golden opportunity to secure desperately sought foreign financial
assistance.8 As for the traditional littoral powers of Russia and
Persia, 9 it is perhaps an irony of history that they have largely been
left out in the cold with respect to Caspian hydrocarbon wealth within
their immediate shorelines.' 0 They now find themselves locked in the
middle of a schizophrenic policy aimed at courting the new states
while simultaneously preventing those same states from taking any
unilateral actions that would compromise their influence in the
Caspian. 1 With the entry of foreign corporations backed by Western
strategic and political interests, 12 Russia and Iran are struggling to
adjust to the new regional circumstances, with command over
regional policies the immediate goal and ultimate control over
13
international oil and gas markets the long-term prize.
At the center of this diplomatic struggle for regional supremacy
is the legal status of the Caspian Sea and its ramifications for the
prospects of ownership and mining rights over the Sea's oil and gas
resources. 14
If, however, the uncertain atmosphere regarding
ownership rights defines the legal battleground upon which the
littoral states have pursued their diplomacy, the practical problem of
transporting the oil and gas to world markets presents the ultimate
geopolitical challenge. 15 Here, the Russian Federation and the

8.
Hugh Pope, US Report Says Caspian Oil Deposits Might be Twice as Large
as Expected, WALL ST. J., April 30, 1997, at A1O. See, e.g., SMITH, supranote 6, at 157211, for an overview of the NIS' dire economic circumstances at the outset of
independence.
9.
In 1935 the Persian government, then under the rule of Reza Shah, the
founder of the Pahlavi dynasty (and the father of Mohammad Reza Shah, who was
overthrown as a result of the Islamic Revolution in 1979), officially changed the
country's name to Iran. DONALD N. WILBER, REZA SHAH: THE RESURRECTION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAN 162 (1975).
10.
In comparison to the three NIS littoral states no significant oil and gas
reserves have been found off the Russian and Iranian Caspian coastlines. See infra
notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
11.
See infra Parts II, III, for an analysis of the geopolitical posturing of Russia
and Iran vis-A-vis the NIS and the littoral states' inconsistent attempts to validate
their political positions through legal means; see also infra Part II.C, for an analysis of
the geopolitical battle for the construction of pipelines in the Caspian region.
12.
See generally Jean-Christophe Peuch, Caspian Sea Oil: The Role of Private
Corporations, FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFF., Fall 1998, 22-Fall FLFWA 27
(explaining the political and financial role of private corporations in the development of
the Caspian region's oil and gas industry).
13.
See Hugh Pope, Great Game Il Oil Companies Rush Into the Caucus to
Tap the Caspian,WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1997, at Al, for good a review of the geopolitics
of the Caspian oil rush and the entrance of western corporations into the region.
14.
See Margaret McQaile, Question Looming Above All: Who is Caspian's
Owner?, 73 PLATr'S OILGRAM NEWS 38, Feb. 24, 1995, 1995 WL 8133653.
15.
See Michael Lelyveld, Russia: Moscow's New CaspianPolicy?, RADIO FREE
EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 7, 1908, at http://www.rferl.orglnca/features/1998/04/
F.RU.980407123639 (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law)
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Islamic Republic of Iran retain a potentially significant measure of
influence over the newly-independent states (NIS).' 6 While Russia's
vast territory stretches from the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea
in the Pacific to the Black and Baltic Seas in the West and Iran
occupies the largest coastline of any Persian Gulf state, the NIS are
essentially landlocked and have no access to the open seas. 17 This is
a significant competitive and market disadvantage for these cashstarved economies, and one that they and the West must overcome if
the potentials of the Caspian are to be fully realized and
diversification of energy sources ultimately achieved. 18 It is in this
way that the battle lines over legal delimitation of the Caspian have
been supplanted by the more immediate concern for sustainable
export routes to lucrative energy markets.1 9
Given the above background, the impetus for this study comes
from the surprising realization that there is little in-depth legal
analysis regarding the status of the Caspian in international

scholarship. 20 Sound analysis regarding the important legal issues
surrounding exploitation of Caspian resources has often been clouded
by political posturing and questionable reasoning. 21 In this sense,
analysis has often operated in a vacuum where legal stakes have been
reduced to seemingly abstract debates about what legal models or
regimes must govern relations between the littoral states in the

(arguing that there are significant economic and political advantages to maintaining
control of oil and gas pipelines under the current international pipeline arrangements).
The economic advantages include, but are not limited to, the collection of transit fees
for the flow of oil and gas passing through a nation's territory. See id. Political
advantages include, but are not limited to, overall control over the flow of the oil and
gas itself. See id. Indeed, without pipelines the right to develop Caspian resources is
largely an academic concern. Id. For an introductory overview of the international
legal implications of the Caspian Sea and its ramifications for pipeline geopolitics, see
generally Constantinos Papadopoulos, InternationalLaw and Pipeline Geopolitics in
the CaspianSea, 36 TExAS J. Bus. L. 1 (1999).
16.
See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan, The Great Game Isn't Over, WALL ST. J., Nov.
24, 1999, at AS.
17.
See ATLAS OF THE WORLD, supranote 6, at 57.
18.
See generally Amir Houshang Amini, Iran's Standing in the Regional GeoEconomic Equation,2 IRAN COMMERCE 4 (Iran), Autumn 1997, http://wv,.netiran.com/
HtdocslClippingsfFeconomy/97100OXXFE07.html, for a geopolitical explanation of why
and how Iran can serve as an ideal strategic partner to the NIS.
19.
See supranote 15 and accompanying text; Part II.C.
20.
To be sure, this deficiency reflects the degree to which the region was truly
closed and isolated to the outside world and the unanticipated frenzy of commercial
and political interest that resulted once its doors were swung wide open and news of
rich energy basins hit corporate ears. See supranotes 1-13 and accompanying text.
21.
When issues have been addressed by scholars there has been an
overwhelming tendency to address the legal status of the Caspian primarily in relation
to offshore exploration and production rights without linking those rights to the equally
important issue of pipeline diplomacy. See, e.g., infra note 22-23 and accompanying
text.

692

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:681

Caspian region, or whether the Caspian should be characterized as a
sea or a lake. 22 The opposite trend has also been prevalent-a
tendency to discuss legal issues primarily within the context of
geopolitical diplomacy. 23 As a result the validity of sound legal
analysis has often been compromised, characterized merely as a
capricious byproduct of political will. In short, there has been little
effort to integrate legal and political analysis into a cohesive and
comprehensive view assessing the role and value of legal diplomacy in
the Caspian "Great Game."
While this study recognizes the limits and pitfalls of legal
analysis as a principal means of explaining diplomacy in the Caspian
context (or any international arena), it will focus on a comprehensive
approach to understanding the broad implications of Caspian energy
issues. The over-arching theme of the study is that sound legal
tactics can and should be effectively incorporated into the long-term
geopolitical strategies of the littoral states involved.
More
specifically, Caspian legal issues will be analyzed from an Iranian
perspective because this approach offers the extreme scenario of
powerful geopolitical will (of the United States and its Caspian allies)
pitted against economically viable and feasible solutions to Caspian
energy issues (involving Iran). 24 In other words the pressure of
American political diplomacy and policy in the Caspian offers the best
test case for determining whether sound legal strategizing can be

22.
See, e.g., John Roberts, Oil: The Caspian-Sea or Lake? That's a Billion
Dollar Question, INTER PRESS SERv., Feb. 27, 1995, 1995 WL 2259214; Thomas Land,
Caspian Nations Play for High Stakes, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Sept. 6, 1996, 1996 WL
1184044. (This is just a sampling of the traditional one-dimensional approach to
analysis of the Caspian oil and gas saga. Most of the sources incorporated in this study
by the author fail to integrate the political, economic, and legal dimensions of the
Caspian "Great Game.')
But see Bernard Oxman, Caspian Sea or Lake? What
Difference Does it Make? 1 CASPIAN CROSSROADS 4, Winter 1996, http://ourworld.
compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/141.htm (criticizing such an approach).
23.
See, e.g., generally OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION 99290 (Michael P. Croissant & Bulent Aras eds., 1999) (providing a comprehensive
analysis of the geopolitical aspects of the Caspian energy game which addresses the
interests of the individual littoral states and other "external" states, including Turkey
and the United States); Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucuses and
Central Asia: Prospects for Oil Exploitation and Export in the Caspian Basin, 300
ADELPHI (1996) (providing an excellent geopolitical and economic analysis regarding
various hydrocarbon production and transport issues); Abraham S. Becker, Russia and
Caspian Oil: Moscow Loses Control, RAND (1998) (analyzing the Caspian oil and gas
context from a Russian geopolitical perspective). The author notes, however, that
several of the above listed studies include small sections on the legal status of the
Caspian Sea. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Croissant & Michael P. Croissant, The Legal Status
of the Caspian Sea: Conflict and Compromise, in OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN
SEA REGION, supraat 21-42; Forsythe, supraat 29-31.
24.
See infra Parts II.B.3, II.C.3.c, for an analysis of the Iran-Libya Sanction
Act and other U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at isolating Tehran [from the Caspian
hydrocarbon scene] and preventing development of its oil and gas sector.
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effectively integrated with diplomatic gamesmanship in an attempt to
safeguard Iran's vital domestic and regional interests in the Caspian.
In this context the Study will address Iran's role at the intersection of
three dynamics-the Caspian Sea legal regime, the battle for Main
Export Routes (MERs), and balance of power diplomacy-while also
paying close attention to U.S. efforts aimed at preventing Tehran's
involvement in the Caspian through the use of unilateral economic
sanctions. The Study will use Iran as an example to argue that
pipeline diplomacy should not and cannot be separated from legal
issues regarding Caspian Sea ownership rights.
The policy
ramifications of such a position warrant Tehran to successfully
reconcile legal and political strategies into a cohesive policy that will
trigger its competitive advantage in the transportation and
distribution of Caspian energy to world markets.

II. THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE CASPIAN

A. Setting Up the Game Board

1. The Geography and Geology of the Caspian
The Caspian Sea is a unique body of water with characteristics
that have prevented accurate geological and legal classification. 2s
The body of water has been called a lake, an enclosed sea, a closed
sea, and an inland sea. 26 Regardless of the label, the Caspian Sea is
the largest inland body of water in the world and is approximately
the size of Japan.2 7 It covers an area of about 400,000 square
28
kilometers with a depth of about 1,000 meters.
The Caspian can be divided into three zones on the basis of depth
and water currents. 29 The northern zone constitutes twenty-eight
30
percent of the total area and has an average depth of 6.2 meters.
31
The water flow is clockwise.
The middle zone constitutes thirty-six

25.
Kamyar Mehdiyoun, International Law and the Dispute Over Ownership of
Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea 2 (Aug. 3, 1999) (unpublished manuscript.
on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw).

26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 1.
28.
Andrei Ivanov & Judith Perera, CIS-Environment: Resource-Rich Caspian
Sea Continues to Rise, INTER PRESS SERV., Aug. 28, 1995, 1995 WL 1013390.
29. Hossein Kaazempour Ardabii, The Caspian Sea: Resources, Legal Status,
Future, 1 ECON. & ENERGY QTLY. 2 (Iran), Spring 1997. httpJlnew.netiran.com/Htdoc4
Clippings/Feconomy1970300XXFE01.html.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.
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percent of the total area and has an average depth of 176 meters.32
The southern zone accounts for the remaining thirty-six percent of
the surface area and averages 325 meters in depth.33 Furthermore,
an underwater ridge divides the Sea into two halves of which the
shallower north is almost salt-free. 34
In this sense, the Sea is
comparable in size, depth, and salinity to many semi-enclosed marine
areas. 35 It lacks any direct outlet to the open seas and is linked to the
Black and Baltic Seas through the Volga river and a series of canals
and other waterways.36
In geological terms, Soviet and Russian
lawyers have expressed some doubt as to whether the Caspian has a
continental shelf, or whether the sea floor may be viewed merely as a
37
depression on the continental land mass.
Prior to 1991 de facto division of coastlines between the Soviet
Union and Iran resulted in approximately an eighty percent control of
the Caspian coastline by the former.3 8 After the breakup of the
Soviet Union the two traditional littoral states of the Soviet Union
and Iran were joined by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan,
causing a significant change in the distribution of the Caspian
coastline. 39
The current share of the coastline between the five
littoral states is roughly as follows: Russia: 18.5%; Kazakhstan:
30.8%; Turkmenistan: 16.8%; Azerbaijan: 15.2%; and Iran: 18.7%.40
Though the south Caspian is the deepest part of the Sea its
southwestern and northeastern shores have yielded the most
productive hydrocarbon reserves. 41 The Sea's approximately 700-mile

32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Ivanov & Perera, supra note 28.
35.
Id.
36.
Mehdiyoun, supra note 25, at 1.
37.
Id. at 1-2.
38.
This figure is an approximation reached by reference to the present
distribution of coastlines and the historical de facto delimitation between Russia and
Iran pursuant to a comprehensive boundary treaty in 1954, designating the port of
Astara as the common boundary on the west and the port of Hosseingholi as the one on
the east. See infra notes 505, 661-65 and accompanying text. For further analysis of
the legal effects of de facto boundary delimitation between the Soviet Union and Iran in
the Caspian Sea, see Parts IV.A.3, IV.B.2.
39.
See ATLAS OF THE WORLD, supra note 6, at 56.
40.
Mehdiyoun, supra note 25, at 1.
41.
See generally UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
CASPIAN SEA REGION (1998), at http://www.eia.doe/gov/emeu/cabs/caspfull.html (copy
on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw). The USEIA estimates that
Azerbaijan's total oil reserves (including proven and possible reserves) amount to
approximately 36-45 billion barrels (BBL) (proven: 3.6-12.5 BBL; possible: 32 BBL),
while its total gas reserves amount to approximately 46 Tcf (proven: 11 Tcf; possible
35 Tcf). Id. Kazakhstan's total oil reserves amount to 102-110 BBL (proven: 10.0-17.6
BBL; possible: 92 BBL), and its total gas reserves amount to 141-171 Tcf (proven: 5383 Tcf; possible: 88 Tcf). Id. Turkmenistan's total oil reserves amount to 82 BBL
(proven: 1.7 BBL; possible: 80), and its total gas reserves 257-314 Tcf (proven: 98.155
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length contains an average of six separate hydrocarbon basins. 42 The
most promising oil-producing area is in the south Caspian along a
narrow structural zone extending across the Caspian from
Azerbaijan's Aspheron Peninsula to western Turkmenistan's PeriBalkhan region. 43 Currently most of Azerbaijan's oil resources are
located offshore, as are about thirty to forty percent of the total oil
resources of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 44 No significant oil and
gas discoveries have been made off the Iranian coastline which
represents the deepest and most treacherous coastline of any littoral
state.4 5
The Russian coastline has also proven relatively
unproductive in yielding significant oil and gas deposits. 46

According

to

the

United

States

Energy

Information

Administration (USEIA) proven oil reserves for the entire Caspian
Sea region are estimated at sixteen to thirty-two billion barrels,
comparable to those of the United States (twenty-two billion barrels)
and the North Sea (seventeen billion barrels).47 Natural gas reserves
are even larger, accounting for almost sixty-six percent of the
reserves in the region. 48 Proven gas reserves are estimated at around
236-337 trillion cubic feet (Tcf. 49 The USEIA also estimates that the
region's possible oil reserves could yield another 163 billion barrels of
oil, while possible gas reserves could top the 328 Tcf mark. 50
Although there is ongoing dispute regarding the true capacity of
Caspian hydrocarbon reserves, 51 most believe that the region's

Tc , possible: 159 Tcf). Id. Russia's total oil reserves amount to 17 BBL (proven: 2.7
BBL; possible: 14 BBL). Id. Finally, Iran's total oil reserves amount to 15 BBL
(proven: .1 BBL; possible: 15 BBL), while its proven gas reserves amount to 11 Tcf
(proven: 0 Tcf; possible: 11 Tcf). Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Mehdiyoun, supranote 25, at 1.
44.
UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION. CASPIAN SEA
REGION, supranote 41.
45.
See id.
46.
See id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. The USEIA estimates that possible gas reserves are as large as the
Caspian's proven gas reserves and could yield another 328 Tcf. Id. Based upon proven
gas reserves, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan each rank among the world's
twenty largest natural gas holders. Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Although the "opening" of the Caspian region was greeted with enthusiastic
frenzy by international corporate powers and optimistic estimates regarding the Sea's
hydrocarbon capacity, the region's true potential has always been questioned by critics.
See, e.g., Amy Jaffe & Robert Manning, The Myth of the Caspian 'Great Game:' The
Real Geopolitics of Energy, 40 SURVIVAL 4, Jan. 1, 1998, 1998 WL 19220807; see also
Steven Greenlee, Caspian OiL" Gold Mine or Tar Pit, 14 WORLD & 1 12, Dec. 1, 1999,
1999 WL 11151520 (providing a background for recent discoveries in Caspian oil and
the resulting "pipeline manias" while arguing that a dark economic cloud regarding the
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potential could lead to a significant diversification of the world's
energy market. 52 At the conservative end of the spectrum the above
estimates would place the Caspian region's productivity below the
Persian Gulf and Siberia, but establish it as a serious competitor to
North Sea production. 53
If optimistic evaluations of total
hydrocarbon reserves prove sustainable, however, the Caspian would
seriously rival the production capacity of the rich Persian Gulf
basins. 54 Other than the Caspian's rich mineral resources the Sea
contains a rich sturgeon stock which accounts for approximately
55
ninety-five percent of the world's caviar market.
Environmental pollution and degradation resulting from years of
Soviet mining and waste disposal policies, however, continually
threaten the fragile ecosystem of the Caspian. 56 The pollution is
worst in the southern Caspian, off the coast of Baku, around the
Aspheron Peninsula, and south into Iranian waters. 5 7 Flow of waste
and pollution from Kazakhstan and Russia via the Volga and other
tributaries has affected Iran's Caspian shores most heavily,

region's real hydrocarbon capacity and geopolitical instability will needlessly lead to
American involvement and conflict in the region).
52.
Most importantly the Clinton Administration was a zealous advocate of
private corporate involvement in the development of the Caspian hydrocarbon market,

although the corporations themselves have been more hesitant. See infra Part II.B; see
also U.S. Interests in the Caspian Sea Region: HearingBefore the S. Foreign Relations

Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade, infra notes 139, 144, for an
example of the Administration's policy goals regarding the Caspian region. This
hesitancy is a product of several factors including doubt as to the real hydrocarbon
potential of the region, political barriers and sanctions imposed by the U.S.
government, and most importantly economic viability concerns regarding the
construction of the Main Export Routes (MERs) themselves. See, e.g., Demirmen, infra
note 417.
53.
UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CASPIAN SEA
REGION, supra note 41.
54.
Id.

55.

Dilip Hiro, Iran-CIS States: Battle for Resources of the Caspian Sea, INTER

PRESS SERV., Nov. 13, 1996, 1996 WL 13589060.
56.
For a general synopsis of environmental concerns regarding the oil rush in
the Caspian, see Danielle Knight, Environment-Finance: Fears of Eco-Disaster in
Caspian Sea, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 4, 1999, 1999 WL 5946864; see also infra Part
VI.C (analyzing the prospects for Iran's effective use of a legal-environmental strategy
to block unilateral exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Caspian); see also
generally Levent Hekimoglu, Caspian Oil and the Environment: Curse or Cure? in OIL
AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 23, at 83-98 (providing an
analysis of environmental issues regarding the Caspian Sea region).
57.
Hekimoglu, supra note 56, at 85. As the southernmost littoral state of the
Caspian, Iran is affected more than any other state when pollutants come downstream
and into the Iranian coastline. Nader Entessar, Iran: Geopolitical Challenges and the
Caspian Region, in OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 23,
at 168. According to Iranian sources Azerbaijan alone is responsible for dumping
75,000 tons of waste per year into the Caspian from its oil and related industries. Id.
The volume of waste per year will undoubtedly increase as Azerbaijan's oil production
enters a new stage of development. Id.
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prompting environmentalists to declare pollution levels there to be
sixteen times that of normal.5 8 The economic byproduct of such

damage has been a substantial reduction in the sturgeon stock and a
continuing decrease in Caspian caviar profits. 59 A mysterious rise in

the level of the Sea has also raised concerns regarding massive
environmental damage resulting from flooding.60
2.

The Caspian Players and the New Geopolitical Landscape:

Redefining Relations Between the NIS and the "External Powers"
The official collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
subsequent creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) caused a regional power vacuum, with major "external powers"
including Iran, Turkey, and the United States, seeking to exert
political, economic, and cultural influence over the new vulnerable
states.6 1 The power vacuum sent all these regional players into a
frenzy, each searching to gain a foothold in the internal affairs of
62
their "client states."
a. 'Mother Russia" and Regional Hegemony
According to Andrei Shoumikhin Russia's relationship with the
NIS can still be characterized by the tradition of uelikoderzhavie, a
foreign policy strategy relying heavily on ultranationalist
justifications to ensure that Russia maintains its traditional spheres

58.

Laurent Maillard, Iran, Russia Seek to Control Caspian Riches, AGENCE

FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 23, 1995, 1995 WL 7871921.
59.
Mary Castille, CaspianSturgeon Stock Dwindles, THE ENVIROM ,ErALIST,
Aug. 23, 1995, at 12; see also Hiro, supra note 55.
60.
Hiro, supra note 55. The Caspian is rising an average of fourteen to fifteen
centimeters a year. Ivanov & Perera, supranote 28.
61.
See generally Paul Starobin, The New Great Game, NATIONAL J., Mar. 13,
1999, 1999 WL 8102236 (outlining the stakes for U.S. and Western involvement in the
new "Great Game"). The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a community
of independent nations established by a treaty signed at Minsk on December 8. 1991,
by the heads of state of Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA
611 (5th ed. 1998); see also infra Part IV.B, for analysis of the legal effect of the Almaty
Declaration on the NIS. The headquarters of the CIS is in Minsk. Id. Between
December eighth and twenty-first the three original signatories were joined by
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan. Id. The CIS was conceived as the successor to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) in its role of coordinating the foreign and economic policies
of the member nations. Id. The primary duties of the CIS were understood to be the
prevention of inter-republican warfare, the mediation of disputes over the disposition of
the former Soviet Union's military forces, and the promotion of trade. Id.
62.
The important non-NIS regional players are Russia, Turkey, and Iran, vith
the United States representing a key fourth actor. See infra Parts lI.A.2.a.d.
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of influence over the Caucuses and Central Asia. 63 The need to assert
its dominance over the Caspian was never more urgent than in the
early 1990s when an economically and politically weak Moscow
sought to salvage what was left of its Soviet hegemony over the
region. 64 Despite the changed circumstances, however, dependence
on foreign trade, military reliance, and political association with NIS
party elites have continued to ensure that '"other
Russia" will play a
65
vital role in the NIS' post-independence life.

On the economic front Russia has an established pipeline
infrastructure in place that allows for relatively safe and costeffective transportation of hydrocarbons out of the Caspian basin. 66
Also, heavy oil extracting equipment needed for offshore production
67
may be delivered locally only through inland Russian waterways.
On the diplomatic and political front Russia possesses the ability to
play a central role in the management of regional conflicts. 68 In
short, Russia has the option of using various economic and political
strategies-from withdrawing raw material supplies to manipulating
regional conflicts-in order to pressure littoral states into favorable
69
concessions.
The introduction of new geopolitical concerns in the Caspian
region has greatly affected Russia's long-term strategy for the
region. 7°
More importantly Russia's wider regional policy is

63.
Andrei Shoumikhin, Russia: Developing Cooperation on the Caspian, in
OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 23, at 136.
64.
See generally id. at 136-39.
65.
See generally ROBERT V. BARYLSKI, U.S.-AZERBAIJAN COUNCIL, THE
CASPIAN OIL REGIME: MILITARY DIMENSIONS, at http:l/ourworld.compuserve.coml
homepages/usazerb/122.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2000) (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw). Most of the current leaders of the NIS were
once members of the Communist Party under the Soviet system and the prospects of
political and economic liberalization did not, and have not yet opened the systems to a
western-style form of governance. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 101-27 (outlining the
structural challenges and limits to democracy in the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
states). In addition, Russia still retains military influence in the region, staging its
troops in most NIS states with Azerbaijan standing out as a notable exception. See
BARYLSKI, supra; see also John R. Lepingwell, New States and Old Solders: CivilMilitary Relations in the Former Soviet Union, in THE SUCCESSOR STATES TO THE
USSR 65-67 (John W. Blaney ed., 1995).
66.
Shoumikhin, supra note 63, at 143; see also infra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2,
II.C.3.a (analyzing the NIS' reliance on Russia's geostrategic position regarding the
transportation of oil and gas out of the Caspian region).
67.
Shoumikhin, supra note 63, at 143.
68.
Id. at 137-38.
69.
President Yeltsin and other Russian officials have used a number of
formulations to articulate Russia's "special responsibility" to the former Soviet
Caucasian and Central Asian states. Forsythe, supra note 23, at 14. The impact of
such aggressive policies has been felt in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, and
Kazakhstan. Id. at 14-15.
70.
Id. at 14.
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inextricably bound to its interest in Caspian oil. 7 1 Russia's current
geopolitical diplomacy in the region is characterized by two
contradictory schools of thought. 72 The first has been espoused by
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov who interprets Russian policy
within a traditional balance-of-power framework. 73 This group views
oil as a central instrument in maintaining geopolitical hegemony in
the region and warns against the creation of new Western joint
ventures. 74 From this perspective the development of oil is a zerosum game rather than a cooperative effort from which all regional
75
players may benefit.
The second school of thought has been supported by Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin and other oil-industry officials who welcome
Western participation in the development of Caspian oil and gas as a
means of ensuring access to capital and advanced technology. 7 6 More
specifically, this group has aggressively lobbied to include Russia in
77
several joint ventures with the NIS and Western corporations.
Inclusion rather than exclusion is seen as the only way to ensure that
75
Russia's political and economic interests in the region are met.
Needless to say that tension between these schools of thought has
often led to a contradictory and fragmented Russian foreign policy in
79
the region.
b. Tehran vs. Ankara:
Hegemony in the Caspian

The Battle for Political and Cultural

The game for political influence also involved regional players
Turkey and Iran, each struggling to counter Russian advances and
neutralize the efforts of the other in the region.80 With the United
States closely monitoring developments while lending financial and

71.
Id.
72.
Id. at 15; see also infra notes 542-46 and accompanying text (discussing the
long-running bureaucratic dispute between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of
Fuel and Power and Russian oil industry officials regarding the proper Russian
response to the NIS' unilateral exploitation of Caspian oil and gas resources).
73.
Shoumikhin, supranote 63, at 144.
74.
Id. at 15-16.
75.
Id. at 16.
76.
See infra notes 542-46 and accompanying text.
77.
See id.
78.
See id.
79.
Forsythe, supra note 23, at 13; see also infra notes 542-46 and
accompanying text, for an analysis of the legal ramifications of Moscow's schizophrenic
geopolitical diplomacy regarding Caspian oil and gas development.
80.
See Anthony Hyman, Central Asia and the Middle East: The Emerging
Links, in CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCUSES AFTER THE SOVIET UNION: DoMESTIc AND
INTERNATIONAL DYNAMIcs 252-59 (Mohiaddin Mesbahi ed., 1994) (analyzing the
political, economic, and cultural links between Central Asia and the Middle East, and
more particularly, the competition for regional influence between Iran and Turkey).
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diplomatic support to its strategic North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) ally Turkey, the region saw a steady balance
shift in favor of Ankara and away from Tehran.
The reasons for this are historical and strategic. The demise of
the Soviet empire has given Turkey an opportunity to renew its
historical ties and increase its regional influence. 8 1 With the
exception of Tajikistan, all the newly-independent Central Asian
states have strong ethno-linguistic ties to their Turkic brethren in the
West. 82 In the Caucuses, Azerbaijan also shares a common historical
bond with Turkey, while Georgia and Armenia seek to reinvigorate
Christian ideals in lands that have been dominated by Islamic and
Communist tendencies for centuries. 83 For these countries secular
Turkey is the more suitable model for political and economic reform
and meaningful integration into the international community. 84
More importantly for Ankara, Turkey is committed to a close
relationship with the Caspian littoral states, especially Azerbaijan,
for political and economic reasons. 85 Turkey has concluded a number
of political, military, and economic agreements with Caspian littoral

81.
Forsythe, supranote 23, at 21.
82.
See Muriel Atkin, Tajiks and the Persian World, in CENTRAL ASIA IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 127-43 (Beatrice F. Manz ed., 1994) (analyzing the unique
ethnic and cultural identity of the Tajiks in a primarily Turkic Central Asia). Although
the southern Caucuses and most of Central Asia were originally settled by IndoIranian tribes and the area was controlled for centuries by successive Persian empires,
a steady flow of migration from Turko-Mongolian tribes originating in north-eastern
Asia slowly displaced the earlier peoples. See Beatrice Manz, Historical Background,
in CENTRAL ASIA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra at 5-7. Turkish, Azeri, Kazakh,
Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Turkmen are all Turkic languages categorized under the Altaic
family.
SUMMER INSTITUTE OF LINGUISTICS INTERNATIONAL, Ethnologue-13th
Edition, at http:llwww.sil.orglethnologue/families/Altaic.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2001) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law). Tajiki,
however, is mutually intelligible with Persian and belongs to the Iranian sub-family of
languages. Id., at http://www.sil.orglethnologue/families/Indo-European.html.
83.
Georgians are ethnically and culturally distinct from their Turkic neighbors.
See Henry R. Huttenbach, Chaos in Post-Soviet Caucasia, Crossroadsof Empires: In Search
of a U.S. Foreign Policy, in THE SUCCESSOR STATES TO THE USSR, supra note 65, at 225.
Their language is part of the Caucasian family group. SUMMER INSTITUTE OF LINGUISTICS
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 82, at http://www.sil.org/ethnologue/families/South-Caucasian.
html. Armenians are also ethnically distinct from all their neighbors, sharing no common

linguistic bonds with either Georgians or Azeris. See Huttenbach, supra at 232-33; see also
SUMMER INSTITUTE OF LINGUISTICS INTERNATIONAL, at http'//www.sil.org/ethnologue/
languages/A rmenian.html. Both countries practice a form of Christian Orthodoxy, while
Azerbaijan is primarily Shi'ite Muslim. See Huttenbach, supraat 225-39.
84.
Hyman, supra note 80, at 254. Although Turkey is a Muslim nation it
embarked on a path of secularism and westernization inspired by the autocrat Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s. Gavin D. Brockett, Collective Action and the Turkish
Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Ataturk Era, 1923-38,
in TURKEY BEFORE AND AFTER ATATURK 47-61 (Sylvia Kedouri ed., 1999) (outlining the
Islamic reaction to Ataturk's secular legislation).
85.
Forsythe, supranote 23, at 21.
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states since 1991.86 On the economic front Turkey is particularly
keen on ensuring that an MER runs from Azerbaijan through
Turkey.8 7 The existence of a pipeline through Turkey is important for
several reasons: 1) it satisfies Turkey's increasing need for energy
imports,8 8 2) it brings in substantial benefits in terms of income (via
transit fees) and jobs,8 9 and 3) it allows Turkey to avoid increased
tanker traffic in the Bosphorus Straits by directing the flow of oil to a
terminal in the Mediterranean."
c. Iran's Regional Aspirations
According to Rosemarie Forsythe Iran's specific regional goals
include political influence, profitable economic and commercial
relations, the spread of religious ideology, procurement of former
Soviet weaponry, and the acquisition of nuclear expertise and
materials.9 1 On a more profound level, however, Iran is interested in
taking on the mantle of regional leader.9 2 Since 1991 Iranian officials
have continuously talked of a "revival of the silk route" which would
establish transportation links between Central Asia and the
Caucuses and the Persian Gulf.93 In February 1992 Iran hosted a
meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) to discuss
Caspian issues, particularly those related to oil and gas
development. 9 4 At Iran's suggestion, the Organization decided to set
up a Caspian Cooperation Organization (CCO) with its headquarters
in Tehran. 95 Thus far, however, not much has been done in the way
96
of multilateral and institutional Caspian cooperation.

Id.
See infra Part II.C.3.b; see also infra note 142 and accompanying text.
87.
88.
See infra Part fl.C.3.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.; see also infra notes 400 and accompanying text, for an explanation of
Turkey's environmental concerns regarding the Bosphorus Straits; see, e.g., infra note
142, for discussion of Turkey's interests regarding the running of an MER through its
territory and its related preference for pipeline routes terminating at its
Mediterranean instead of its Black Sea ports.
91.
Forsythe, supra note 23, at 23; see also generally A. Ehteshami, Iran and
Central Asia: Responding to Regional Change, in SECURITY POLITICS IN THE
COMMONVEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 87-103 (Mehdi Mozaffari ed., 1997), for an
analysis of Iran's changing geopoliticl concerns after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
92.
Ehteshami, supranote 91.
93.
Id. at 24.
94.
Id. at 25.
95.
Id.
96.
See infra Parts M4A, VI.C.2, for an analysis of the reasons why Caspian
multilateral cooperation and negotiation have been slow to take shape and the
prospects for Iran's successful use of a legal strategy that forces the NIS and other
regional players to strongly consider multilateral action.
86.
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In the face of slow multilateral negotiation and cooperation,
Tehran has begrudgingly realized that it must take up bilateral
diplomacy with the Caspian littoral states. 97
From Tehran's
perspective the situation with Azerbaijan9 8 is perhaps the most
important regional relationship and one that will continue to have
important ramifications for Iran's role in the Caspian energy game.
Relations between the two countries have, however, been strained
from the get-go. 99 Today Azerbaijan presents the most formidable
NIS challenge to Iran's regional and security policies. 10 0 Baku's main
complaints against Tehran include the latter's support of Islamic
opposition groups in Azerbaijan and declarations that Azerbaijan has
always been a part of Persia and should therefore be integrated into
Iranian territory. 01' To make matters worse, Iran's open financial

97.

See infra Parts III.B.5, VI, for an analysis of the political and economic

reasons behind Iran's pursuit of bilateral cooperation with the littoral states over
development of oil and gas resources despite its continuing insistence that all

exploitation of the Sea's resources should be based on unanimous, multilateral
cooperation.
98.
For an informative political, economic, and social analysis of the state of
affairs in Azerbaijan (especially within the Caspian oil and gas context), see Alec
Rasizade, Azerbaijan, the U.S., and Oil Prospects on the Caspian Sea, 16 J. THIRD
WORLD STUDIES 1, Apr. 1, 1999, 1999 WL 16174007.
99.
See Katz, infra note 135 (explaining the reasons behind the RussianIranian alliance against Azerbaijan). While Azerbaijan is the only Shi'ite-majority
nation of the former Soviet Republics it has consciously sought to avoid religious links
with Tehran.
See id. To a certain extent this reflects the degree to which
secularization under the Soviet system infiltrated all levels of Azeri society, from
politics to culture. Greenlee, supra note 51. The more contentious issue between the
two states, however, revolves around Iran's significant Azeri minority which accounts
for approximately twenty million of the nation's sixty-five million-plus population.
Yuri N. Zinin & Alexei V. Maleshenko, Azerbaijan, in CENTRAL ASIA AND THE
CAUCUSES AFTER THE SOVIET UNION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS, supra
note 80, at 112. After Azerbaijan gained its independence Azerbaijani nationalists and
officials frequently called for the creation of a greater Azerbaijan which would include
Iran's northern Azeri-dominated states. Mehdi Mozaffari, The CIS' Southern Belt: A
New Security System, in SECURITY POLITICS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT
STATES, supra note 91, at 32 n.16. This has seriously concerned Tehran. Id.; see also
Entessar, supra note 57, at 160-68 (outlining the closely intertwined history of Iran
and Azerbaijan and analyzing ultranationalist Azeri calls for the "unification of
northern and southern [Iranian] Azerbaijan').
100.
See Entessar, supra note 57, at 160.
101.
Mesbahi, Russia and the Geopolitics of the Muslim South, in CENTRAL ASIA
AND THE CAUCUSES AFTER THE SOVIET UNION:
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
DYNAMICS, supra note 80, at 301; see also Entessar, supra note 57, at 167 (explaining
that a number of Iranian parliament deputies representing the Iranian-Azeri provinces
issued a joint resolution asking for the annexation of the Republic of Azerbaijan to
Iran); id. at 167 (explaining that current President Aliyev's administration accused
Iran of backing the opposition Islamic parties in the October 1998 presidential
elections). See also generally text of Gulistan Pact, infra note 594 (providing the legal
basis for Russia's annexation of northern Azerbaijani territories that had long been a
part of the Persian empire); Treaty of Turkmenchai, infra note 597 (providing the legal
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and military support of Armenian separatists during the conflict in
the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave has done more to damage relations
between the two neighbors than any other disagreement since
1991.102 Tehran, in turn, blames Baku for inciting nationalist Azeri
fervor across the borders and calling for the creation of a greater
Azerbaijan,10 3 ignoring the Islamic (Shi'ite) interests of the Azeri
people, 10 4 and allying itself too closely with Israel and the United
States. 10 5
More specifically, Tehran fears that Azerbaijan's
increasing alliance with the United States and Israel will lead to
more than just American corporate involvement in the Caspian
basin.10 6 The real fear is that the Caspian will eventually become
another security nightmare for Iran-that it will become another
10 7
Persian Gulf.
Iran's relations with Kazakhstan are more cordial than with
Azerbaijan.10 8 For the most part, however, Kazakhstan has no doubt
looked primarily to Turkey and the West as a model of political
reform and governance. 10 9 In order to decrease its dependency on
Russia, Kazakhstan has attracted Western capital for the

basis for Russia's annexation of northern Azerbaijani territories that had long been a
part of the Persian empire).
102.
Nagorno-Karabakh is a contested Armenian enclave within Azeri territory.
Yuri N. Zinin & Alexei V. Maleshenko, supra note 99, at 99. After 1991 Armenians
living under Azeri rule began an armed secessionist movement that turned into all-out
war. Id. at 107. Iran and Armenia allied to help the secessionists secure an unstable
foothold in the enclave but fighting has continued to this day despite a Russian.
mediated cease-fire in May 1994. Id. at 112-13. The instability in the Caucuses
seriously jeopardizes any pipeline routes through Azerbaijan and Armenia and
onwards to Turkey's Mediterranean coast. See discussion infra Parts II.C.2, II.C.3.b.
103.
In June 1992 the Azerbaijani Popular Front's Abdufaz Elchibey was elected
president of Azerbaijan. Entessar, supra note 57, at 164. Almost immediately,
Elchibey openly accused Tehran of "neglecting the interests of the Azeris" in Iran and
called for the "unification of northern and southern [Iranian] Azerbaijan." Id. at 165.
Elchibey also called for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic and extolled the virtues
of "Pan-Turkism." Id.
104. Id. at 165. Tehran strongly objected to the exclusion of Islam as
Azerbaijan's official religion in the 1995 draft constitution. Id. Around the same time
massive demonstrations began in Tabriz and other major Azeri cities in Iran. Id. The
demonstrators called for a show of Islamic unity amongst all Azeris and accused
"communist infiltrators" of being responsible for drafting the "anti-Islamic"
constitution. Id.
105.
Id. at 167.
106. Id.
107.
See id.
108. See generally Stuart Parrot, Central Asia: Iran Builds Regional Bridges,
RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 10, 1997, at httpJ/vww.rferl.orgnca/
featuresl997/ll/F.RU.971110161320.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof
TransnationalLaw), for an explanation of Iran's attempt to build friendly relations
with its Central Asian neighbors and convince them to prevent Western corporate and
political powers from gaining a foothold in the region.
109. See generally Vladimir Babak, Kazakzhstan: Big Politics Around Big Oil, in
OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION, supranote 23, at 193-98.
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exploitation of its natural resources.' 1 0 The main factor that affected
Kazakhstan's decision to look to the West was the availability of
investment capital and a strong desire to diversify its financial
sources.11 1 Today, U.S. and European investments in Kazakhstan's
oil and gas sector account for the majority of foreign investment in
12
Caspian energy ventures."
Though Astana has placed high priority on attracting U.S. and
western capital investment for oil and gas production it has also
recognized the importance of establishing practical and viable means
of transporting its oil and gas to the open seas via pipelines." 3 For
this Astana has looked to both Russia and Iran. As for its relations
with Tehran, the geographic and cultural distance between
Kazakhstan and Iran has ironically allowed them to establish a
4
rather cooperative relationship based on economic ties."
Kazakhstan has tempered outright bias with rational policy-making,
recognizing the advantages of establishing cordial and productive
relations with Iran. 115 Since 1992 Iranian and Kazakh officials have
continued to develop trade and cultural links." 6 On the economic
front the two countries have signed a series of oil swap deals whereby
Iran receives Kazakh oil via its Caspian ports and transfers an equal
7
amount of its crude oil from its Persian Gulf terminals."
As for Iranian-Turkmen relations, Ashqabad has displayed a
more willing lean toward warm relations with [Moscow and]

110.
Id. at 194.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113. Id. at 198-205 (providing a general outline of Kazakhstan's pipeline
diplomacy strategy which looks to all countries, including ones that may not be
politically acceptable to the United States, as a possible means of solving its
transportation problems).
114.
See, e.g., infra note 115, for examples of economic cooperation between the
two countries; Part III.B.2, for Kazakhstan's more moderate position (in light of
Tehran's legal arguments) on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
115.
For an example of Kazakhstan's more balanced approach via Iran, see Iran
Calls for Agreement on Division of CaspianReserves, Dow JONES ENERGY SERV., May
9, 1998, 5/9/98 DJTES. Kazakhstan and Iran have agreed that a proposed pipeline
through Iran would be commercially viable. Id.; see also Jean-Michel Cadiot, Caspian
Sea at Center of Iran, Kazakhstan Call for Closer Ties, AGENcE FRANcE-PRESSE, Oct. 6,
1999, 1999 WL 25119409. In 1999 Iran and Kazakhstan engaged in bilateral talks
regarding the legal status of the Caspian. Id. They agreed to foster cooperation in the
development of oil and gas in the Caspian region and reaffirmed a 1996 agreement
providing for oil swaps between the two nations. Id. They called on Turkmenistan to
join them in the construction of an oil pipeline through Iran linking Central Asia to
international markets. Id.; see also infra Parts II.C.2.b, II.C.3.c (analyzing Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan's considerations regarding the option of running pipelines through
Iranian territory).
116.
Entessar, supra note 57, at 160.
117. Id.; see also infra Part II.C.2.b, for a more in-depth explanation of Iran's oil
swap arrangements with the NIS.
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Tehran.1 18 There are several reasons for Ashqabad's close relations
with Tehran. First, there are no major security and political
problems between the two nations. 119 This has allowed both nations
to establish extensive communication and transportation links with
each other. 120 Also, Ashqabad sees Iran as an authoritative regional
power, a means of economic aid, and a way to integrate itself into the
12 1
world economy.
Second, Iran and Turkmenistan have undertaken several major
Caspian hydrocarbon projects, especially with regard to
transportation of natural gas. 122 In fact, Iran may well be considered
Turkmenistan's most important economic partner, accounting for
over fifty-two percent of all Turkmen oil exports in 1997.123 In short,
Turkmenistan looks favorably on the fact that Iran has not only
helped it enter the world gas market but has offered it a means to end
124
its dependence on the Russian transport of Turkmen gas.
On a third and related point the Iranian-Turkmen relationship is
indirectly affected by the strain in Turkmen-Russian relations-the
former was the most neglected and isolated republic within the Soviet
system. 125 More specifically, Turkmenistan realizes the advantages
of cooperating with Iran and establishing a potentially lucrative
market with a gas heavyweight other than Russia. 12 6 Iran represents
an ideal partner and the opportunity to create a regional gas cartel
127
rivaling that of Russia.
Fourth, unlike Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan was
more politically, economically, and culturally isolated from the
West. 2 8 For example, the United States consciously distanced itself

118.
See Country Profile Turkmenistan 1999/2000, Aug. 12, 1999. 1999 W1
25862519.
119.
Entessar, supranote 57, at 158.
120.
Id.
121.
Vladimir Mesamed, Turkmenistan: Oil, Gas, and Caspian Politics, in OIL
AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION, supranote 23, at 211.
122.
See id.; see also infra Part VI.B.3, for analysis of the prospects of an
Iranian-Turkmen Caspian gas cartel.
123.
Mesamed, supranote 121, at 211.
124.
Id.; see also infra notes 264-71 and accompanying text, for a discussion of
Ashqabad's conflicts with Moscow regarding export of its gas via Russian pipelines.
125.
See generally Mesamed, supranote 121.
126.
See Stuart Parrot, Central Asia" Iran's Energy Plans Could Aid Exports,
RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 11, 1997, at httplvvw.rferl.orglncal
features/1997/llI/F.RU.971111141010.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof

TransnationalLaw).
127.
See id.; supraPart VI.B.3.
128. In part this cultural isolation is a result of the continuing significance of
tribal relations in the social and political culture of Turkmenistan. For a study of the
intricacies of tribal culture, see, e.g., Andrei G. Nedvetsky, Turkmenistan, in CENTRAL
ASIA AND THE CAUCUSES AFTER THE SOVIET UNION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
DYNAMICS, supranote 80, at 191-95; KHAZANOV, supra note 6, at 125.
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from Ashqabad for several years due to its alleged violations of
human rights. 129 This has changed in recent years as Washington
has slowly recognized the serious potential for cooperation with
Turkmenistan in diverse spheres, especially with regard to the
regional gas market. 130
Also, the United States hopes that
increasingly warm relations between it and Ashqabad will convince
the latter that cooperation with Iran is harmful to its long-term
interests.131
Last but not least there is the religious dimension, coupled with
Washington's security concerns due to the region's high potential for
instability. 132 The Bush and Clinton administrations expressed
concern regarding what some have termed the "Green Peril"-an
expansion of Islamic fundamentalism propagated by Iran's "desire" to
export its revolutionary zeal to Muslim communities beyond its
borders. 133
The presence of nuclear and military arsenal in
Kazakhstan and other former republics also worried Washington,
especially in light of the prevailing view concerning Iran's sponsoring
134
of international terrorism and arsenal-building.

129.

Mesamed, supra note 121, at 210.

130.

Id.

131.
Id. at 210-11.
132.
See generally Ehteshami, supra note 91, at 87-103.
133.
Given the power vacuum created in Central Asia and the fact that all the
relevant states are Islamic, the United States and Russia were both worried that Iran
would incite religious zeal as a backlash against years of Communist rule in the
countries. See KHAZANOV, supra note 6, at 130. The brand of political Islam
introduced by Khomeini after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was particularly
worrisome for Washington, who had experienced firsthand the wrath of fundamentalist
Shi'ism supported by Tehran in Lebanon via the Hezbollah and other anti-U.S.-Israeli
factions. Breffni O'Rourke, Iran: President Khatami Begins Mideast Tour In Syria,
RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, May 13, 1999 at http://www.rferl.org/ncal
features/1999/05/F.RU.990513132406.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw). Within the Caspian context, some scholars have pointed to Iran's
participation in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), a body founded in 1964
(by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey) to promote regional cooperation, as a possible means
by which Tehran could seek to export its brand of Islamic fundamentalism to the NIS.
Entessar, supra note 57, at 157 (explaining that "after the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, Iran encouraged the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union to join the ECO in
order to create an 'Islamic common market."'). The success of such an ambitious
project, however, remains highly suspect under current conditions. Id.
134.
See, e.g., Steven E. Miller, Proliferation Dangers in the Former Soviet
Union, in THE SUCCESSOR STATES TO THE USSR, supra note 65, at 17-29, for a short
review of the unstable political and military situation in the FSU states and the
potential for nuclear 'leakages" to countries such as Iran. For example, the U.S.
Congress passed the Iranian Non-Proliferation Bill aimed primarily at Russia on
March 14, 2000, whom Washington accuses of supplying Tehran with nuclear arsenal.
Clinton OKs Linking Russia Aid, Iran Sanctions, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000,
at All. The bill authorizes the President to impose economic sanctions on any country
or entity the Administration deems has violated the sanctions. Id.
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The failure of Iran to significantly manipulate religious motives
and tensions in the NIS, however, signaled the extent to which the
NIS governments placed economic and financial interests at the

forefront of their policy agendas, looking instead to non-Russian

secular powers such as Turkey and the United States. 135 Although
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are officially Muslim nations, years of
secular Soviet rule and a continuing emphasis on tribal associations
3 6
have relegated Islam to a secondary if not tertiary role in society.'
Even Shi'ite Azerbaijan kept a distance from Iran's Islamic policies,
with President Aliyev often playing up the danger of Islamic
fundamentalism when dealing with the United States and western
allies.' 3 7 This has angered Iranian authorities who consider Baku's
"anti-religious" policies detrimental to the interests of the two Shi'ite
138
nations.
d. The United States:
Caspian

Washington's Geopolitical Interests in the

Finally, there is the United States. 3 9 For the United States and
its political allies the Caspian region holds the key to the realization

135.
Many commentators have argued, however, that such was not so much a
result of Tebran's failure to play the religious card but of its realization that realpolitik
and long-term balance of power diplomacy was more to its advantage than an outward
appeal to religious fundamentalism. See, e.g., Charles Clover & Guy Dinmore, A
Relationship Based on Shared Enmities, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at 15, for a
strategic analysis of Iranian President Khatami's recent visit to Moscow in order to
discuss military cooperation and the status of the Caspian Sea; see also BBC Online,
Analysis: Iran and Russia Forge Closer Links, Mar. 13, 2001, at http:/Inews.bbc.co.uk/
hilenglishworld/middleeastnewsid_121800011218159.stm (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law) (discussing Khatami's recent visit to
Moscow (dubbed the "Moscow Summit") and the two countries' strategic alliance
despite seemingly conflicting regional and international interests). Nowhere is this
more evident than in Iran's involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, its increasing diplomatic alliance with secular Russia, and its
vital role in attempting to broker peace between warring Islamic and Communist
factions in Tajikistan in favor of the latter. Mark N. Katz, An Emerging Russian.
Iranian Alliance?, 1 CASPIAN CROSSROADS 4, Winter 1996, http://ourvworld.
For a realpolitit" analysis of the
compuserve.com/homepageslusazerb/145.htm.
emerging Russian-Iranian security and arms relationship and its ramifications for U.S.
energy diplomacy in the Caspian, see Andrew Borowiec, Black Gold Fuels Caspian
Competition: Iran-Moscow Link Seen Squeezing U.S Out Of Untapped Riches Race,
WASH. TIES, Mar. 28, 2001, at A15.
136.
But see Zahid I. Munavvoarov, Uzbehistan, in CENTRAL ASIA AND THE
CAUCUSES AFTER THE SOVIET UNION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DYNA.ICS, supra
note 80, at 139-40 (arguing that years of secular Soviet rule have not erased Islam from
the Central Asian memory).
See supranote 133 and accompanying text.
137.
Entessar, supranote 57, at 165.
138.
For a review of the Clinton Administration's official policy stance regarding
139.
the Caspian, see U.S. Interests in the Caspian Sea Region: Hearing Before the S.
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of a long-term strategic agenda. 140 By establishing its presence in the
region, Washington could: 1) weaken the influence of the Persian
Gulf states and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) from monopolizing the production and distribution of world
energy reserves; 2) create a controlled environment ensuring that the
flow of petro-dollars will lead to political and economic reform in
Central Asia and the Caucuses; and 3) undermine the historical
dominance of the Russian Federation and Islamic Republic of Iran
not only in the Caspian Sea region, but in Eurasia and Central
Asia. 141 Washington seeks to achieve these goals by allying itself
with Turkey and ensuring that Ankara gains control of the Caspian
energy market by funneling pipelines through its territory and into
14 2
the Mediterranean Sea.

Foreign Relations Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade, (1997)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Ambassador, Under
Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs), 1997 WL 14152431. In testimony in
front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, Ambassador Eizenstat outlined five
main foreign policy interests in the Caspian region. Id. They include: 1) the
independence and sovereignty of the NIS and their democratic and market
development; 2) promotion of regional conflict resolution; 3) the increase and
diversification of world energy supplies; 4) continued support for U.S. companies; and
5) continued pressure on the Iranian regime to change its unacceptable practices. Id.
Eizenstat stressed that U.S. interests in the region are not concentrated on
establishing a regional sphere of influence, although he did underscore the need to
strengthen strategic alliances with Turkey and even Russia. Id. Eizenstat also
referred to a list of measures aimed at implementing U.S. policy interests in the region.
Id.; see also Sherman W. Garnett, The United States and the Caspian Basin, in THE
NEW CENTRAL ASIA: IN SEARCH OF STABILITY 21-38 (The Trilateral Commission ed.,
2000) (providing an outline of the policy objectives and goals of the United States in the
Caspian region). But see Michael Reynolds, Central Asia is No Game, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Jan. 25, 2000, at 14, for a critique of U.S. involvement in the Caspian and the
perils of potential geopolitical confrontation with Russian interests in the region.
140.
See Transcript of White House Background Briefing on Caspian Sea
Diplomacy, Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline, (White House Background Briefing, Nov. 17, 1999),
1999 WL 22283700.
141.
Id.
142.
Id. Turkey is an extremely important geopolitical and military ally to the
United States. See generally Bulent Aras & George Foster, Turkey: Looking for Light
at the End of the Caspian Pipeline, in OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA
REGION, supra note 23, at 241-43. The symbiotic aspect of the relationship is
particularly important in the Caspian context. See id. The United States, through
Ankara, is able to wield substantial diplomatic and political influence over Azerbaijan
and the other Central Asian republics. Id. at 142. On the other end Ankara is heavily
reliant on the United States to throw its financial and economic support behind plans
to bolster the Turkish economy, primarily with regard to the energy market. Id.
Turkey is expected to become increasingly dependent on fuel imports in the coming
decades. Id. Development of new production and pipeline routes in the Caspian is
extremely important to Ankara because the prospects of becoming increasingly
dependent on Russian and Iranian imports may compromise Turkey's national security
and jeopardize its geostrategic importance as a NATO ally. Id.
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Until the oil rush opened the door to private corporations
flooding the Central Asian and Caucasian energy market the United
States had made relatively modest strides in developing its relations
with the NIS. 143 With the collapse of the Soviet system, however,
American companies rushed to the region, 144 and with the discovery
of oil in Azerbaijan and the latter's overwhelming desire to shake off
Russian influence and woo foreign investment, the United States
officially entered a new era of U.S.-Azeri relations. 145 As a result of
the increasingly strong ties between Washington and Baku the above
power dynamic in the Caspian has led to a de facto balance of power
game between the United States, Turkey, and Azerbaijan on the one
hand, and Russia, Armenia, and Iran on the other, with the latter
three engaged in a loose tripartite alliance aimed at countering
14 6
American and Turkish advances.
B. The Energy Variable: Modifying the Rules of the Game
The discovery of huge oil and gas reserves in the Caspian basin
and the realization that the region could potentially play an
increasingly significant role in world energy politics has drastically
altered the geopolitical landscape of the region. 147 Most importantly,
the "energy variable" has introduced two new concepts into the
geopolitical vernacular of the Caspian: 1) power defined as a direct

143.
U.S. involvement in the region has exploded since 1994-95. Stephen J.
Blank, The United States: Washington's New Frontierin the Transcaspian,in OIL AND
GEoPoLiTcs IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 23, at 251.
144.
See, e.g., U.S. Interests in the Caspian Sea Region: Hearing Before the S.
Foreign Relations Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade, (1997)

[hereinafter Hearings 1] (statement of Charles J. Pitman, Chairman and President,
Amoco Eurasia Petroleum Company), 1997 WL 14152432. This document outlines the
testimony of Charles J. Pitman, Chairman and President of Amoco Eurasia Petroleum
Company, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade. Id. Pitman applauded the Clinton Administration's
attempts to provide a forum in which U.S. corporations could voice their interests and
concerns regarding the potential for direct foreign investment in the Caspian region.

Id.
145. But see Elshan Alekberov, Despite Political Obstacles, Energy Work
ProgressesAround CaspianSea, 96 OIL& GASJ. 24, June 15, 1998, 1998 WL 11540919
(pointing out that the U.S. Congress, under pressure from strong Armenian lobbying
groups in Washington, passed the Freedom Support Act of 1992, Section 907 of which
prohibits direct financial aid to and involvement with Azerbaijan). Given the
increasing warming of relations between Washington and Baku, however, many

senators and private corporate interests have argued that the law unduly burdens
direct U.S. involvement in Azerbaijan's oil and gas sector, thus harming vital American
interests. E.g., HearingsI, supra note 144; see also S. Frederick Starr, Power Failure:
American Policy in the Caspian,NAT'L J., Mar. 1, 1997, 1997 WL 1912115571.

146. Alekberov, supra note 145. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Security between Armenia and Russia signed in Moscow on August 29, 1997,
entails arming Armenia and giving Russia an outpost in the region. Id.
147.
See generally supra Part II.A; infra Part II.B.
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result of ownership and production rights over hydrocarbon resources
in the region, and 2) power defined as an indirect byproduct of such
ownership rights-or the power to control the transportation of such
resources. Note the degree to which the two are inextricably linked.
More specifically, however, without the ability to transport their oil
and gas to the open seas, the NIS' ownership of oil and gas deposits in
and around the Caspian Sea is essentially meaningless.
1. Setting the Stage: Major Political, Economic, and Legal Events in
Caspian Oil and Gas Development
a. Pre-1991 History
In many ways the Caspian oil and gas frenzy of the 1990s is a
rediscovery of sorts. 148 Although the availability of proven reserves
in the region had been recognized for years exploration and
development in the Sea has never reached levels seen in other regions
14 9
such as the Persian Gulf, the North Sea, and Siberia.
Today the stagnant and unrealized potential of the Caspian as
an energy hotbed monopolized by the Soviet Union and Iran has
instead given way to a dynamic new environment wherein the NIS,
hungry for foreign investment and capital, are seeking to free
themselves from the legal and political constraints imposed upon
them during the Soviet era. 150 And the West is more than eager to
play a role.
Historically Iran's involvement in Caspian oil and gas
development has been minimal. 151 Soviet and Russian involvement,
however, as uneven and inefficient as it may have been, did succeed
in building an operative oil and gas industry in both Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan. 152 Baku has always been the center of Soviet oil and gas
policies if not exploration in the Caspian and its proven and potential
reserves are perhaps the richest and most economically accessible in
the region. 15 3 Indeed Azerbaijan is the oldest known oil-producing
region in the world-oil production began in Baku in the nineteenth

148.
See generally Ardabili, supra note 29, for a general overview of oil and gas
development history in the Caspian and the present legal status of the lake; Bulent
Gokay, History of Oil Development in the Caspian Basin, in OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN
THE CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 23, at 3-19; Forsythe, supra note 23, at 9-12;
CYNTHIA CROISSANT, AZERBAIJAN, OIL AND GEOPOLITICS 19-23 (1998).

149.
150.

See infra notes 157, 312 and accompanying text.
See generally CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCUSES AFTER THE SOVIET UNION:

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 80.

151.
Id. at 151.
152.
See generally David Knott, Caspian Sea Activity Picking Up Off Former
Soviet Union Republics, 93 OIL & GAS J., Jan. 30, 1995, 1995 WL 7943059.
153.
Id.
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and early twentieth century. 1 54 The majority of the oil fields were
located in the Aspheron Peninsula, but heavy drilling and usage
prompted the Soviets to start extracting oil in the Azeri "sector" of the
Caspian Sea in the late 1940s. 155 It peaked in the 1940s when it
accounted for 71.6% of the Soviet Union's total production. 156 By the
1960s and 1970s, however, the Soviets had refocused their energy
157
resources to Siberia.
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union Azerbaijan experienced a
"new oil boom.' 5 8 In the late 1980s the rich Chirag, Azeri, and

Guneshli oil deposits located in the Caspian Sea bed off Baku began
to receive great attention from foreign corporations. 15 9 In 1991 the
Azeri government issued a decree soliciting bids for the exploitation
of the three fields. 160 Several American and European firms won the
tenders for the fields. 161 A new era of Caspian energy development
had begun.
b. Post-1991 History
The discovery of huge oil and gas deposits off the Azeri coastline
coupled with the collapse of the Soviet empire sparked a whole new
level of interest from Western and Asian governments and corporate
interests in the Caspian region. 16 2 The political and economic
opening of the Caucuses and Central Asia further allowed these
corporate and political interests to conduct new research and
feasibility studies to determine whether development of the

154.

A.A. Narimanov Ibrahim Palaz, Oil History, Potential Converge in

Azerbaijan, 93 OIL & GAS J., May 22, 1995, 1995 WL 7944165. In fact half of the
world's oil was being produced in Azerbaijan at that time. Id. Drilling of the first oil
well in the Bibi-Eibat area of the Aspheron Peninsula was initiated by a Russian
engineer in 1848. Id. In 1913 Azerbaijan produced eighty-three percent of all oil in the
countries that later belonged to the Soviet Union. Id. During World War II Nazi
military strategy included a march to the Caspian and seizure of Baku's vast oil and
gas reserves. Yagmur Kochumov, Issues of International Law and Politics in the
Caspian in the Context of the Turkmenistan-AzerbaijanDiscussion of Fuel Transport,
at http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepageslusazerb/422.htm Qast visited on Feb. 5,
2000) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw).
155.
Nasib Nassibli, Azerbaijan: Oil and Politics in the Country's Future,in OIL
AND GEOPOIrICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 23, at 102.
156.
Id. at 103.
157.
Id. at 104; see also James Markham, Caspian Oil and Blood, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC, June 1999, at 33.
158.
Nassibli, supra note 155, at 104.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
These firms included Amoco, Unocal, McDermott, and a British
Petroleum-Statoil alliance, who bid for the Azeri field. Id. At the time Pennzoil and
Ramco were negotiating for the Guneshi field, and British Petroleum-Statoil was
bidding for Chirag. Id.
162.
See supra notes 12, 13, and 20 and accompanying text.
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hydrocarbon basins was economically profitable and financially
viable. 163 With the signing of the "Contract of the Century" creating
one of the first major Caspian joint-ventures between an NIS and
Western corporations, the new oil and gas frenzy had officially
begun.

164

The following section will provide a rough outline of the major
events that directly or indirectly affected Caspian Sea oil and gas
165
development in rough chronological order:
"

With the advent of a new era in Caspian politics, the five
littoral states slowly began to address issues regarding
166
management and control of the Caspian Sea.

"

In April 1993 Kazakhstan signed a major deal with Chevron
worth $20 billion over forty years to develop the huge Tengiz
oil-field on the north-eastern shore of the Caspian. 167 Russia
did not raise any concerns over the signing of that agreement,
quite possibly because the field was not located miles offshore
and because the Russian government was already under
negotiations with the Kazakhs to ensure that the oil from the
field would ultimately be exported via Russian pipelines to

163.
See generally Peuch, supra note 12.
164.
The "Contract of the Century" refers to the creation of the Azerbaijan
International Oil Consortium, or AIOC,in 1994. Nassibli, supra note 155, at 108; see
also infra note 171.
165.
The list will also deal with aspects of U.S. sanctions against Iran and will
explore the legal ramifications of the sanctions policy within a Caspian context in
subsequent sections. See infra Part II.B.3.
166.
As early as 1992 the five littoral states proposed to establish a joint
company or 'Ioc"
called the Caspian Economic Community (CEC) in order to
coordinate energy exploration and distribution projects in the Caspian Sea. Caspian
States are FormingJoint E&P Company, 38 APS REV. OIL MARKET TRENDS, March 2,
1992, 1992 WL 2691899. The same year saw Iran hosting a convention of the
Organization for Cooperation Among Caspian States which envisaged the development
of relations between neighbors on shipping links, joint use of the Caspian's resources,
and adoption of measures promoting ecological security. Mesamed, supra note 121, at
9. Iran was interested in establishing such multilateral cooperation primarily for
geopolitical reasons. Id.
167.
See UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CASPIAN SEA
REGION, supra note 41. The TengizChevroil (TCO) consortium between Chevron and
Kazakhstan was the first significant East-West Caspian oil consortium. See Forsythe,
supra note 23, at 37-39. It went into operation in April 1993. Id. at 37. At $20 billion
it is one of the largest single investments by a U.S. firm in the former Soviet Union.
Id. Chevron began negotiating the deal in 1990 before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Id. The Tengiz oil field is the largest oil discovery since the 1970s, with proven oil
reserves of six to nine billion barrels. Id.
According to the provisions of the
TengizChevroil joint venture the field is to be developed over a forty-year period. Id.
In April 1996 Mobil announced that it would purchase a twenty-five percent share of
TengizChevroil. Id. at 38.
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the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.1 68 As a result the
Caspian Pipeline consortium (CPC) was created. 169 The CPC
involves the governments of Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Oman, and proposes to carry oil from the
Tengiz field to
170
the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.
The major turning point in Caspian oil and gas development
during the post-Soviet era occurred on September 20, 1994,
when the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) signed
an $8 billion, thirty-year contract with several foreign
companies to create the Azerbaijan International Oil
Consortium (AIOC) in a move to develop the Azeri, Chirag,
and Guneshli fields, located seventy to eighty miles off
171
Azerbaijan's coastline.

168. Forsythe, supra note 23, at 38. On March 17, 1993, the Russian
government signed an agreement with Chevron and Kazakhstan to allow
TengizChevroil to export 65,000 barrels per day, with a future increase of up to 130,000
barrels per day. Id. at 38. Up to early 1996, however, Russia had not even allowed
TengizChevroil to consistently export the 65,000 barrels per day pursuant to the
agreement. Id.; see also infra Part II.C.2.a.
169.
Meeting Expected on Caspian Rights, 74 PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Apr. 30
1996, 1996 WL 8705710 (volume and number unavailable online); see also infra Part
II.C, for an analysis of the MERs including the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).
The CPC was formed by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Oman in 1992. Forsythe, supra note
23, at 49. The aim of the consortium was to build a pipeline that would transport oil
from the Caspian region to the Black Sea. Id. From 1992 to late 1994 the CPC tried to
persuade Chevron to provide most of the financing for a twenty-five percent nondecision-making equity share. Id. The company was expected to assume the risk of
throughput guarantees regardless of whether it shipped the oil. Id. Chevron refused
the terms and the progress stalled due to lack of adequate financing. Id. Meanwhile
the members put forth several different restructuring measures, all of which failed. Id.
at 50. Finally on April 27 of that year, the following restructuring was settled upon:
Russia: 24.0%; Kazakhstan: 19.0%; Oman: 7.0%; Chevron: 15.03; LUKoil (Russia):
12.5%; Mobil: 7.5%; Rosneft (Russia): 7.5%S; Agip SpA (Italy): 2.0%; British Gas (UK):
2.0%; Oryx (United States): 1.75%; Munaigaz (Kazakhstan): 1.75%. Id. at 51.
170.
Id.
171.
Forsythe, supra note 23, at 39. In 1991 a number of foreign companies,
including Amoco, British Petroleum, and Unocal began negotiating with Azerbaijan to
develop the Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli fields. Id.; supra notes 160.61 and
accompanying text. In October 1993 the companies signed a new development protocol
for the fields. Forsythe, supra note 23, at 39. In April 1994 State Oil Company of
Azerbaijan (SOCAR) officially informed the partner consortium companies that the
Russian oil company LUKoil had purchased a ten percent stake in the consortium. Id.
After several more months of bargaining, the final project deal, worth an estimated $8
billion in capital investments was signed on September 20, 1994. Shares in the
consortium, according to the agreement at the time of signing, included: SOCAR:
20.0%; British Petroleum (UK): 17.13,o; Amoco: 17.01%3a; LUKoil (Russia): 10.0%;
Pennzoi 9.82%; Unocal: 9.52%; Statoil (Norway): 8.5694; McDermott: 2.45%; Ramco
(Scotland): 2.08%; Delta-Nimir (Saudi Arabia): 1.68%; and TPAO (Turkey): 1.75%a.
Id. at 39-40. In December 1994 the consortium established the AIOC to oversee the
project's day-to-day operations. Id. at 41. The USEIA estimates that total reserves in
these three fields are three to five billion barrels. See UNITED STATES ENERGY
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In a strategic move the government of Iran quickly decided to
get its foot in the door by signing on for a five percent share of
the AIOC development project. 172 On the same day as the
signing of the accord Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman
Grigori Karasin officially disputed the right of any Caspian
173
nation to make unilateral developments in the region.
Russia couched its diplomatic concern on legal grounds,
contending that all mineral resources of the Caspian outside
of a narrow twelve-mile limit should be the joint property of
all littoral states. 174 Until that time Russia had voiced little
concern regarding offshore oil development in the Caspian. 175
In early 1995 there were signs from U.S. officials that Iran's
participation in the AIOC would cause serious problems for
the consortium and present the possibility that the United
States would block multilateral financing of the project. 176 In
late February a U.S. State Department official voiced his
concern over Iran's proposed participation by explaining that
while U.S. law does not bar U.S. firms from doing business in
Iran it places limits on certain transactions, particularly
177
those that might grant military benefits for Iran.
*

In March 1995 a $1 billion oil and gas field development
between Conoco and Iran for its South Pars field in the
Persian Gulf came under fire from Senator Alfonse D'Amato
of New York, who promptly called for an outright ban on
178
foreign investment and trade with Iran's oil and gas sector.
Baku began to feel the pressure. 179 Several days later the

INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 41.

A SOCAR

representative voiced the importance of the signing by claiming that the prospects for
energy development in Azerbaijan will be centered on the development of these three
fields for the next twenty to thirty years. John Roberts, Russia-Iran: Regional
Neighbors Find Caspian a Stormy Sea, INTER PRESS SERV., May 18, 1995, 1995 WL
2261158.
172.
Natalia Borisova, U.S. Members of Caspian Consortium Get News of
Unwelcome Guest-Iran,44 OIL DAILY, Nov. 15, 1994, 1994 WL 12782175.
173.
Id.; see also infra note 404 and accompanying text.
174.
Borisova, supra note 172.
175.
Caspian Sea Legal Move, EAST EUR. MARKETS, Oct. 28, 1994, 1994 WL
11290113; see also infra Part III.B.4, for an analysis of the Russian legal strategy and
perspective regarding ownership rights in the Caspian.
176.
Margaret McQuaile, U.S. Official Pans Iran Pipeline Route: But Caspian
Role Stance Finessed, 73 PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS 39, Feb. 27, 1995, 1995 WL 8133683.
177.
Id.
178.
The U.S. Government is TargetingPetroleum Projects in its Efforts to Keep
Iran Ostracized in the World Community, 93 OIL & GAS J. 11, Mar. 13, 1995, 1995 WL
7943567.
179.
Iran countered by threatening to block early oil swaps from Azerbaijan to
its northern refineries in exchange for crude oil from its Persian Gulf terminals, a way
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United States choked off Iran's Caspian energy plan on two
fronts: the AIOC rejected Iran's proposed bid to enter the
consortium1 80 and President Clinton announced a ban to
prevent U.S. firms from contracting to produce oil in Iran-a
move that forced Conoco to pull out of the South Pars
project.18 1 Iran called the move illegal and promptly joined
Russia in its stance that AIOC's unilateral exploitation of
Caspian oil and gas was illegal under the current legal regime
of the Caspian Sea.18 2
On May 18, 1995, Russian President Boris Yeltsin spoke out
on the issue of the legal regime of the Caspian by asserting
that the Sea is a special inner sea and could not be divided. 183
Yeltsin explicitly referred to oil and gas interests as falling
within the scope of the common ownership1i 4 As Azeri and
Kazakh insistence on developing their mutual sectors of the
Caspian Sea free from Russian involvement increased, the
Iranian government submitted a proposal for an international
convention to govern the Sea.1 8 5 The convention called for
collective sharing of the Caspian's resources ruling out any de
186
jure partition.
"

On October 30, 1995, Iran and Russia signed a joint
declaration opposing any unilateral action to develop the
Caspian's resources despite LUKoil's ten percent stake in the

of ensuring early flow of oil to international markets without having to address the
more serious concerns regarding pipeline construction. Margaret McQuaile, Iron on
Caspian: If No Equity, No Swaps, 73 PLATr'S OILGRAM NEWS 72, Apr. 13, 1995, 1995
WL 8134461; see also infra Part I.C.2.b, for an analysis of the oil swap arrangement.
180. James Meek, Oil Fuels Debateon Whether Sea is Ocean or Lake, GUARDIAN,
May 31, 1995, at 10.
181. Id.; see also infra notes 290-93 and accompanying text.
182. James M. Dorsey, Sea of Troubles: Consortium Sees Break in Disputes
Clouding Caspian Oil Pipeline, WALL ST. J. EUR., Apr. 26, 1995, at 1. Iranian Deputy
Foreign Minister Abbas Maliki was quoted by reporters as saying that the treaties
singed by Iran and the Soviet Union in 1921 and 1940 were still in effect and indicated
that Iran was now thinking of accepting Moscow's view that the water and underwater
resources of the Caspian should be considered the common property of all the littoral
states. Id.; see also infra Part Im.B.5, for Iran's use of the "legal veto" strategy.
183. Daniel Sneider, US, Russia Vie for Rich Oil Fields in Caspian Sea, CHRIST.
SC. MON., June 8, 1995, at 6.
184. Id.; see also infra Parts m, V-.2, for an analysis of the Russian legal
position and the condominium theory of ownership.
185. Andrei Ivanov, Iran Calls for Caspian Convention, OIL & GAS J., May 28,
1995, 1995 WL 8423121 (volume and number unavailable online).
186. A top Iranian official, however, divulged the real reasons behind Iran's
recent partnership with Russia and a sudden concern for the fragile Caspian ecosystem by explaining that "Iran had no reason to facilitate the projects of countries
which do not border the Caspian, especially when itself is excluded." Id.
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AIOC.18 7 Several months later, in an international conference

on oil and gas development, President Heydar Aliyev of
Azerbaijan rebutted earlier Russian assertions and made it
clear that Azerbaijan regarded the area being developed by
the AIOC as part of an Azeri "sector" of the Caspian. 188
"

Meanwhile Iran sought out new ways to frustrate U.S. policy
and enter the Caspian oil and gas game. In several
international conferences hosted by Iran the National Iranian
Oil Company (NIOC) officially declared its desire to
participate in the Caspian energy scene by playing a role in
the transportation or export sector.' 8 9 Azerbaijan, who
continued to feel uncomfortable totally excluding Iran from
joint-venture projects in its claimed sector began the difficult
task of finding an all-European consortium for the NIOC to
work with in order to appease its southern neighbor. 190 In
early June 1996 Iran and SOCAR signed the Shah Deniz
contract worth $4 billion in which a privately-run Iranian
company has a ten percent stake. 19 1 The conciliatory measure
forced Iran to again distance itself from the Moscow's legal
position regarding common ownership of the Sea's
192
resources.

"

On October 9, 1995, the AIOC officially decided to support a
two-pipeline system for transport of its "early oil. '' 193 Azeri
officials caved into Russian demands that Azeri oil take the
"northern route" to Novorossiysk but continued to focus on a

187.

Russia, Iran Call for Cooperation Over Caspian Oil, DOW JONES INTL.

NEWS, Oct. 30, 1995, 10/30/95 DJINS. The Russian company LUKoil signed a joint
venture contract with SOCAR to develop several gas fields off the Azeri coastline. Id.
LUKoil is officially a member of the AIOC Consortium. Id.; see also supra note 171 and
accompanying text.
188.
Margaret McQuaile, Caspian Status at Center of Baku Talks, 73 PLATr'S
OILGRAM NEWS 100, May 24, 1995, 1995 WL 8135204.
189.
Iran has identified some forty prospective structures in the southern
Caspian and is drilling a well at Merdat from a rig leased from Azerbaijan. Roger
Robinson, Iran Puts Up Caspian Tenders, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 12, 1996, 1996 WL
8523488 (volume and number unavailable online).
190.
Iran Looks to Deepen Interest in Azeri Projects, 74 PLATr's OILRAM NEWS,
June 25, 1996, 1996 WL 8706349; see also Caspian Sea Attractive But Controversial,
PETROLEUM ECON., Jan. 1, 1996, 1996 WL 9803387 (volume and number unavailable
online).
191.
Iran Looks to Deepen Interests in Azeri Projects,supra note 190.
192.
Azeris Brush Off Russian ProposalOn Caspian Split, 74 PLATI"S OILGRAM
NEWS 161, Aug. 20, 1996, 1996 WL 8707200.
193.
Laurent Ruseckas, Which Way Will Azerbaijan's Oil Flow? The Pipeline
Debate Continues, 1 CASPIAN CROSSROADS 3, Summer-Fall 1995, at http://ourworld.
compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/136.htm (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law); see infra Part II.C.2, II.3.a-b, for in-depth analysis of the
"northern," "western," and "early oil" pipeline routes.
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more desirable plan drawn up by Turkish and American
policy architects that the MER pipeline ultimately go from
Baku to Ceyhan, a Turkish Mediterranean port. 194 The BakuSupsa line to the Georgian Black Sea coast was thus chosen
195
as the second "early oil" route.
In March 1996 U.S. Senate Banking Committee head Senator
Alfonse D'Amato called on President Bill Clinton and UN
Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali to bring a halt to a
UN-backed feasibility study for a possible international gas
pipeline that would supply Europe and East Asia via Iran. 196
In August 1996 President Clinton signed the Iran-Libya
The bill threatened
Sanctions Act (ILSA) into law. 197
sanctions against any company, domestic or foreign, which
invests more than $20 million annually in Iran's oil and gas
98
sectors.'
*

In April 1996 Boris Yeltsin and Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbayev signed a declaration reinforcing the concept of
multilateral action by the littoral states regarding
The declaration also
development of offshore fields. 199
included the official signing of a new agreement for the CPC
2 00
which would cost an estimated $1.5 billion.

*

On November 13, 1996, Russia, Iran, and Turkmenistan
agreed to cooperate on splitting the oil resources of the
Caspian Sea. 201 A signed memorandum indicated the three
states' willingness to found a joint company to develop the
mineral resources of the Sea on an equal basis.202 Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan did not sign the memorandum. 20 3 In the
meeting Russia also unveiled a new plan on the regime of the

Ruseckas, supra note 193; see also infra Parts II.C.3.a-b. for an analysis of
194.
the Baku-Ceyhan MER.
195.
Ruseckas, supranote 193.
Iran-Europe-Asia-US/Politics: Iran Gas Under New US Fire, Ir. GAS
196.
REP., Mar. 15, 1996, 1996 WL 8731372.
See infra Part I.B.3 (analyzing the ILSA).
197.
198.
See id.
199.
Babak, supra note 109, at 192. The declaration stated that "the new legal
status of the Caspian must be agreed through consensus between the pre-Caspian
states. No one has the right to decide the Caspian's status unilaterally . . . .
Kazakhstan and Russia agree... on the following principles: the Caspian states ...
will respect the UN decision requiring them to respect sovereignty, territorial integrity,

political independence and the equal sovereignty, without the use of force or
threatening the use of force." Id.
200.
Id.
201.
Hiro, supra note 55.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.

718

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:681

Caspian whereby the littoral states would retain a forty-five
mile economic zone beyond which all the resources of the Sea
would be developed under joint ownership. 20 4 Under the plan

most Kazakh and Turkmen offshore oil fields would lie within
the forty-five mile zone, while the oil-rich Azeri fields would
not.20 5 The Russians also proposed the creation of join-stock
companies in order to develop the Sea's common waters and
suggested the development of a "double-tender system" giving
the five nations first claim in any future oil and gas
contracts. 20 6 This proposal represented the largest Russian
concession made to date on the legal status of the Caspian.
"

On December 6, 1996, the final CPC agreement was signed in
Moscow.

207

*

In August 1997 President Yeltsin annulled the most recent
offshore deal with Azerbaijan over the Kaipaz field on the
basis that the median line dividing the Caspian placed the
field within Turkmenistan's sector; Ashqabad also questioned
the legal right of Azerbaijan to develop the Azeri and Chirag
208
deposits.

*

In October 1997 France's Total agreed to undertake a $2
billion development of the giant South Pars oil field off Iran's

204.
Jane Upperton, Arif Usseinov, & Margaret McQuaile, Two Key Caspian
States Reject Plan to Govern Sea, 74 PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS 223, Nov. 15, 1996, 1996
WL 13193868. This proposal was dubbed the "doughnut proposal." See infra Parts
III.B.4, V.B.2, for specific legal models similar to the Russian "doughnut proposal" and
an analysis of the proposal itself.
205.
Paul Globe, Russia: Analysis From Washington-The CaspianBetween Sea
and Lake, Nov. 18, 1996, at http:/www.nsu.nsk.su/filf/icons/english/econ/caspian.htm
(copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw).
206.
Patrick Crow, Competition for the Caspian, 94 OIL & GAS J. 49, Dec. 2,
1996, 1996 WL 8288738.
207.
Caspian Consortium Gets Final Accord for Oil Pipeline to be Ready Early
'99, 47 APS REV. OIL MARKET TRENDS 22, Dec. 2, 1996, 1996 WL 8937338. The
agreement set the CPC's ownership structure and allowed the ten members to buy fifty
percent of the consortium. Id. The ten companies involved in the planning purchase of
fifty percent in the CPC included Chevron and Arco which accounted for the largest
stakes in the consortium. Id.; see also supra note 169 and accompanying text (outlining
the original ownership structure of the CPC).
208.
Mesamed, supra note 121, at 214. President Niyazov of Turkmenistan
declared that "everyone must respect this median line" which has been established by
Azerbaijani, Kazakh, and Russian experts. Id. A maritime expert at the Foreign
Ministry's Legal Department was not aware of the Russian-Azeri deal until after the
signing. Id. The Minister reacted furiously when he discovered the details of the deal
and promptly declared any Russian participation in the contract "illegal." Id. For
details on the long-running dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding
the Kaipaz-Serdar fields, see infra notes 523-27 and accompanying text.
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Persian Gulf coast. 20 9

The deal raised concerns that the

210
contract would violate the ILSA.

"

In October 1997 the United States questioned statements
made by Turkmenistan about a proposal to export gas to
Turkey via a pipeline going across northern Iran. 21 1 The
proposed agreement was said to be $1.6 billion and would run
3,200 km. 212 In November 1997 U.S. Undersecretary of State
Stuart Eizenstat noted that the Turkey deal to import gas
from Turkmenistan through Iran would not violate the ILSA
but rejected the notion that pipelines running through Iran
were acceptable to the U.S. administration. 2 3 The project
was Iran's biggest international energy project since the 1979
revolution and would run 3,200 km on the eastern side of the
2 14
Caspian Sea.

o

On November 8, 1997, the Chirag field produced its first oil;
Iran protested in a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi
215
Annan.

"

In late 1997 Iran and Turkmenistan unveiled a gas swap
program that would start the export of Turkmen gas directly
to Iran by December via a new 200 km pipeline from its
Korpedzhe gas field to Kurt-Kui in northeast Iran. 2 10 The

209.
Total's Iran Deal Sparks Row with U.S., 95 OIL & GAS J. 40, Oct. 6, 1997,
1997 WL 9575713.

210.

Id. Earlier, Total took over the Sirri field after Conoco was forced to pull

out pursuant to the Executive Order signed by President Clinton barring U.S.

investment in Iran's oil and gas sector. Id.
211.
Sonia Winter, Turkmenistan: U.S. Questions Gas Pipeline Via Iran, RADIO
FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 16, 1997, at http://vw.rferl.orglnca/featurezJ1997/

10/F.RU.971016135301html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof Transnational
Law).
212.
Id.
213.
Patrick Crow, Caspian Questions (US May Lose Out on Caspian Sea
Offshore Oil), 95 OIL & GAS J. 44, Nov. 3, 1997, 1997 WL 9576042.
214.
Id.; see also infra note 458-62 (analyzing the Iran-Turkmenistan.Turkey
gas pipeline project).
215.
Iran ProtestsAzerbaijan's UnilateralExploitation of Caspian Sea, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 13, 1997, 1997 WL 13433398. Iran sent a protest letter to UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan arguing that Azerbaijan's "claim of sovereignty and
unilateral exploitation of the resources is contrary to the agreements reached between
bordering countries and the legal status for the Caspian .... [Iran] express[es] [its]
deep objection to the move by the government of Azerbaijan [and] .. . deem[s] it in
contradiction of a friendship pact between Iran and the former Soviet Union in 1921
and a commercial agreement in 1940. The government of Iran reserves the right to
any action in the future to protect its inalienable rights to the sea." Id.
216.
Stuart Parrot, Iran: New Gas Pipeline Boosts Regional Ambitions, RADIO
FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Jan. 6. 1998, at http//lNwNw.rferl.org/ncalfeatureI
1998101/F.RU.980106134821.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
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project would be largely funded by Iran and would cost an
estimated $190 million. 217 The gas swap began in January
1998 and represented the first stage in the ambitious trans218
Iranian 3,200 km pipeline to Turkey.

* U.S. officials unveiled the first phases of a Turkmen TransCaspian Pipeline (TCP) plan. 219 The plan, along with the
proposed Baku-Ceyhan MER, was put at the top of the U.S.
policy agenda for the region. 220 Both Iran and Russia lodged
official protests against such a project based primarily on
2 21
environmental grounds.
"

In July 1998 Russia and Azerbaijan signed a protocol on the
legal status of the Caspian. 222 In it Russia displayed a more
willing acceptance of sectoral division using the median line
although it continued to insist that the Caspian's waters
223
should be owned in common.

*

In April 1998 the $2.8 billion deal between Turkmenistan and
224
the United States for the TCP was signed in Washington.

TransnationalLaw). For more in-depth analysis of Iran's oil and gas swap initiatives,
see infra Part II.C.2.b.
217.
Id.
218.
Id.; see also supranotes 211-14; infra notes 458-62.
219.
Margaret McQuaile, Turkmen Pipeline US' Ramsay: Only 2 Years Needed
for Construction, 75 PLAIT'S OILGRAM NEWS 225, Nov. 19, 1997, 1997 WL 8881892; see
also Pipeline Under the Caspian to Transport Turkmen Gas Is Continuing to Gain
Favor, 75 PLAIT'S OILGRAM NEWS 225, Nov. 19, 1997, 1997 WL 8112522; David B.
Ottaway & Dan Morgan, U.S. Backs Non-Iranian, 'Eurasian' Corridor West for
Caspian Sea Oil, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1997, at A37; infra Part II.C.3.b, for analysis of
the TCP as a possible option for a trans-Caspian "western route."
220.
The timing of the announcement is largely seen as a reaction against the
threat of Iran and Turkmenistan swapping gas via an Iranian pipeline that would
eventually link both nations' gas resources to Turkey. Id.
221.
Russia and Iran are Against the Construction of Trans-CaspianPipelines,
RuSsIAN ECON. NEWS, Dec. 10, 1999, 1999 WL 5893465; see also infra Part VI.C.3.c,
for the possibility of Iran employing an environmental strategy to force multilateral
cooperation on Caspian oil and gas issues.
222.
Russia Signs Caspian Pact with Kazakhstan, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 7,
1998, at 2.
223.
See id. The agreement only mentions division of the "seabed." Id.; see also
infra Part III.B.4 (analyzing the possible veto effects of the Russian "doughnut
proposal").
224.
Iran Voices Opposition to Turkmen-US. Oil Deal, DEUTCHE PRESSEAGENTUR, Apr. 26, 1998, 4/26/98 DCHPA. The pipeline would be 1,200 km long and
would travel across the length of the Caspian and alongside the seabed. Id. Amoco,
Bechtel, and General Electric comprised the international joint-venture. Id. Iran
quickly denounced the agreement cicing environmental and legal concerns as the
primary factors for its official stance. Id.
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o

In May 1998 the Clinton Administration decided not to
2 25
impose sanctions on the South Pars Total deal.

"

Russia changed its attitude on sectoral division in the
Caspian by reaching an agreement to divide the northern part
of the seabed between itself and Kazakhstan. 22 6 In July of
1998 Yeltsin and Nazarbayev signed the landmark accord in
Moscow dividing the northern sector of the oil-rich Caspian
among themselves. 22 7 Moscow, however, officially declared
that the waters were still joined in common. 228 Iran rejected
2 29
the legal legitimacy of the bilateral deal.

"

Feeling isolated by the recent political and legal maneuvering
of Moscow Iran also appeared to shift to a bilateral approach
to solving legal disputes in the Caspian. 23 0 For the first time
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi declared that both the

225. Gerald Karey, Iran Sanctions Deal Won't Better Chances for US Firms, 76
PLATr'S OILGRAM NEWS 96, May 20, 1998, 1998 WL 9828114; see also U.S. Waives
Sanctions on South Pars Field, 96 OIL & GAS J. 21, May 25, 1998, 1998 WL 11540391.
Stuart E. Eizenstat, a key figure in U.S. sanctions policy validated the sanctions
against Iran by arguing that any trans-Iranian pipeline route would frustrate global
energy policies aimed at: 1) preventing any Caspian country from monopolizing
regional hydrocarbon transportation, 2) ensuring that Caspian production diversifies
worldwide energy supplies, and 3) avoiding shipping congestion in the Bosphorus
Straits through Istanbul. Sanctions Decisions on South Pars Imminent, OIL & GAS J.,
Apr. 13, 1998, 1998 WL 27193575 (volume and number unavailable online). Eizenstat
remarked that "an Iranian route for Caspian oil 'makes no sense' because it would add
volumes having to pass through the Strait of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and
m
Arabian Sea and thus wouldn't diversify worldwide energy sources.
" Id. He also
argued against a pipeline route through Russia ending at the Black Sea ports of
Georgia or Russia by asserting that increased tanker traffic at the Bosphorus Straits
would invite a cataclysmic environmental disaster. Id.; see also Sonia Winter, Russia:
U.S. Leans Away from Sanctions on Iran Deals, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY,

May 15, 1998, at http://www.rferl.orgncafeaturesl1998l05F.RU.980515121831.html
(copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw).
226. Jane Upperton, Russia, Kazakh stan Said in Agreement on CaspianSea, 76
PLATT'S OILGRAMf NEWS 69, Apr. 13, 1998, 1998 WL 9827600.

227. Ron Synovitz, Russia/Kazahstan:
Yeltsin, Nazarbayeu Inh Accord on
Caspian Oil Rights, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, July 6, 1998, at http'J/vv.refr.
org/ncalfeatures/1998107/F.RU.980706133055.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal
of TransnationalLaw).
228. Id.
229. Iran Against Russian-Kazakh Agreement on Caspian Sea Legal Status,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, July 7, 1998, 7/7/98 DCHPA; see also infra Parts Ifl.B.5,

VI.C, for a description and criticism of Iran's "legal veto" strategy, respectively.
230. Nina Kamran, Iran Stand to Badly Loose [sic] in Caspian Sea by Russia.
Kazakhstan Deal, IRAN PRESS SERV., July 8, 1998, at http:J/vvw.iran.press.
service.comlarticles/caspian.htm (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw) (criticizing Tehran's "blindfold reliance" on support from Moscow
with regards to a legal stance on the Caspian); see also Turkmenistan, Iran To Set Up
Caspian Status Working Group, DOW JONES ENERGY SERV., Aug. 13, 1998, 10114J97
DJTES.
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seabed and the waters should be divided equally among all
2 31
littoral states.
Dutch Shell and British Lasmo signed a $19.8 billion deal
with NIOC to explore the Caspian.2 32 The deal appeared to
pass the legal obstacles imposed by the ILSA. 233 Azerbaijan

protested claiming 23that the exploration is taking place in its
"sector" of the Sea.

4

*

Russia enters the gas pipeline race by aggressively pursuing
the so-called Blue Stream Project which will carry Turkmen
235
gas under the Black Sea and into Turkey.

*

The TCP project receives a significant boost in August 1999

*

Iran awards Alborz 1, 2, 3 and 4 fields in the Caspian to
237
Towse's Petro Iran Company.

*

Azerbaijan enters the gas race by announcing that it has
23 8

236
when Dutch Shell buys a fifty percent share of the project.

found new gas resources in the Shah-Deniz field.

231.
By an "equal and fair division" Iran means that each littoral state should
have a twenty percent share of the seabed and its waters. Iran's ForeignMinister Calls
for Caspian Convention, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Aug. 14, 1998, 8/14/98 DJINS.
232.
Iran Signs Deal With Two European Companies Over Caspian Oil,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Dec. 14, 1998, 12/14/98 DCHPA.

233.
Id.
234.
Iran Rejects Azerbaijan's Protest Over Oil Contract, DEUTSCHE PRESSEAGENTUR, Dec. 16, 1998, 12/16/98 DCHPA; see also Michael Lelyveld, Azerbaijan/Iran:
Oil Feud Flares in Tough Economic Times, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Dec.
21, 1998, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/12/F.RU.981221163315.html (copy
on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw). A press release from the
Azeri Foreign Ministry read: "Azerbaijan believes that the unilateral, unjustified act
by Iran undermines positive tendencies noted in talks over the Caspian's status and
could negatively affect the spirit of cooperation in the region." Iran to Explore Disputed
Caspian Area, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 21, 1998, 1998 WL 11542736 (volume and number
unavailable online). Iran's Foreign Ministry responded by stating that the charge had
no legal basis. Id.
235.
The consortium is represented by Gazprom and Italian ENI. Russia Steps
Up Pressurein Caspian,DOW JONES INT. NEWS, Oct. 16, 1998, 1998 WL 11349228. For
more in-depth analysis of the Russian Blue Stream Project as a competitor to the TCP,
see infra Part II.C.3.b.
236.
Hugh Pope, Shell, Turkmenistan Sign Alliance for Pipeline Project, WALL
ST. J. EUR., Aug. 9, 1999, at 4. Shell, however, says that despite the move it will
continue to be involved in feasibility studies for a trans-Iranian gas route. Id.
237.
Sarah Lloyd, IranAssigns Rights to Disputed Caspian Sea Block to Local
Company, 77 PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS 171, Sept. 7, 1999, 1999 WL 12180770.
238.
Hugh Pope, Azerbaijan, After Reports of Gas Find, Says it Plans to be 'a
Major Exporter,'WALL ST. J., June 23, 1999, at A23.
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"

After years of doubt and hesitation regarding the economic
viability of the Baku-Ceyhan MER, BP-Amoco, lead operator
23 9
of the AOC, decides to endorse the project.

o

On November 18, 1999, three important documents were
signed outlining the prospects for exporting Caspian oil and
gas through the Eurasian corridor. 240
The Istanbul
Declaration specifies: 1) backing for the Baku-Ceyhan MER;
2) a memorandum of mutual understanding which specifies
the development of Azeri gas projects and backing for the
export of Azeri gas to Turkish and international markets; 241

and 3) an intergovernmental declaration on the TCP between
242
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.

o

On November 14th despite the threat of sanctions, Shell
signed an agreement with the NIOC to redevelop the Soroosh

239.
Michael Lelyveld, Azerbaijan: Caspian Sea Pipeline Gets Major Backing,
RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 20, 1999, at httpJ/www.rferl.orglnca/
features/1999/10/F.RU.991020134216.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2001) (copy on file
with Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw). For more than a year BP Amoco
representatives stood firm in the face of U.S. government pressure supporting the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, arguing that the AIOC volumes would not justify building a
line to carry one million barrels of oil per day. Id. Instead BP Amoco had argued that
plans to expand the existing Baku-Supsa pipeline (carrying "early oil") would be more
economically feasible. Robert Perkins, Cathy Landry & Arif Useinov, BPAmoco Says it
Backs Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline, 77 PLATr's OILGRAM NEWS 202, Oct. 20, 1999, 1999 WL
12181468.
240.
Documents on Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Nov. 19,
1999, 1999 WL 26465435. The three agreements included the following proposals: 1)
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey will sign an agreement offering promises of financial
support plus a legal framework for the project; 2) the same three countries and
Turkmenistan will sign an agreement guaranteeing transport of gas from
Turkmenistan to Turkey-, and 3) Turkey will agree to cover cost overruns associated
with the construction of the pipeline inside its borders. Id.; see also Nancy Mathis &
David Ivanovich, With Agreements in Sight, Clinton Cheers Caspian Pipelines, HOUS.
CHRON., Nov. 17, 1999, at 1. Russia immediately voiced its concern that U.S. support
for the agreements took advantage of Russia's weakened state in an attempt to control
the region's oil reserves. Id. For a general explanation of Iranian criticism of the
Baku-Ceyhan agreements, see Iran Says U.S.-Azeri Oil Accord is Illegal, DEUTCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, May 1, 1999, 511199 DCHPA; Iran Says Caspian Sea Oil Contracts
Lack Legitimacy, Dow JONES ENERGY SERV., May 1. 1999, 511/99 DJTES. Analysts
were also quick to point out that the agreements failed to address many significant
issues making the plan economically and legally viable. See, e.g., Margaret McQuaile,
For Baku.Ceyhan Line, Istanbul Ceremony Just a Start, 77 PLATr'S OILGRA. NEWS
228, Nov. 29, 1999, 1999 WL 12182113. These include the lack of transit agreements,
ownership structures, and specific plans regarding MER routes. Id.
241.
Documents on Baku-Cehyan Pipeline, supra note 240. This document was
signed between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Id.
242.
Id. The TCP Declaration is a framework document that vill provide the
basis for negotiating the actual legal package for the gas pipeline. See generally
Mathis & Ivanovich, supra note 240.
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and Norooz oil43fields in the Persian Gulf worth an estimated
2
$800 million.
*

In late 1999 Azerbaijan continued to change the dynamics of
the regional gas market race by claiming it had discovered
huge gas deposits in the offshore Aspheron field, perhaps five
times greater than Shah Deniz field found earlier that
244
year.

*

In late December 1999 Iran threatened Turkey with gas
penalties under a 1996 agreement to purchase but decided to
delay. 245

The availability of Iranian capacity to sell the

agreed quantities surprised all, leading to conjecture that the
move was a political counter-attack against competing MERs
246
seeking to dominate the lucrative Turkish gas market.

*

Bickering among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkmenistan
delays construction of the TCP and Baku-Ceyhan lines, as
Washington grows impatient with the slow pace of
progress. 247 Viability concerns continue to plague realization
of the project.248

243.
David Knott, Iran Deal for Shell, 97 OIL & GAS J. 47, Nov. 22, 1999, 1999
WL 29184879.
244.
Michael Lelyveld, Azerbaijan: New Gas Discovery Gives Baku Added
Weight, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Dec. 29, 1999, at http://www.rforl.
org/nca/features/1999/12/f.ru.991229165033.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2001) (copy on
file with the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw).
245.
Michael Lelyveld, Iran: Turkey Seeks to Avoid Gas Penalties, RADIO FREE
EUROPE-RADIO

LIBERTY,

Dec.

30,

1999,

at

http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/

1999/12/f.ru.991230155145.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2001) (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw).
246. Iran, Turkey Agree to Delay in Gas Deliveries, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Jan. 12, 2000, at http:llwww.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/O/F.RUO00127/ 43848 (last
visited Mar. 28, 2001) (copy on file with the VanderbiltJournalof TransnationalLaw).
247.
Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: Slow Progress On Pipelines Raises Concerns,
RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Jan. 27, 2000, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/
features2000/01/F.RU000127143848.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2001) (copy on file with
the Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw). With more recent gas finds off the
Azeri coast, Baku has demanded that it also contribute to gas being carried through
the TCP. Michael Lelyveld, Azerbaijan: CaspianRegion Faces Fuel Shortages, RADIO
FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Feb. 3, 2000, at http://www.rferl.org/ncalfeatures/
20000/02/F.RU.000203143229.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2001) (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw). This, alongside the long-running dispute
regarding demarcation of the median line between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in
the Caspian, has seriously hampered plans for continuation of the TCP. Id.
248. David Ignatius, Editorial, U.S. Pipeline Strategy in Trouble, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 28, 2000, at 27A.
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2. The NIS: The Search to Reduce Russian Reliance2 4 9
In order to decrease their economic dependency on "Mother
Russia," the NIS have looked both to regional and "external
players." 250 As noted above, the important regional players are
Turkey and Iran. 251 The most important and active "external player"
is the United States.2 52 It is important to realize, however, that the
NIS' desire to establish links with Turkey and Iran is in many ways
independent of their desire to foster ties with Washington. Turkey
and Iran offer the NIS a geoeconomic solution to a geoeconomic
problem: practical and arguably efficient pipeline routes that will
transport their oil and gas to world markets. 253 On the other hand a
political and economic alliance with the United States addresses
wholly different needs-the NIS realize that they require the political
and financial support of the United States and Europe to ensure that
such costly projects are realized. 254
Despite this conceptual
dichotomy, however, the U.S. administration has aggressively
attempted to link geoeconomic concerns with geopolitical
ones, forcing
255
the NIS to reconcile seemingly conflicting interests.

249.
For an informative editorial analysis of Russia's geopolitical interests in the
Caspian region especially with regard to the oil and gas market, see Mortimer B.
Zuckerman, Editorial, The Big Game Gets Bigger-Russia Will Gain Wealth and
Influence if it Controls CaspianSea Oil, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 10, 1999, 1999
WL 8432767; see also Azeris Brush off Russian Proposalon Caspian Split, supra note
192 (explaining the NIS' need to diminish their economic dependence on Russia).
250.
See Forsythe, supra note 23, at 13-17 (outlining the significant geopolitical
and geoeconomic control that Moscow still exercises over the Caspian region and the
NIS' attempts to break free from this dependency).
251. Id. at 13; see also supraParts II.A.2.b.c.
252.
Forsythe, supranote 23, at 7; see also supra Part IIA.2.d.
253.
See infra Parts ll.C.1-2, ll.C.3.b-c, for analysis of the NIS transportation
puzzle, regional pipeline plans, and the interplay between geopolitics and
geoeconomics, and Iran and Turkey's roles in the Caspian pipeline game.
254.
See, e.g., Forsythe, supra note 23, at 37-43 (outlining some of the largest
current joint-venture projects (the Kazakhstan-Chevron joint venture known as
TengizChevroil; the Azerbaijani offshore oil project consortium, the Azerbaijani
Karabakh field in the Caspian, Kazakhstan's Karachaganak oil and gas field, and a set
of projects in Kazakhstan's offshore area), all of which involve direct and indirect U.S.
corporate participation); see also generally Peuch, supra note 12 (discussing the role of
U.S. and other private corporations in the Caspian region).
255. The most telling example of the United States' efforts to link the
geoeconomic and geopolitical games is its use of unilateral trade sanctions against
Iran. See infra Part II.B.3, for an in-depth analysis of the ILSA, the centerpiece of the
U.S. sanctions regime against Tehran. Trade sanctions are an attempt to render
cooperation and participation with Iran, which arguably offers the most practical and
efficient geoeconomic solutions to the region's transportation problems, a geopolitical
impracticality. See id.; see also infra Part II.C.3.c (discussing and anal-zing the
advantages of a "southern route" MER through Iranian territory).
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Russia's territory offers the longest-used
oil and gas
transportation infrastructure system in the region, although neglect
and hard economic times have rendered many of the lines obsolete
and technologically deficient. 256 Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are
more dependent on Russian transportation than Azerbaijan because
25 7
of their isolated location on the eastern coast of the Caspian.
Though Russia has made some gains in convincing both states to use
the northern corridor through its territory to transport their oil and
gas to Western markets, both countries have placed export
25 8
diversification on the top of their agendas.
One of the paradoxes of the Soviet era was the fact that
Kazakhstan, although extremely rich in hydrocarbon resources, was
considerably dependent on oil and gas imports from Russia and other
NIS. 259 In addition almost half of the country's oil refineries were
dependent on Russia's supply of raw oil for refining. 260 As a result of
the economic crisis that plagued Russia and the NIS after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, however, oil and gas imports to
Kazakhstan were disrupted and there was a sharp decline in the
261
Kazakh refineries' oil production.
With the discovery of huge oil and gas reserves situated on
Kazakhstan's Caspian shores Astana justifiably saw an opportunity
not only to free itself of Russian imports for domestic consumption,
but also to become a viable competitor to Russian oil exports. 262 In
order to decrease its dependency on Russian imports, however,
Kazakhstan must not only find sustainable pipeline routes that link
its western oil and gas fields to the open seas, but it must also build
pipelines to handle a massive transfer of oil from its western shores
263
to its eastern inlands for domestic consumption.

256.
For an informative synopsis of the problems associated with the CIS'
dependence on aging Soviet pipeline networks, see C.I.S. Struggles to Solve Problems
in Pipeline System, OIL & GAS J. 29, May 3, 1993, 1993 WL 2987103 (volume
unavailable online). More than 98 percent of CIS crude oil moves by pipeline. Id. The
total length of crude oil and products pipelines in the CIS is 56,000 miles. Id. The CIS
gas supply network involves 200 gas and condensate fields and 140,000 miles of main
gas pipelines. Id.
257. See generally id.
258.
See id.
259. Babak, supra note 109, at 184-85.
260. Id. at 185.
261.
Id.
262.
Id. (explaining that the huge discovery of oil and gas reserves in
Kazakhstan, together with the possibility of Kazakhstan becoming a major competitor
to Russia as an exporter of oil in the next ten to twenty years, has created a very
complicated relationship resulting in elements of mutual competition and cooperation
between the two).
263. Id.; see also infra notes 341-54 (highlighting Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan's
needs for an effective export diversification agenda).
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A survey of Turkmen dependence on Russian export routes also
2
brings the need for an export diversification agenda to light. 6
During the Soviet era Turkmenistan depended heavily on Moscow to
transport its gas through the Russian pipeline system. 26 5 Russia,
however, consistently engaged in the practice of re-routing Turkmen
gas to poorer Eastern European republics such as the Ukraine in an
attempt to gain a market advantage for its own gas, which it sent off
As a result
to more lucrative markets in Western Europe. 266
Turkmenistan faced diminishing economic returns on its gas forcing
it to stop export to the Ukraine when the latter defaulted on
payments. 267 The feud has been ongoing, with Gazprom, 2 68 the
Russian conglomerate that controls the network system, threatening
to cut-off Turkmen supplies when it wants to force concessions out of
Ashqabad. 269 Kazakhstan has experienced similar problems with
Transneft, 27 0 the state-managed corporation who masterminds oil
27 1
pipeline distribution throughout the Federation.
For Azerbaijan the establishment and success of an independent
oil and gas industry serves a different purpose than it does for
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. As mentioned previously, even after
the decline of oil and gas production off Baku Azerbaijan managed to
maintain a somewhat independent and unique role in the region's

264.

C.LS. Struggles to Solve Problems in PipelineSystem. supra note 256. Gas

transportation in the FSU is controlled by Gazprom, successor to the Soviet Ministry of
Gas. Id. Gazprom is a semi-independent state-run corporation made up of twenty.two
regional pipeline operators in Russia and the republics. It reports its activities to the
Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy. Id. Gazprom has controlled the other end of
Turkmenistan's biggest gas pipeline to eastern Europe for decades. Jennifer DeLay,
The Caspian Pipeline Tangle. A Steel Web of Confusion, in OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN
THE CASPIAN SEA REGION, supranote 23, at 69.
265.
See C.I.S. Struggles to Solve Problems in PipelineSystem. supra note 256.
266.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 74. Ashqabad is extremely dissatisfied with
Moscow's refusal to ship Turkmen gas beyond the CIS borders because its members are
often unable to pay for the imported gas. Id. at 69. In the spring of 1997 Gazprom
retaliated against Ashqabad's demands by putting a total freeze on shipments of
Turkmen gas. Id. The freeze severely hampered the Turkmen economy, especially
because it coincided with a disastrous cotton harvest. Id.; see also infra note 269
(explaining that cotton is one of Turkmenistan's major exports).
267.
Sharon Behn, Pipeline Under the Caspian to Transport Turhmen Gas is
Continuing to Gain Favor, 75 PLAT'S OILGRAM NEWS 225, Nov. 19, 1997, 1997 WL
8881891.
268.
See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
269.
C.I.S. Struggles to Solve Problems In Pipeline System, supra note 256.
Seventy percent of Turkmenistan's economy is gas and cotton. Id. The Russian
squeeze on Turkmen gas exports caused a thirty percent drop in the country's GDP
from 1993-95. Id.; see also supra note 266 and accompanying text.
270.
Oil transportation in the FSU and CIS is controlled by Transneft, which
also reports to the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy. C.I.S. Struggles to Solve
Problems In Pipeline System, supra note 256. Transneft is made up of seventeen
regional pipeline operators in Russia and the republics. Id.
Id.
271.
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energy needs. 272 As a result Azerbaijan was not dependent on
Russian and other NIS imports to meet domestic consumption
demands during the Soviet era. 273 Instead, the collapse of the Soviet
structure meant that Baku could finally take control of the
management, production, and distribution of its own hydrocarbon
basins. 274 Most importantly it meant that Baku could now exercise
full control over the allocation of revenue generated from these
exports.

275

Like its Kazakh and Turkmen counterparts Azerbaijan is also a
land-locked NIS with no access to the open seas. 276 Unlike the former
two, however, Azerbaijan's geographic position on the Caspian's
western shores allows it the more feasible option of bypassing
Russian [and Iranian] territory altogether.277
3. The Iran Factor: The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act Within a Caspian
Context
Recent elections in Iran have slowly changed simplistic attitudes
towards Iran as an autocratic and incapable member of the
international community of nations. 278 In fact today's Iran is
arguably the most stable nation in the Caspian region. 279 Although
the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the ensuing eight-year war with
neighboring Iraq, and international isolation have done much to
disrupt the economic stability of Iran the country has managed to
280
All
keep its head above water both politically and economically.
this would suggest that the NIS, despite potential and existing
political differences of outlook with their southern neighbor, have

272.
See supra Part II.B.l.a.
273.
See id.
274.
For a history of Russian and Soviet control over Azerbaijan's hydrocarbon
resources and industry, see Gokay, supra note 148, at 6-16. For a comprehensive
outline of the current developments in Azeri oil exploitation and management, see
CROISSANT, supra note 148, at 23-33.
275.
Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 30.
276.
See ATLAS OF THE WORLD, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
277.
See id.; see also generally infra Part II.C.3.
278.
John Fulmer, World Has Eyes on Iranian Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2000, at A8.
279.
The Caucuses are arguably the most unstable region in the Caspian area.
See Bhamy V. Shenoy, S. Gurcam Gulen, & Michelle M. Foss, Caspian Oil Export
Choices Clouded by Geopolitics, Project Economics, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 19 1999, 1999
WL 9723464 (volume and number unavailable online). Russia and Chechnya continue
to have problems, the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict may have been temporarily
resolved but tensions run high, and Georgia has ongoing problems with secessionist
movements in its Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. Id.
280.
The country has managed to survive primarily because of European and
Asian dependence on its oil and gas exports, which account for more than eighty
percent of its hard currency.
See UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 41.
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much to gain from a strategic partnership with Iran's NIOC and
National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC).2 81 More importantly the
partnership could address the two major concerns of the NIS:
distribution of their oil and gas to world markets and freedom from
Russian monopoly. There are, however, several political and legal
hurdles that must be overcome before such an association is realized.
In 1996 President Clinton signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
(ILSA) into law. 282 In many ways the ILSA is the centerpiece of
American foreign policy against post-revolutionary Iran. 283 The bill,
sponsored by former Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York, seeks to
isolate Tehran by imposing stringent sanctions on any company,
domestic or foreign, that invests at least $20 million in Iran's oil and
gas sector. 284 The law received a cold reception from U.S. giants such
as Amoco and Exxon and met adamant opposition from Europe and
Japan who challenged the legality of the ILSA's extraterritorial

281.
For a discussion of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the
National Iranian Gas Company (NIGO) and their management of the country's oil and
gas sector, see Ghorban, infra note 968; see also infra Part VI.B, for an analysis of the
prospects for Iranian-NIS cooperation in the Caspian oil and gas market.
282.
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-073. For an online
review of the text of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S.
PoLIcY TOWARDS IRAN: IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 (PL 104.073),
http:/usinfo.state.gov/regionallnea/gulfsec/irnsanc.htm. For an in.depth legal analysis
of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, see generally Lucien J. Dhooge, Meddling with the
Mullahs: An Analysis of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996,27 DENy. J. INYr'L L
& POL'Y 1 (1998). The ILSA requires the President to impose at least two of the
following six sanctions upon any company believed to have made a prohibited
investment: 1) deny U.S. Export-Import Bank assistance for exports to the sanctioned
company;, 2) deny specific licenses or other specific permission for the export of
controlled goods or technology to the sanctioned company;, 3) prohibit U.S. financial
institutions from making loans or providing credits to any sanctioned company totaling
more than $10 million in any 12-month period; 4) prohibit any sanctioned company
that is a financial institution from being designated as a primary dealer in U.S.
government debt instruments or from serving as a repository for U.S. government
funds; 5) prohibit U.S. government procurement from the sanctioned company;, and 6)
restrict imports into the United States with respect to the sanctioned person, in
accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Fred Reinke &
Mark Kantor, Esqs., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act: Response to Iranian Gas Deal May
Affect Future Investments, MIDDLE EAST EXEC. REP., Sept. 1997, 20 No. MEEXREP 9.
The Act allows for the possibility of a waiver if the President determines that it is
important to the national interest. Id.
Within thirty days of making such a
determination the President must submit a report to Congress that provides a detailed
rationale for the determination, including- 1) a description of the conduct giving rise to
the sanctions; 2) an explanation of U.S. efforts to secure the cooperation of those
governments with jurisdictions over the company subject to sanctions to terminate its
activity or impose penalties; 3) an estimate of the significance of the sanctionable
activity to the development of the Iranian or Libyan petroleum industries; and 4) a
statement as to the response of the U.S. government if the sanctioned company
continues to violate the law. Id.
283.
Dhooge, supra note 282, at 2.
284.
Id at 33.
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application as a violation of GATT rules.28 5 While the legality of the
ILSA's extraterritoriality has been the subject of much legal and
scholarly debate, its debilitating effect particularly on U.S. oil and gas
involvement with Iran is evident. 28 6 The law has no doubt been more
successful in thwarting U.S. firms from directly dealing with the
NIOC than it has in restricting the mobility of foreign firms, a reality
that is readily pointed to by U.S. companies losing a competitive
287
advantage to their European and Asian counterparts.
The impetus for the sanctions occurred in 1995 when Iran
attempted to revitalize its oil and gas sector by relaxing legal
impediments to direct foreign investment. 288 The policy reforms
convinced Conoco to help the NIOC develop the rich South Pars gas
field in the Persian Gulf. 2

9

In the wake of Conoco's announcement

American politicians began a campaign spearheaded by Senator
D'Amato to prevent Conoco's involvement in the project. 290 The move
convinced President Clinton to issue Executive Order 12957
291
prohibiting U.S. involvement with petroleum development in Iran.
Several weeks later Conoco pulled out of the deal and Dutch Shell
moved in. 292 Subsequent to these developments the ILSA was signed

into law and Executive Order 12959 signaled the
293
implementation of Congressional will against Tehran.

official

285. Id. at 5; see also Raj Bhala, National Security and InternationalTrade Law:
What the GATT Says, and What the United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
263, 279 (1998); Stuart Parrot, Iran: Why it Holds the Potential to Divide the West,
RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 10, 1997, at http://www.rferl.org/
nca/features/1997/11/F.RU.9711110121845.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt
Journalof TransnationalLaw).
286.
Manouchehr Takin, Effects of U.S. Sanctions on Iranian and Caspian
Petroleum Industries: Can the World Do Without Iran, Iraq, Libya? MIDDLE EAST
EXEC. REP., Dec. 1997, 20 No. 12 MEEXREP 19 (analyzing U.S. firms' reactions to the
administration's threat of sanctions against Conoco).
287.
For a general overview of Iran's success at courting foreign investment in
its oil and gas sector after the imposition of the ILSA, see Iran's bid to Lure Oil
Investment Succeeding Despite U.S. Sanctions, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 5, 1999, 1999 WL
9723378 (volume and number unavailable online); see also Patrick Crow, U.S.
Petroleum Firms Hit Hard by Washington's UnilateralSanctions, 95 OIL & GAS J. 18,
May 5, 1997, 1997 WL 9574572.
288.
See infra notes 970-74 and accompanying text (discussing Iran's use of the
"buyback system" designed to increase foreign direct investment in the country's oil
and gas sector while abiding by the Islamic Republic's constitutional restrictions
prohibiting foreign control of the sector).
289.
See id.
290.
Raj Bhala, FightingBad Guys with InternationalLaw, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 13 (1997); see also supra note 178 and accompanying text.
291.
Bhala, supra note 290, at 13.
292.
Meek, supra note 180, at 10. Total later moved in and overtook the
development of the Sirri oil field in 1995 under a seventy-thirty partnership agreement
with Indonesia's Petronas. Total's Iran Deal Sparks Row with U.S., supra note 209.
293.
Total's Iran Deal Sparks Row with U.S., supra note 209.
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The next significant step came in 1997 when a consortium
headed by France's Total reached an agreement with the NIOC to
develop the Sirri fields in the Persian Gulf.294 The move represented

international snubbing of the United States' extraterritorial
application of unilateral sanctions, a feature of the ILSA that the
European Union particularly despised. 295 It also placed the State and
Treasury Departments in a difficult position: a waiver in the face of
the first real test case for sanctions would convince the world that the
ILSA lacked

legitimacy

and that

its threats were

hollow. 296

Imposition of sanctions, however, would severely antagonize the EU
and set the United States on a political and economic collision course
with free trade interests. 297 Finally after months of diplomacy,
allegations, and speculation, Secretary of State Madelaine Albright
announced the administration's decision to waive sanctions against
Total in the interests of national policy and international
cooperation.298

There are increasing signs that the Total waiver has severely
weakened the United States' credibility with regard to
implementation of sanctions.29 9 Other international companies such
as British Petroleum-Amoco have followed Total's example and
signed multi-million dollar deals to further develop Iran's other oil
and gas fields in the Persian Gulf.300 Even American firms have
sought permits from the Treasury Department to facilitate Iranian oil
deals within the Caspian context. 30 1 The Clinton Administration
already sent several signals that it interpreted the ILSA so as to
allow such deals as long as American companies did not directly deal
within Iranian territory. 30 2 Other nations, namely the NIS and

294.

Id. The consortium included Total which held a forty percent stake,

Russia's state-owned Gazprom which owned a thirty percent stake, and Indonesia's

state-owned Petronas which owned a thirty percent stake. Id. The consortium signed
a "buyback" contract with the NIOC covering Phase two and three of the development
of the South Pars offshore gas field. Id.
295. Id. The French government denounced the U.S. stance and the EU quickly
followed suit arguing that sanctions against Total were "illegal and unacceptable." Id.
EU representatives also opposed the ELSA because they claimed that its
extraterritorial effects violated international law. Id.; see also U.S. Waives Sanctions
on South ParsField, supranote 225.
296. See U.S. Waives Sanctions on South ParsField,supra note 225
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301.
Karey, supranote 225. Though U.S. companies cannot invest in Iran as a
result of the ILSA and various Executive Orders there is an exemption for companies
seeking to swap Iranian crude oil for Caspian product if the deal is approved by the
Treasury Department. Id. Mobil, for example, has already requested approval for a
proposed. See infra note 305 and accompanying text. Its request was denied. Id.
302. Karey, supra note 225.

732

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 34:681

Turkey, have also ignored the threat of sanctions by signing notable
30 3
oil, gas, and pipeline deals with the NIOC.
So far the ILSA has also directly impacted Iranian involvement
in Caspian oil and gas development, and its ramifications may be farreaching. 30 4
For example, a recent request by Mobil to swap
Turkmen gas via Iran was rejected from the Treasury Department's
Office of Foreign Asset Control.3 0 5 Also, in October 1997 the United
States questioned statements made by Turkmenistan about a
proposal to export gas to Turkey via a pipeline running across
northern Iran. 30 6 The proposed agreement was said to be worth $1.6
billion and would run 3,200 km. 30 7
In November 1997 U.S.
Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat noted that the Turkey deal
to import gas from Turkmenistan through Iran would not violate the
ILSA but rejected the notion that pipelines running through Iran
were acceptable to the U.S. Administration. 30 8 The project was Iran's
biggest international energy project since the 1979 revolution, and
30 9
would run on the eastern side of the Caspian Sea.
The Caspian region's new economic and strategic importance call
for more hands-on involvement by U.S. firms seeking to enter into
joint-ventures for lucrative pipeline and drilling projects with the
littoral states.3 10 In this sense the Caspian oil and gas boom and the
new era of worldwide energy development it has ushered in has
perhaps, more than any other recent geoeconomic phenomenon, called
into question the viability of U.S. trade policy vis-a-vis Iran. The
long-term resolution of this issue is more important than its

303.
For example, Turkey signed a thirty-five year agreement to buy gas from
Iran. See Lelyveld, supra note 245; see also supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
But see infra Part II.C.3.c (explaining that [both Iran and] the NIS primarily look at oil
swaps instead of massive pipeline projects through Iranian territory in order to solve
the region's short term transportation problems).
304.
Manouchehr Takin, U.S. Sanctions Against Oil Giants at Odds With its
CaspianPolicy, 95 OIL & GAS J. 41, Oct. 13, 1997, 1997 WL 9575869; see also John H.
Lichtblau, U.S. CaspianArea Foreign Policy in Conflict With Resource Plans, 95 OIL &
GAS J. 31, Aug. 11, 1997, 1997 WL 9575650. The articles argue that U.S. sanctions on
Iran will not only prevent full U.S. involvement in the Caspian Sea oil and gas trade
but they will also affect the overall development and pace of economic reform in the
region. Id. Indeed, many American oil executives strongly believe that the best export
route for Caspian oil is Iran. Stephen Kinzer, Oil Wealth of the Caspian Fuels a New
'Great Game,' PIT. POST-GAZETrE, Feb. 1, 1999, at Al; see also infra Part II.C.3.c
(analyzing the negative impacts of U.S. sanctions policy on the NIS and Turkey, both of
whom refuse to wholly ignore Washington's warnings regarding investment in Iran's
oil and gas sector); infra note 357 and accompanying text.
305.
Patrick Crow, Diplomatic Dancing,OIL & GAS J., May 10, 1999, 1999 WL
9723792 (volume and number unavailable online).
306.
See supranote 211 and accompanying text.
307.
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
308. See supranote 213 and accompanying text.
309.
See supranote 214 and accompanying text.
310. See generally infra Part II.C.
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immediate legal effects would suggest. For Iran success of its legal
arguments regarding division of the Caspian's resources could restore
its regional integrity and economic viability not only in the transport
sector but eventually in the mining and exploration sector. These
successes could present it with an opportunity to seriously undermine
the viability of the ILSA and other economic sanctions leveled against
it by the United States. As will be seen later, however, Tehran has
yet to effectively incorporate legal strategies regarding Caspian legal
issues in order to seriously challenge the validity and soundness of
the ILSA.
C. PipelineDiplomacy: The Real Battle for Main Export Routes

(MERs)
1. Pipelines: The Interplay of Geopolitics and Geoeconomics
Oil producers in the Caspian had no need to worry about pipeline
routes as long as Soviet central planning survived.31 1 What pipeline
investments and construction did exist during the Soviet era focused
on Siberia-the whole pipeline network of the USSR was designed to
channel Siberian oil westward to the big refineries and industrial
centers of Western Russia and onward toward hard currency markets
in Europe. 312 Most of the oil and gas from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Turkmenistan was transported along limited distances, refined,
3 13
and used for consumption within the USSR.
At the outset of independence the condition, capacity, and
configuration of the existing Russian-controlled pipelines out of the
region were inadequate for the significant increase in oil volumes
being generated by the NIS after independence.3 1 4 The urgent need
to alleviate some of the financial and economic pressures confronting
the NIS, however, forced them to entertain the possibility of using
existing Russian pipelines linking the NIS to the to Black and Baltic
Seas. 315 Moscow has taken full advantage of its regional hegemony
and competitive advantage in pipeline capacity and has further used

311.
Delay, supranote 264, at 43.
312.
Id.
313.
Id.
314.
Forsythe, supranote 23, at 44.
315.
See infra Parts II.C.2.a, I.C.3 (outlining the Russian geopolitical and
geoeconomic advantages over the NIS and Moscow's successful strategy to ensure that
the NIS continue to rely on Russian export routes).
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its leverage to force the NIS to expand existing pipelines and upgrade
3 16
them to MER status.
For the NIS it is painfully clear that sustainable economic
success ultimately requires the construction of new MERs that would
link them to the most lucrative world energy markets. 3 17 More
importantly, the NIS and Western powers quickly realized that a
monopoly of transit rights by any one country over these MERs would
allow it enormous political and economic leverage. 318 The political
consequences of such a monopoly include the option of cutting off or
rerouting pipelines in order to force concessions out of the vulnerable
NIS; the economic consequences mean that the NIS and oil
corporations would be forced to pay exorbitant tariffs to the transit
country. 319
Export diversification is the only solution to this
320
monopoly problem.
Within this context the NIS pipeline strategy thus required the
following three-step process: 1) dependence on existing Russian and
perhaps Iranian pipeline networks and other means of traditional
and innovative transport (including tanker shipments and oil swaps)
to meet the NIS' immediate export demands; 321 2) expansion,
modification, and construction of "early oil" pipelines linking the NIS
to the open seas and allowing the throughput of medium volumes of
oil and gas; 322 and 3) construction of MERs establishing permanent
export routes to strategic markets, including Europe (via the Black or
the Mediterranean seas), South Asia (via the Persian Gulf and the
Arabian Sea or pipelines to Pakistan and India), and East Asia (via
3 23
MERs linking Central Asia to China).

316.
See id.; see, e.g., infra notes 324-40, 385-405 (discussing Moscow's pressure
tactics on the NIS in order to force them to accept "early oil" and MER lines through
Russian territory).
317.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 75. Pipelines have become a "necessary evil" for
the NIS because existing export pipe, rail, and barge routes are overtaxed,
inconvenient, and unreliable. Id. MERs appear to be the only economical means of
transferring Caspian crude to export markets. Id.
318.
Forsythe, supra note 23, at 44.
319.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 75-76.
320.
See Forsythe, supra note 23, at 44.
321.
See infra Part II.C.2, infra Part II.C.3.a (discussing the NIS' reliance on
"early oil" export options [involving Russia and Iran] such as small to medium-volume
pipelines, oil swaps, and use of MERs primarily through Russian territory).
322.
See infra Part II.C.2.a.
323.
See infra Part II.C.3.
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2. "Early Oil" Export Options
a. Small to Medium-Volume Pipelines
Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are looking forward to the
completion of long-term export plans which include multi-billion
dollar projects. 3 24 The most advanced of these MER projects is the
$20 billion TengizChevroil joint venture, which is presently exporting
40,000 to 65,000 barrels per day (bpd) through the Russian pipeline
system.8 25 Although the project is capable of exporting over 90,000
bpd, Moscow has limited the amount allotted for reasons of political
and commercial leverage. 3 26 Thus the project is looking for short
term routes to absorb its present excess production of 30,000 to
327
50,000 bpd.
According to the terms of the AIOC agreement which came into
force on December 12, 1994, the companies have agreed to export
"early oil" starting at about 40,000 bpd and projected to increase to
80,000 to 100,000 bpd in two years.32 8 From the beginning the AIOC
set its eyes on the construction of an "early oil" route that would
bypass Russian territory and pass through Georgia to the Black Sea
port of Supsa.3 29 The AIOC had always been wary about sending oil
through Russia. 33 0 Most members of the consortium were fully aware
33 1
of Baku's reluctance to let Moscow play a key role in oil transport.
It seemed, however, that Azerbaijan had few options available to it at
the time. 332 With a Russian pipeline connecting Baku to the Black
Sea port of Novorossiysk already in place Moscow began to pressure
Azerbaijan and the AIOC to use this "northern route" for its "early
oil" exports. 3 33 On October 9, 1995, the AIOC officially decided to
support a two-pipeline system for transport of its "early oil." 3 34 The
Baku-Novorossiysk route, however, ran through some 153 kilometers
of Chechen territory. 3 35 With the north Caucus republic embroiled in

324.
Forsythe, supranote 23, at 44.
325.
Id.; see also supra note 167
TengizChevroil project).
326.
Id.
327.
Id.
328.
Id.

329.
330.
331.

(outlining the

specifications

of the

See DeLay, supranote 264, at 47.
Id. at 49.
Id.; see also supra Part II.B.2 (analyzing Azerbaijan's reliance on Russian

pipeline systems and

the need

for export diversification).

332.
Id. Other than the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, no other complete trunks
existed. Id.
333.
Id.
334. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
335. DeLay, supra note 264, at 49.
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a brutal war of secession against Moscow, the Baku-Novorossiysk
pipeline sustained continuous damage from both sides. 336 On August
31, 1996, Moscow admitted that the pipeline had sustained too much
damage and suspended all operations pending further negotiations
3 37
with the Chechen authorities.
In August 1997, Transneft, Russia's state-run oil pipeline
operator, signed a series of transport agreements with Grozny
covering repair of the punctured sections of the pipeline, the safety of
repair workers, and the security of oil transports. 338 After months of
negotiations and squabbling the pipeline was patched up on
schedule-before the start of commercial production from the Chirag
site on November 8, 1997. 339 Continuing delays and problems with

the Chechens over transit fees plagued the line until mid-1998 when
oil flows stabilized and Azerbaijan finally established its first oil
340
export link to world energy markets.
The Baku-Supsa "early oil" project that Azeri officials had looked
to with such admiration also experienced numerous geopolitical,
financial, and logistical problems.3 4' The logistical problems were
obvious: unlike the Baku-Novorossiysk line, the Supsa line had not
yet been built.342

The project required the construction of 985

kilometers of pipeline from Baku to Supsa, building and rebuilding of
all the pumping stations needed along the route, and the construction
of a high capacity oil export terminal at Supsa. 343 The geopolitical
problems were highlighted by the fact that the pipeline was to pass
through four areas of ethnic tension in the unstable Caucuses. 3 44
Finally, in March 1998, AIOC officials admitted that the line could
not possibly be finished on time and that the project required an

336.
Id. at 49-50. Both sides dealt heavy blows to the Chechen oil sector during
the war of secession. Id. at 49. The oil-refining facilities in Grozny were repeatedly set

on fire, guerrillas blew up a number of pipelines, and numerous holes were punched
throughout the line in order to steal the oil. Id.
337.
Id.
338.
Id. at 50.
339.
Id.
340.
Id. at 50-51. But see DeLay, supra note 264, at 73 (explaining that the
Baku-Novorossiysk "early oil" route is currently virtually inoperative).
341.
Id. at 51-54.
342.
Id. at 52.
343.
Id. at 52-53.
344.
Id. at 52. In Azerbaijan the pipeline passes close to the de facto border of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Id.; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute). In Georgia it passes near the frontier of South Ossetia
and then passes near the de facto border between Georgia and the breakaway region of
Abkhazia. DeLay, supra note 264, at 52; see also supra note 279 (discussing the
Georgia-South Ossetia-Abkhazia disputes). Finally, the pipeline terminates within the
boundaries of Ajaria, an autonomous republic within Georgia which has reached a
tense diplomatic standoff with Tbsili. DeLay, supra note 264, at 52.
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additional $275 million. 345 Since then, however, the line has been
carrying approximately 115,000 bpd and its success has prompted
some AIOC managers to view the pipeline as the primary "early oil"
346
export conduit.
For Kazakh officials export diversification was not always at the
top of their agenda. 347 With the signing of the initial CPC documents
in 1993 many Kazakh officials believed that one MER would satisfy
the country's export needs. 348
This attitude, however, quickly
349
changed.
In April 1998 Minister of Energy, Industry, and Trade
Murat Murtazayev was quoted as saying that no less than six
possible MERs were under consideration, despite certain political and
logistical constraints. 350 In the meantime, however, Astana needed to
rely on an "early oil" pipeline that would carry existing volumes of oil
produced off its western Caspian shores. 3 51 Like Baku, Astana had to
rely on Russia: the only functioning export pipeline ran from Atyrau
on the Caspian Sea across the Russian border to Orsk in the southern
Urals and onto the hub of Samara on the Volga River. 352 And like
Baku, Astana experienced the same delay tactics employed by
Transneft with the Supsa line. 353 These problems included delays,
reneging on transport negotiation promises, limiting the flow of
35 4
Kazakh oil, and forcing unreasonable concessions out of Astana.
Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have at one time or another
355
seriously considered "early oil" pipeline arrangements with Iran.
The construction of such pipelines, it was thought, would eventually
lead to the construction of MERs to the Persian Gulf if political and
economic conditions with Tehran improved. 356 Given the legal

345.
346.
347.

DeLay, supranote 264, at 53.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 58

348.

Id.

349.

Id.

350. Id. The Minister identified six pipeline routes being seriously considered
by Astana: 1) the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, 2) the Tengiz-Novorossiysk CPC pipeline to
the Black Sea, 3) the Transcaspian pipeline, 4) the China pipeline, 5) the Iran pipeline,
and 6) the Trans-Central-Asia pipeline through Afghanistan. Id. For in.depth analysis
of several of these pipeline routes, see infra Part II.C.3.
351.
Forsythe, supra note 23, at 44.
352. DeLay, supranote 264, at 58-59. See id. at 58-60, for a complete analysis of
the Atyrau-Orsk-Samara pipeline and the reasons why it failed to satisfy Astana's
export ambitions.
353.
See id.
354. Id. To date the Atyrau-Orsk-Samara line has carried only a fraction of
Kazakhstau's current production capacity. Id. For example, Transneft has been
extremely stingy with granting TengizChevroil quota shipments through the line. Id.
When it has granted such quotas, it has severely restricted the flow of consortium oil to
a pitiful one million metric tons. Id.
355. Forsythe, supranote 23, at 46.
356. Id.
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impediments imposed by the Washington via the ILSA, however,
Baku and Astana have decided not to rile up U.S. officials and have
begrudgingly held off on any formal negotiations with Tehran over
357
MER construction.
b. Oil Swaps
For the NIS the oil swap option presents a more simple and
innovative way of exporting oil and gas to world energy markets
because it does not encounter the same political, economic, and
358
logistical problems associated with the construction of pipelines.
For the same reasons the oil swap model allows countries with wellestablished oil and gas sectors, like Iran, to simultaneously
participate in the Caspian energy game and also offer practical
3 59
solutions to the NIS' transportation problems.
The oil swap plan works as follows: the NIS deliver their oil to
Iran's Caspian shores. 360
This could be done either via the
construction of short and cheap pipeline networks or through
shipping across Caspian waters. 36 1 There a transfer of title between
the NIS and Iran allows the former to sell its oil to Iran. 362 Existing
and planned pipelines within the Iranian territory then pump the
Caspian crude to northern refineries situated in Tabriz and Tehran,
allowing for the ultimate distribution of refined oil to urban and
industrial centers in the region; an equal amount of Iranian crude oil
363
is then exported out of the country's Persian Gulf terminals.

357. See generally DeLay, supra note 264, at 57 (discussing Baku's reluctance to
view Iran as a major transportation partner); id. at 64-66 (discussing Astana's
reluctance to do the same).
358. See infra notes 360-63 and accompanying text, for a description of the oil
swap model; see also supra notes 318-19, for an explanation of the political and
economic disadvantages of pipelines regimes.
359.
See infra notes 364-74 (analyzing Iran's role as a transporter of NIS oil and
gas through the oil swap model).
360. For example, Tehran has courted Kazakhstan with a plan to ship up to two
million tons of oil to northern Iran annually in exchange for the same amount of
Iranian oil to be collected at ports in the Persian Gulf. Iran'sForeign Minister Calls for
Caspian Convention, supranote 231. Implementation of the plan requires Iran to build
a pipeline with a capacity of 350,000 bpd linking its Caspian port of Neka with the
Persian Gulf. Id.
361.
See id.
362.
See id.
363.
Id. The flow of existing pipelines that currently carry Persian Gulf oil to
northern Iranian refineries can be reversed with minor alterations. Id. There have
been delays and difficulties with the program because Caspian crude oil is chemically
different and represents some problems for Iranian refineries in northern Iran. Id. In
this way, the swap mechanism ultimately works by importing Caspian oil for local use
in Iran's northern refineries while an equal amount of Iranian crude is exported in the
south through Persian Gulf terminals. Id.
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In this way an oil swap program would substantially reduce
reliance on a pipeline transport system because it does not require
bilateral or multilateral cooperation between several states regarding
management of a pipeline regime. 36 Instead the NIS gain instant
market access and force the burden of transportation and profit365
bearing to shift to Iran.
The advantages of the oil swap model represent one of many
solutions to the transport of early NIS oil to world markets where
Iran may play a significant planning role. 366 Already, several of the
NIS have seriously entertained the option and are using Iran's
infrastructure to implement "early oil" swaps.3 67 There are, however,
political and diplomatic barriers that must be overcome. First, there
are the external restraints: although Washington has displayed an
uneasy acquiescence to such plans because they are technically
beyond the scope of the ILSA, its hardball stance against any Iranian
solutions to Caspian energy issues continues to stall NIS attempts to
jump into such arrangements. 368 Also, the pipeline craze is still very
much a part of Caspian diplomacy. 369 The United States and Turkey
have downplayed the importance of oil swaps, Russia has scarcely
and the NIS have not
referred to it in its Caspian energy3 7policies,
0
advantages.
its
evaluated
adequately
Second, the main barrier to use of the oil swap option is Iran
itself.371 Tehran has not fully taken advantage of this option because
it has been lured by the promise of bigger and better opportunities in
the Caspian oil market. 372 Though the construction of the Neka-Rey
pipeline transporting NIS crude from its Caspian shores to refineries
in Tehran has begun implementation has taken much longer than

See, e.g., Rob Sobhani, The Role of Iran in Early Caspian Oil, CASPIAN
364.
ENERGY ISSUES, Winter 1996, at 13; see also generally Sergei Vinogradov, Cross-Border
Pipelines in InternationalLaw, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT 75 (1999), for an overview
of international legal regimes dealing with pipelines and energy transport.
See Sobhani, supranote 364, at 14.
365.
Iran may use the oil swap model as a springboard to strengthen its
366.
potential as an MER for Caspian oil and gas. See generally infra Part VI (outlining
Iran's regional energy goals and advancing policy recommendations that vll satisfy
these goals).
367.
Id.
Meek, supranote 180, at 10.
368.
See, e.g., DeLay, supra note 264, at 41-81 (outlining the ins and outs of the
369.
Caspian "pipeline tangle").
See supraParts II.C.2.a-b.
370.
Narsi Ghorban, Neka-Rey Pipeline: Boosting Economic Integration of
371.
Caspian States, 21 IRAN TODAY 211 (Iran), May-June 1998, at http/vtI.netiran.coml
Htdocs/Clippings/Feconomy/980501XXFEO1.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt
Journalof TransnationalLaw).
Id.
372.
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expected.3 7 3 This delay may be a reflection of hard economic times
and government inefficiency, but it also represents a larger problem
plaguing Iranian authorities regarding the country's proper role in
374
the Caspian energy market.
At present Iran has focused on the first phase of the long term oil
swap programs: the construction of a pipeline from Neka to Tehran
and Tabriz in order to facilitate oil swaps with Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan.37 5 The first phase will allow swapped oil from the
Neka-Rey pipeline to reach Tehran and Tabriz oil refineries, where
approximately 350,000 bpd of swapped petroleum will be
processed. 376 In the second phase, arrangements to transfer a further
460,000 bpd of petroleum from the Caspian to Arak and Isfahan
refineries will be made. 377 Finally, in phase three of the swap
program the new and existing pipelines will be upgraded so that
approximately 810,000 bpd may be transferred directly from Neka to
southern terminals in the Persian Gulf.3 78 Meanwhile, Iran has
already participated in several oil swaps with Kazakhstan and
379
Turkmenistan via tanker shipments.
3. MERs and the Caspian Transportation Grid
There are now more than twenty proposed Caspian pipelines in
competition, many of which are vying for the distinguished honor of
ultimately serving as an MER to world energy markets in Europe and
Asia. 380 The maze of existing and proposed pipeline networks falls
within three major categories: the "northern route," the "western

373.
Iran's Foreign Minister Calls for Caspian Convention, supra note 231. Oil
swaps with Kazakhstan have so far occurred via tanker shipment and railway access.
Id. Turkmenistan is already supplying Iran with gas but plans are still underway to
build a trans-Iranian pipeline linking Turkmenistan's gas to Turkey. Ben Patridge,
Central Asia: Iran Invites Funding for Major Caspian Oil Pipeline, RADIO FREE
EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, June 1, 1998, at http://www.rferl.orglnca/features/1998/06/
F.RU.980601133203.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational

Law).
374.
Cadiot, supranote 115.
375.
Entessar, supra note 57, at 171.
376.
Id.
377.
Id.
378.
Id.
379.
Id. In May 1996 President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and President
Rafsanjani of Iran signed an agreement calling for regular oil swap deals between the
two countries. Id. at 172. In January 1997 Kazakhstan shipped 500,000 barrels of oil
to northern Iran in exchange for an equal volume of Iranian oil shipped out of Persian
Gulf terminals. Id. In the first full year of the agreement (1997) the two countries
swapped more than 70,000 tons of oil. Id.
380.

UNITED

STATES ENERGY

REGION, supra note 41.

INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,

CASPIAN SEA
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route," and the "southern route." 381 U.S. Caspian policy has strongly
supported the "western route" through Turkey and into the
Mediterranean, while "northern route" plans through Russia and to
the Black Sea have been tolerated. 38 2 The "southern route" through
Iran, however, was strongly discouraged by the Clinton
Administration.3 8 3 Given the dependence of the NIS and the overall
potential of the region in meeting world energy needs it is
understandable why Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the United States
have placed pipeline diplomacy at the top of their regional and
international agendas.
In the absence of comprehensive legal
arrangements and regimes dealing with transportation security
guarantees regarding oil flow and price stabilization, control of the
MERs means the power to absorb significant transit fees and more
importantly, the potential to gain valuable geopolitical leverage by
38 4
threatening the world's energy supply.
a. Russia and the "Northern Route"
For its part Russia has taken the MER game very seriously. 385
Although U.S. officials continually downplay Russian concerns
regarding the regional balance of power, political experts agree that
Moscow continues to see the Caspian region as its backyard and U.S
involvement as a threat to its regional interests. 386 It is this tension
that forced Russia to strike first in the pipeline competition, securing
the first MER through its territory and onto the Black Sea terminal
at Novorossiysk. 38 7 The TengizChevroil joint-venture and the CPC

381.

See, e.g., Entessar, supra note 57, at 172.75, for use of this terminology

when referring to existing and proposed MERs in the Caspian region.
382.
See, e.g., id. at 173 (discussing the strong U.S. support for the "western
route").
383. The Clinton Administration's Special Advisor to the Caspian region, John
Wolf, has continuously traveled to the NIS attempting to convince them to bypass any
Iranian pipeline routes transporting their oil to world markets. Amelia Taron, U.S. on
Mission to Deter IranianRoutes, OIL & GAS J., Oct. 31, 1997, at 1997 WL 8916325: see
also Sonia Winter, Central AsialCaucuses: A Mission to Deter Iranian Connections,
RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 11, 1997, at httpl/vnwvv.rferl.orglnca/
features1997ll/F.RU.971111133334.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw).
384. See generally Vinogradov, supranote 364; see also Shenoy et al., supra note
279.
385. See supra Part II.C.2.a (analyzing Russia's insistence that an "early oil"
route run from the NIS to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, setting up the
foundation for the expansion of the line to an MER at a later date); see also infra note
404 and accompanying text (providing the heavy-handed remarks of several Russian
officials regarding the importance of export routes running through Russian territory).
386. Id.; see also supra Part IILA.2.a (providing a general outline of Russia's
geopolitical regional concerns); see also generally Becker, supra note 23.
387. See generally supra notes 168-70 (setting forth the details of the Russian
involvement in the creation of the CPC).
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that was created to transport Kazakh oil to world markets represents
the first significant draw of blood in the pipeline frenzy. 3 88
In April 2001 CPC construction finally ended and the region's
first MER delivered Kazakh oil at the Novorossiysk terminal. 389 The
journey, however, has been anything but easy, causing Astana to
seriously consider other MER options via "western routes" (across the
Caspian Sea), "southern routes" (via Iranian territory), and "eastern
routes" (toward China). 390 Also, despite the relative success of the
CPC as the first completed MER many of Astana's regional
transportation concerns remain unaddressed. First, Kazakhstan
realizes that its isolated geographic location renders it highly
vulnerable to dependence on Russia for oil and gas transport-the
CPC and other "northern route" projects only deepen Kazakhstan's
dependence on Transneft and Russian diplomatic manipulation. 391
Second, the line passes through the troubled north Caucuses regions
posing many of the same problems experienced by the AIOC's
northern "early oil" option. 392 Third, a transportation model based
solely on a "western route" ignores the fact that most of the Kazakh
3 93
population lives in the country's northern and eastern territories.
If domestic consumption demands increase in the future Kazakhstan
must be prepared to siphon significant hydrocarbon resources
eastward. 394 Finally, a single route strategy connecting Kazakhstan's
western oil fields to the Black Sea neglects to efficiently serve
growing energy needs in South and East Asia. 3 95

For all these

reasons export diversification requires that Kazakhstan seriously
consider other transport options in the near future.
b. Turkey and the "Western Routes"
The immediate focus of Washington's pipeline dreams is the
construction of an MER linking Azerbaijan to Turkey, and its
388.
See id.
389.
Press Release, Chevron, Caspian Pipeline Reaches Another Milestone
(March 26, 2001), at http:llwww.chevron.com/newsvs/pressrel/2001/2001.03-26.shtml
(copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw).
390.
See, e.g., supra note 350 and accompanying text (outlining Astana's export
diversification agenda).
391.
The Russian government was slow to hand over key assets and grant
needed licenses to the CPC so that the Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline would begin
operations. DeLay, supra note 264, at 61. The governments of the Russian regions
though which the pipeline was to pass raised numerous objections on environmental
and property grounds. Id. The delays have cost the CPC substantial time and money.
Id. Current estimates predict that the final price tag for the project will go beyond $3.5
billion, nearly $2.3 billion more than originally thought. Id.
392.
See supra notes 335-40, 44 and accompanying text.
393.
Babak, supra note 109, at 192.
394.
See id. at 193.
395.
Id. at 192.

20011

IRAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA LEGAL REGIME

brainchild is the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline (BCP).3 96 The BCP would
run from Baku, through Supsa in Georgia, and onto the
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in Turkey. 397 The route represents the
398
centerpiece of a larger Caspian east-west transport axis.
Washington's ambitious hopes are that this axis will ultimately
include Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas as well, requiring these
eastern littoral states to construct lines that will either cross the
3 99
Caspian Sea or pass around it and into Turkey.
Since 1991 Azerbaijan has been entertaining several other
options for MERs transporting its oil and gas while Russia has
continually pressed for a "northern route" that would run through the
troubled northern Caucuses and meet the CPC line at the
Novorossiysk terminal.400
The need for a short-term solution,
however, required the construction of "early oil" pipelines that would
allow some sale of Azeri oil until the MERs were built.40 1 The United
States and Turkey pushed for an "early oil" route to the Georgian
Black Sea port of Supsa, arguing that the line would represent the
first stage of the Baku-Ceyhan MER. 40 2 Russia also argued that an
existing pipeline from Baku to Novorossiysk could be updated to
ensure increased throughput capacity for the "early oil."403 Feeling
the pressure Baku finally decided to entertain a two-route "early oil"
policy to appease both camps and keep its options open. 4 4 Russian

396.
President Clinton & President Demirel of Turkey, Remarks by President
and President Demirel at Meeting of the Turkish Business Council, (Nov. 17. 1999),
1999 WL 24368512.
397.
DeLay, supranote 264, at 454-56.
398.
See id.
The axis is also sometimes referred to as the "Eurasian
transportation corridor." Entessar, supranote 57, at 172.
399.
Although both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have agreed in principle to
add their hydrocarbon supplies to the Baku-Ceyhan line in order to ensure feasibility of
the project, there is some political doubt as to whether they will come through. See id.
400.
Ben Partridge, Azerbaijan: Report Says Baku Pipeline to Play Key Role in
Future Geopolitics, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, July 31, 1998, at
http-Jlwww.rferl.orglncalfeatures/1998/07/F.RU.980731125156.html (copy on file with
the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw). Turkey is against any route that ends
up in the Black Sea and requires tanker transport to the Mediterranean because it
argues that increased tanker traffic flow in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits has
created ultra-hazardous environmental concerns for the region. Id. Under the
Montreaux Convention of 1937 Turkey is required to allow navigation through the
straits. Id. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline would bypass this problem because it links
Caspian gas directly to the Mediterranean. Id.
401.
"Early oil" is the term used to describe the transport of NIS oil or gas before
the construction of MERs. See, e.g., DeLay, supra note 264, at 49. The capacity of the
pipelines will be minimal, and most probably the volume of oil produced vill be small
because production levels will not reach maximum capacity for a few years. See id.; see
also supra Part II.C.2.a.
402.
See supraPart II.C.2.a.
403.
See id.
404.
Upon news that Azerbaijan planned to construct an MER pipeline that
would bypass Russian territory, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigory Karasin
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aggressiveness once again demonstrated the degree to which Moscow
was serious about the role that MERs would play in securing its
regional interests.

40 5

In February 1999 contractors finished work on

the western end of the pipeline and by April 17 the Baku-Supsa line
loaded its first shipment of "early oil" at the Black Sea terminal. 40 6
The pipeline, as mentioned above, primarily serves the interests
of Turkey and the United States. 40 7 These interest include the
following: 1) a BCP would terminate at a site that was already the
terminus for another major pipeline and that was already equipped
with high-capacity terminal and tanker loading facilities;40 8 2)
Azerbaijan favored the idea of exporting oil with the help of the
Georgians, who had become close allies, and the Turks, with whom
the Azeris share ethnic ties;40 9 3) Turkey pushed for an MER
termination point at Ceyhan instead of one at the Black Sea because
gas delivered at the former would not have to be shipped across the
Black Sea and through the Bosphorus Straits in order to reach its
markets; 4 10 4) the BCP would pass primarily through Turkish
territory-Ankara would thus gain an economic windfall because the
pipeline would mean the collection of transit fees and the generation
of jobs; 411 5) the NIS oil traveling through the pipeline would meet
Turkey's growing energy demands; 4 12 and 6) control over the pipeline
4 13
would be in the hands of American and NATO allies.
While the BCP may arguably be the most politically expedient
solution to U.S. and Turkish geopolitical interests, it is not the most
economically feasible. 414 The costs associated with the project are

released a statement asserting that Russia would not recognize the signing of the
contract creating the AIOC, and that "unilateral actions, especially on resources and
the Caspian Sea, contradict international law and risk damaging the ecological system
of the sea." Nassibli, supra note 155, at 111. The strongest objection to the BakuCeyhan MER came from Valter Shonia, the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan: "We
have had 200 years of cooperation with Azerbaijan ....

Russia is interested in

cooperation with the West over Azerbaijan but if there are some attempts to unseat
Russia, there will be unpleasant consequences." Id.; see also supra notes 173-75 and
accompanying text.
405. The two-route "early oil" strategy is more of a Russian victory than thought
because Russian troops have substantial presence in Georgia, which is continually
struggling against secessionist tendencies in Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia.
BARYLSKI, supra note 65. In reality, therefore, Russia would gain some control over
both the Novorossiysk and Supsa lines. See id.
406.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 73.
407. See infra notes 408-13 and accompanying text.
408. DeLay, supra note 264, at 54
409.
Id. at 54-55.
410. Id. at 55.
411.
Parrot, supranote 216.
412.
See id.
413.
See supranote 142 and accompanying text.
414. See, e.g., Joe Soligo & Barnes Ronald, Baku.Ceyhan Pipeline: Bad
Economics, Bad Politics, Bad Idea, OIL & GAS J., Oct. 26, 1998, 1998 WL 11542379
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mammoth. 4 15 The terrain and distance it must cross is difficult. 416
Questions regarding viability of the pipeline in terms of profitability
still plague the AIOC. 4 17 In short, private financial and commercial
interests of the big oil corporations involved in the joint-ventures
4 18
continue to question the wisdom of constructing the line.
Furthermore, rivalries between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey
regarding the proportion of throughput capacity, transit fees, and
419
other financial concerns continue to plague the project.
The situation for control over gas transport is a similar replay of

Russian and American grandstanding in the region. Here the focus of
American policy is Turkmenistan which many believe contains the

world's fourth largest gas reserves. 420 Turkey figures heavily into the
equation because of its geostrategic position and because it presents a
lucrative import market for international gas exporters. 4 21 Like

(volume and number unavailable). But see Bhamy Shenoy, S. Gurcan Gulen &
Michelle Michot Foss, Analysis Suggests Economic Viability of Trans.CaspianSea Gas
Line, 97 OIL & GAS J. 46, Nov. 15, 1999, 1999 WL 29184965.
415.
Soligo et al., supra note 414. American and European oil companies
generally oppose the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline due to its high costs. Nassibli, supra note
155. Instead they prefer an Iranian route which would cost approximately $1.3 billion.
Id. In May 1999 Turkish energy Undersecretary Yardakul Yigitguden declared that
Ankara believed the cost of the project to run from $2.65 billion to $2.7 billion, rather
than the $2.4 billion originally estimated. DeLay, supra note 264, at 74.
416.
DeLay, supranote 264, at 74.
417.
Ferruh Demirmen, Despite Recent Gains in Momentum, Prospects for the
Baku-Ceyhan Caspian Oil Export Line Remain Doubtful, 97 OIL & GAS J. 46, Nov. 15,
1999, 1999 WL 29184757. Viability concerns deal with projections regarding the
economic returns of the MERs, or the degree to which profits will offset costs. Id. The
concerns are two-fold- 1) whether world oil prices will sustain the weight of the project;
and 2) whether throughput volume, or the actual amount of production that will be
transported through the pipelines, will be sufficient to offset the sizeable production
costs associated -with the projects. Id. More specifically, world oil prices steadily
declined throughout 1998 and were averaging about $12 per barrel at the end of the
year. DeLay, supra note 246, at 73. Azerbaijani oil is not profitable unless prices top
the $12 per-barrel mark. Id. This forced the AIOC to cut expenses any way it could.
See id. In late 1998 and early 1999 the consortium managers drafted major cost.
cutting programs and pushed back the start date of the main oil development program
to 2003. Id. They also declared that under no circumstances were they willing to
commit to a pipeline that would cost $3.7 billion or more. Id.
418.
Hugh Pope, American Firms Win Pipeline Project; U.S. Aid Believed Vital
to Caspian Job, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1999, 1999 WL-WSJ 5440660. Without massive
U.S. and corporate financial involvement the Baku-Ceyhan project is totally
impracticable. Id. But see DeLay, supra note 246, at 73 (explaining that as of May
1999 the AIOC had backed away from making any formal decisions regarding an MER
due to worries that the project was simply not economical).
419.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 56.
420.
See UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION. CASPIAN SEA
REGION, supranote 41. Russia and Iran are the first and second largest gas producers
in the world, respectively. See id.
421.
During the Soviet era, Turkey was the biggest buyer of Russian gas.
Parrot, supra note 126. The break-up of the Soviet Union allows Ankara to diversify
its gas base by adding Turkmenistan and even Azerbaijan to its import list. See id.
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Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan is in a difficult position because it too is
located on the eastern side of the Caspian and is, therefore,
essentially land-locked. 422
Any westward pipeline route from
Turkmenistan would either have to bypass Russian territory, cross
Caspian waters, or go through Iran. 4 23 For its part, Russia has
already courted Ashqabad with its own MER dubbed "Blue Stream,"
designed to carry Turkmen gas through Kazakhstan, into Russia,
under the Black Sea, and into Turkey. 424 Despite the great logistical
problems associated with underwater pipeline laying in the Black Sea
the project has already begun construction and will probably export
Turkmen gas to Turkey well before the proposed Trans-Caspian
425
pipeline.
President Niyazov has dedicated much time and energy to
establishing new gas export routes after relations soured with
Gazprom, the state-run body responsible for the transport of gas
throughout Russia. 426 With Ashqabad in desperate need for foreign
capital, a trans-Caspian westward route into Turkey began to gain
427
momentum despite the logistical and financial difficulties involved.
Like the BCP, the TCP would pass through the territories of
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. 428 The same political and economic
windfalls that would accrue to these countries and the United States
from the BCP would also accrue to them via this trans-Caspian

Iran also seeks Turkey as a customer for its gas. Lelyveld, supra note 245; see also
Iran, Turkey Agree to Delay in Gas Deliveries, supra note 246; Part II.C.3.c (analyzing
proposed gas pipeline construction projects linking Turkmenistan and Iran to Turkey).
422.
See ATLAS OF THE WORLD, supra note 6, at 56.
423.
In other words, Turkmenistan must either rely on a "northern route"
through Kazakhstan and Russia, a "western [Trans-Caspian] route," or a "southern
[Iranian] route." See id.
424.
Robert Lyle, Caspian: View Differ on Viability of Oil Pipelines,RADIO FREE
EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Mar. 4, 1999, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/03/

F.RU.990304125619.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational
Law). The project, however, faces serious technical difficulties because of the depth of
the Black Sea. Id.
425.
Id.; see infra notes 427-34 (discussing the details of Turkmenistan's TransCaspian pipeline project).
426.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 69; see also supra notes 265-69 and
accompanying text (discussing the Turkmen-Russian gas pipeline dispute).
427. The political problems involved are the following: both Moscow and Tehran
officially object to any trans-Caspian route based primarily on environmental concerns,
although geopolitical interests are their primary motives. Iran Voices Opposition to
Turkmen-U.S. Oil Deal, supra note 224. The long-standing legal dispute between
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over delimitation of their sectors has also delayed the
construction of the TCP. See Ignatius, supra note 248, at 27A. To add to the problems,
Azerbaijan has recently threatened to add its own significant flow of gas to the line,
displacing previously projected Turkmen volumes and competing for access to the
Turkish market. Pope, supra note 238, at A23; see also Lelyveld, supra note 244. The
economic problems largely regard the financial viability of the project. Demirmen,
supra note 417.
428.
See supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text.
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"western route. ' 429 The problems associated with this project,
arguably the most expensive and ambitious of all proposed Caspian
MERs, include: 1) vociferous Russian and Iranian objection to any
430
pipeline crossing the Caspian Sea floor on environmental grounds;
2) the logistics of constructing an underwater pipeline across the
Caspian; 431 3) the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea,
especially with regard to the dispute between Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan regarding delimitation of their "sectors,"432 4) the huge
costs associated with such a project; 433 and 5) dealing with
434
geopolitical instability associated with any trans-Caucus route.
Finally, with respect to Caspian legal issues, it is important to
note that arguments asserting that the unresolved legal status of the
Caspian Sea requires unanimous multilateral consent with respect to
any development projects are most valid when dealing with any
pipeline project attempting to cross Caspian waters. 435 This is so
because such a transit route inevitably touches upon the rights and
concerns of all littoral states involved, whether these rights involve
ownership, transportation, or environmental issues.
4 36
To date work on the TCP gas pipeline has been very slow.
Moreover, a legal dispute between Baku and Ashqabad regarding
delimitation of their "sectors" of the Caspian has all but stalled any
progress on plans to begin construction of the TCP. 437 To make
matters worse the constant political and legal wavering of Ashqabad
on key related issues, including the legal status of the Caspian Sea,
has substantially reduced investment confidence in an already risky
4 38
pipeline venture.
c. Iran and the "Southern Route"
Then there is the Iran factor. 439 Iran's geostrategic position
straddling, the oil-rich Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea and its

429.

See supra notes 407-13 and accompanying text.

430. Iran Voices Oppositionto Turkmen-U.S. Oil Deal, supra note 224.
431.
See id.
432.
See generally infra Parts HI, IV, V, for legal analysis of the status of the
Caspian Sea.
433.
See, e.g., Shenoy et al., supra note 279.
434.
See id.
435.
See Iran Voices Oppositionto Turhemen-U.S. Oil Deal, supra note 224.
436.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 74.
437. Id.
438.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 72.
439.
See Fuller, supra note 5. Graham Fuller states:
Any elementary look at the map will show that Iran sits astride this region and
really is in the center of it. You can't get from East to West, or West to East
without being extremely ingenious in your transportation to avoid traveling
through Iran itself. From my point of view American policy is highly
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advanced infrastructural and transport capacities (not to mention its
relatively stable political environment, especially when compared to
the Caucuses and Central Asia) represent a competitive advantage
over Turkish and Russian export routes. 44 0 Political scholars, policy
architects, and international oil companies have all argued that the
"southern route" represents the most cost-efficient means of exporting
Caspian oil and gas to world markets. 4 4' With the prospect of eastern

export routes through Afghanistan or Pakistan remaining highly
improbable at the present, 442 the Persian Gulf route presents the
added benefit of geographic proximity to South and East Asian
markets where analysts predict demand
for oil and gas will outstrip
443
Western demand in years to come.
Tehran's approach to solving Caspian transportation issues has
been piecemeal primarily because of the political barriers to the
laying of pipelines across Iranian territory and because of Iran's slow
entrance into the Caspian pipeline game. 444 Iran realizes, however,
that its strategic position affords it the luxury of avoiding major MER
construction projects because its present infrastructural capacity 445
and location allow it to satisfy NIS needs through a combination of oil
swap and pipeline upgrade programs. 446 By enhancing the capacity

unrealistic towards Iran, and is increasingly under challenge .... [I]f Iran is
not a part of the future energy picture it will be virtually impossible to deal in
this region without it. The people who are trying to bring oil in and out of the
region know it, the Azeris know it, and Baku, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
despite their suspicions about Iran, also understand that their policies are
greatly complicated by US policy.
Id.
440.
See Stuart Parrot, Iran: Tehran's Foreign Policy Looks in All Directions,
RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 10, 1998, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/
features/1997/11/F.RU.971110121412.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof
TransnationalLaw).
441.
Kinzer, supra note 304, at Al; see also Entessar, supra note 57, at 174
(explaining that the "southern route" through Iran is the preferred option for many oil
companies). There are already numerous pipelines and port facilities in Iran that can
easily carry shipments of Caspian energy to the Persian Gulf. Id. Also, Turkmen gas
fields are already linked to Iran and Azeri oil fields can be easily connected to oil
refineries in Iran. Id. This route also has the added benefit of being able to bypass the
congested Strait of Hormuz by routing the pipelines to the Iranian port of Jask instead.
Id.
442.
See infra notes 463-78 and accompanying text.
443. Babak, supra note 109, at 202.
444.
Parrot, supra note 440 (explaining how Iran is looking to alternate means
of contributing to the Caspian's energy transport policy, including the expansion of its
already existing gas pipeline network and facilitating oil swaps).
445.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 64 (explaining that Iran's current pipeline
infrastructure is more reliable than that of Russia).
446.
See infra Part VI, for a discussion of Iran's ability to link its geopolitical
interests with its legal interests in order to trigger its competitive advantage in the
Caspian transportation sector.
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of existing pipelines and extending the length of other ones Iran has
the ability to purchase NIS oil and gas directly, then recover costs by
4 47
selling its own oil and gas via Persian Gulf terminals.
The oil swap model, however, cannot be the long-term solution to
NIS transportation problems if Caspian production levels meet
projected estimates within the next several years.448 By then the
high volume of Caspian oil and gas will not be accommodated by
simple pipeline enhancements. 449 Assuming that political barriers to
pipeline construction across Iranian territory are eventually
overcome, however, Iran also represents the most cost-efficient and
viable MER. 450
Construction costs will still be cheaper than
competing MER projects because the plan would simply require
reversing the oil that already flows through the existing network of
pipelines that currently run from northern and central refineries in
451
Tabriz, Tehran, and Isfahan to the Persian Gulf.
While Azerbaijan (and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan) has not
seriously entertained the possibility of MER pipelines through Iran
both have engaged in talks discussing the possibility of oil and gas
swaps as an early option for distributing their resources to world
markets. 452
Current pipelines (and plans) in Iran include the
ambitious expansion of pipelines connecting Turkmen gas to Iran,
which will eventually be linked to Turkey,4 3 and the construction of
several more pipelines extending an already existing network of lines
further north into the Caspian Sea. 4 54 In short, Iran could represent

447.
See supra notes 360-63 and accompanying text (explaining the intricacies of
the oil swap model). As mentioned before, under this arrangement the Iranian side
would take delivery of Caspian oil, send it to Tehran or Tabriz for processing and
distribution, and then make an equivalent amount of crude available in the producer's
name at the Kharg Island terminal in the Persian Gulf. DeLay, supra note 264. at 65.
448.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 65.
449.
Id.
450.
Id. at 66.
451.
Id.
452.
But see Azerbaijan Will Consider Oil Exports via Armenia and Iran, 5
ALEXANDER'S GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS 1, Jan. 25, 2000, at http//vvw.gasandoil.com/

goctnewslntc00462.htm (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational
Law). In the early 1990s Azerbaijan seriously entertained Iran's proposals to carry its

"early oil" through Iranian pipelines. Azerbaijan Planning PL To Divert its Oil to
Black Sea Via Iran, Turkey, 69 PLATr'S OILGRAM NEWS 248, Dec. 27. 1991. 1991 WL
2445161. See also Babak, supra note 109, at 201 (explaining that the Kazakhs have
visited Tebran on several occasions and consider Iran to be one of their major partners
in the Near East, and that officials consider the issue of transporting Kazakh oil
through Iran to be a main topic of bilateral negotiations between the two nations).
453.

Dutch-Shell has already begun feasibility studies regarding linking

Turkmen and Iranian gas lines to Turkey. See Azeris Brush Off Russian Proposalon
CaspianSplit, supra note 192.
454.

This includes the Neka-Rey pipeline that will link the Caspian port of Rey

to the town of Neka situated just north of the Tehran oil refinery. Iran's Foreign
Minister Callsfor CaspianConvention, supra note 231.
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"a bustling transport hub and the center of gravity of the world oil
455
industry."
Yet the interest shown in Iranian pipeline plans does not exactly
match the NIS' ambitions of becoming world-class energy
exporters. 4 56 Tehran has proven much more willing to discuss swaps
than pipelines because they offer it a fast and easy way to meet its
northern urban consumption demand and thrust it into the Caspian
export market.

457

Finally, Turkmenistan has already started cooperating with Iran
on the possibility of constructing several gas lines across the latter's
territory. 4 58 One gas pipeline to Iran has already opened-the 190
km link between Korpeje and Kord-Kuy, built at a cost of $190
million, was commissioned in December 1997. 4 59 President Niyazov

hopes that a much longer pipeline stretching 3,200 km or more from
Dauletabad field and crossing all of Turkey as well as northwestern
Iran will also be built. 460 He would also like to see some of the
country's oil pass through Iran and into the Persian Gulf.4 61 Several

European and American companies, including Mobil, have already
4 62
asked Washington for permission to conduct such swaps.
d. The "Eastern Routes"
The NIS have flirted with several export options that would
make use of an "eastern route" serving either South Asia through
Afghanistan, Pakistan, or India, or East Asia via China. 4 63 The
advantages of such an MER are numerous. For one, demand in these
regions is predicted to outstrip demand in the West in the near

455.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 64.
456. Id. at 65.
457. Id. In other words swaps could help keep Iran's big cities supplied with
natural gas, make Kazakhstan and other NIS dependent on Iranian markets and
transport routes, and raise Iran's profile in the Persian Gulf. Id.
458.
Id. at 71.
459. Id. For Iran the construction of the Kord-Kuy pipeline linking it with
Turkmenistan is so important that it funded some eighty-five percent of the $200
million project with the understanding that Turkmenistan would repay its share by
supplying undetermined volumes of free natural gas to Iran for three years. Id. at 172.
460. Id. at 71. In 1996 Turkey and Iran signed a $20 billion agreement for the
purchase of natural gas through Iran. Id. at 171. Turkey signed the deal despite U.S.
pressure to abandon the project. Id. at 172. Turkey has also announced that it plans
to construct a 188-mile pipeline linking the Iranian border with the Turkish city of
Erzerum. Id. This section will later be connected to a 623-mile Erzerum-Ankara
pipeline that will ultimately allow Turkmen and Iranian gas to reach the Turkish
capital. Id.
461.
Id.
462. Id. at 72.
463.
See, e.g., supra note 350 and accompanying text (outlining Kazakhstan's
consideration of the "eastern route" option).
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future. 464 These largely untapped markets present the NIS with a
long-term, forward-looking export base that promises to be as
lucrative, if not more lucrative than the relatively saturated western
energy markets. 465 Like their counterparts, however, these MER
projects are not devoid of serious political and economic problems.

466

More specifically with regard to the South Asian "eastern routes,"
Afghanistan remains a wholly impracticable option because of
persistent war, and constant tensions between Pakistan and India
continue to hamper efforts to serve the Asian subcontinent. 4 67 Here
again, the NIS, India, and Pakistan have looked to the possibility of
Iran serving as a transit country. 468 Though negotiations and talks
regarding such an "eastern route" through Iran are underway, no
469
major progress has yet been made.

Finally, there has been ongoing talk about the prospect of
constructing a pipeline from Kazakhstan to East Asia.470 China's
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) began conducting feasibility
studies for an ambitious pipeline plan that would transport Kazakh
oil to China. 471 Some 600 km of the pipeline worth $300 million were
already in place as of spring 1998.472 Once the line is finished it will
be able to carry twenty million metric tons of oil per year. 473 If the

pipeline is completed it will be the longest oil transport link in the
world. 47 4 Despite the potential benefits of such a pipeline, however,

there are major problems that must be dealt with.475 The pipeline is
expected to terminate in China's Xinjiang province, a poor region
with an Uighur population that has had long-standing ethnic and
religious complaints against Beijing. 476 Political problems aside,
pipeline construction has never been undertaken on such a vast
scale.477 The CNPC will be 'lucky indeed if its ambitious pipeline
project does not encounter... financial and technical problems on a
478
grand scale."

464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

Babak, supranote 109, at 202.
See id.
DeLay, supra note 264, at 67.
Id.
Id.
See id.
DeLay, supranote 264, at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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III. THE CLOUDY LEGAL DIMENSION OF CASPIAN GEOPOLITICS

A. The Big Picture
Although the official position of the littoral states with respect to
the applicable law governing a legal regime for the Caspian's
resources has often been inconsistent and fickle each state has
attempted to strengthen its geopolitical position by referring to an
applicable legal model or regime.4 79 A Special Working Group (SWG)
involving key diplomats of the five littoral states has met on and off
for the past several years in order to hammer out a convention on the
regime of the Sea. 48 0 A legal center coordinating the group of the
SWG has also been set up in Baku.48 1 So far, however, an effective
multilateral legal approach has been sacrificed in place of bilateral
agreements between the states, ostensibly creating a multitude of
48 2
interim legal relationships.
On April 5, 1994, the legal status of the Caspian Sea received
international attention for the first time when the UK ambassador to
Russia received a confidential note from Moscow challenging
Azerbaijan's position on the status of the Sea. 48 3 Pursuant to this
event the five littoral states met in Moscow in October of 1994 to
further discuss regional cooperation regarding exploitation of the
Caspian's resources. 48 4 The Russians staunchly warned against
unilateral action taken by any of the littoral states. 485 A year later
then President Yeltsin of Russia rejected any notions that the Sea
may be divided amongst the littoral states. 48 6 Finally, in November

479.
See, e.g., Turkmenistan Details CaspianLicense Round, 95 OIL & GAS J. 39,
Sept. 29, 1997, 1997 WL 9575817; infra Part III.B (outlining the individual legal
positions of the littoral states).
480.
Iran'sForeign Minister Calls for Caspian Convention, supra note 231.
481.
See id.
482.
See, e.g., Margaret McQuaile, Iran, Kazakhstan Pact Sets Caspian Sea
Work Rights, 74 PLArr'S OILGRAM NEWS 96, May 16, 1996, 1996 WL 8705495
(explaining an Iranian-Kazakh declaration recognizing each littoral state's right to
exploit its Caspian mineral resources); Babak, supra note 109, at 188-93 (analyzing
legal diplomacy between Russia and Kazakhstan and the ultimate execution of a
bilateral agreement on division of the northern Caspian between the two littoral
states).
483.
Nassibli, supra note 155, at 112. Russia directed the protest at the United
Kingdom because of the latter's participation in the AIOC and because Moscow was
concerned about the entry of Western oil corporations into the Caspian basin. See id.
484. Id. at 112. A representative of the Russian FM declared that the legal
status of the Sea was determined by the Turkmenchai Treaty signed between Russia
and Persian in 1828. Id.; see also infra Part IV.A.1, for an analysis of the Turkmenchai
Treaty and other Soviet-Iranian Treaties.
485.
Nassibli, supra note 155, at 112.
486.
Id. Yeltsin declared: "The Caspian Sea is a specific sea, an internal sea. It
cannot be divided among the littoral states. All Caspian states have to work out joint
programs for the development of biological, gas, and oil treasures of the Caspian Sea."
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1996 Ashqabad hosted yet another conference on the legal status of
the Sea. 4 87 The Azeris strongly advocated division of the Sea into
national sectors, relying on a 1970 Soviet decision to divide the Sea
into four agreeable parts.48 8
They also declared that from a
geographical point of view the Caspian is a sea, not a lake.489 The
Kazakhs also agreed with this proposal.4 90 The Russians retreated
from their earlier position rejecting any sectoral division and instead
submitted a compromise solution calling for a dual or "split regime"
distinguishing between the surface waters and the subsoil resources
49 1
of the Sea.
Despite these multilateral efforts, however, the littoral states

have so far approached exploration and exploitation issues in the
Caspian in a seemingly practical manner-they have assumed that
notwithstanding legal agreements validating condominium principles
allowing at least some areas of the Sea to be joined in common, they
are free to exercise sovereignty over their coastline and offshore
waters. 492 The more contentious outgrowth of such a policy, however,
has been the NIS' practice (especially Azerbaijan) of unilaterally
exploiting oil and gas resources based on the theory that

Id. According to Nassibli, however, Yeltsin's remarks rely on the Soviet-Iranian
Treaties of 1921 and 1940 and are ill-founded because the treaties do not discuss
mineral reserves. See id.
487.
Id. at 113.
488.
Id. Further, Nassibli suggests that the Soviets actually divided the Sea
into two zones, one Soviet and the other Iranian. See id. at 112. But see discussion
infra Parts IV.B-C (rejecting the legal validity of administrative boundary delimitation
during the Soviet era).
489.
Nassibli, supra note 155, at 112.
490.
Id. More specifically the Kazakhs declared that while the territorial waters
and fishing zones of the Sea may be used in common, the seabed should be divided into
national sectors. Id.
491.
Id. According to this proposal the first forty-five offshore miles of the
Caspian should be treated as territorial (meaning that both the waters and the subsoil
resources would be the exclusive property of the adjoining littoral state), and the
remaining part of the Sea (surface and sub-surface) should be viewed as common
property. Id.; see also infra Part Ill.B.4, for a more in-depth analysis of the Russian
"doughnut proposal;" infra Part V.B.2, for in-depth analysis of several "split regime"
models.
492.
Azerbaijan, for example, isn't waiting on a regional solution. Russia and
Iran Continue to Press for Cooperative, MultinationalDeuelopment of Caspian Sea Oil
and Gas, 94 OIL & GAS J. 11, Mar. 11, 1996, 1996 WL 8286887. It went forth with
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) and consortium arrangements for the AzeriChirag-Guneshli and Karabakh sites as early as 1995. Id. Similarly, even Russia and
Iran, who have been most adamant regarding unilateral exploration and production
activities in the Caspian, have begun development of their Caspian oil fields off its
shores so they do not fall behind in the production race. Iran's First Oil Platform in
Caspian Sea Starts Operation, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, Feb. 24, 1996, 1996 WL
3810426; see also Babak, supra note 109, at 188-93 (explaining Russia's latest
concession regarding the advantages of engaging in bilateral agreements with the

NIS).
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administrative boundaries imposed upon the Sea during the Soviet
era are still applicable. 493 Though this rough and ready approach
seems to be a practical solution there is no definite consensus among
the littoral states on the494specific boundaries upon which de facto
delimitation should occur.
If the extension of Soviet era administrative boundaries is the
default rule governing NIS relations in the Caspian, then bilateral
agreements between littoral states represent temporary attempts to
smooth out the inconsistencies and inefficiencies of such rules in the
wake of a more comprehensive and permanent agreement involving
all littoral states.
Indeed the pattern of recent diplomatic
developments seems to suggest such a piecemeal and noncomprehensive approach to the resolution of legal issues regarding
ownership rights. 495 All the littoral states, including Russia and
Iran, have entered into joint venture and contractual agreements
with domestic and foreign companies for on and offshore
development. 4 96 Several littoral states have entered into bilateral
agreements dividing their areas into "national sectors" and others are
continually pursuing this path of negotiation. 497 Furthermore, the
United States firmly believes that sectoral division of the Sea is in the
4 98
interest of all parties involved.
Finally, there is some doubt as to whether the murky legal
499
status of the Caspian has and will dissuade foreign involvement.
Although all littoral states outwardly agree on the principle of
unanimous consent and multilateralism regarding a comprehensive
regime governing relations in the Caspian, several have claimed that
the lack of such a regime should not obstruct advancement of oil and
gas projects. 500 The record seems to verify this trend.50 1 In short, the
present record of state practice and legal maneuvering has not led to
the development of any consistent legal understanding regarding

493.

See supra note 488 and accompanying text. But see generally infra Part

IV.B, for a legal analysis of the effect of Soviet boundary delimitation between
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and itself.
494.
See, e.g., the dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over where the
Soviet administrative delimitation lines exactly lie. Mesamed, supra note 121, at 215.
495.
See generally supra Part II.B.1; see also infra Part III.B.
496.
See generally supra Part II.B. 1.
497.
Id.
498.
Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 34. This is not surprising given
the geopolitical interests of the United States in the Caspian region. See supra Part
II.A.2.d.
499.
See, e.g., Hearings I, supra note 144. Pitman, Chairman and President of
Amoco Eurasia Petroleum Company, introduced testimony that suggested that the
murky legal status of the Caspian is deterring foreign corporate involvement in the
region. Id.
500.
See generally supra Part II.B.1.
501.
Azerbaijan's several multi-billion dollar Caspian deals attests to this. See
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littoral relations in the Caspian. Additionally the legal posturing of
the states has done little to clear up the status picture though this is
not surprising considering the varying and conflicting geopolitical
interests of the littoral states.
B. Legal Diplomacy: The IndividualState Positions

1. Azerbaijan: The Radical Advocate
The most adamant and consistent state has been Azerbaijan,
which from the beginning insisted that the Third UN Convention on
the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) recognizing the existence of territorial
50 2
seas and exclusive economic zones should apply to the Caspian.
This position is not surprising when one realizes that more than
eighty percent of Azerbaijan's current energy production comes from
offshore fields.50 3
For Azerbaijan, therefore, the stakes are huge:
common ownership of the Sea and its resources effectively means the
loss of control and a threat to the very well-being and independence of
50 4
the country.
The official Azeri position is: 1) that the seabed must be divided
on the bases of the equidistance or median line principle; 2) the
Soviet-Iranian Treaties of 1921 and 1940 are inapplicable to mining
rights and regulate only fishing and navigation routes; 3) the Soviet
Union divided the Caspian into Iranian and Soviet zones by drawing
a boundary line across the Sea between Astara and Hosseingholi and
further dividing the Soviet sector among Azerbaijan, Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan; and 4) the Azerbaijani Mallis (or
Parliament) and the Constitution have codified the principle of
sovereignty over the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian. 505
Given the competitive advantage of Azerbaijan vis-A-vis other
littoral states in the oil and gas race it is understandable why Baku
has been the most aggressive advocate of sectoral division of the
Caspian. 50 6 The United States, while officially claiming that the
status of the Sea should be resolved based on mutual consent of all
parties, is in general agreement with the Azeri position.50 7 In short,

502. See id. For an in-depth legal analysis of the Third UN Convention on the
Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), see infra Part V .A
503. Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 30.
504. See id. at 30-31.
David Starr, AzerbaijanAsserts Legal Rights over Caspian, 23 OIL & GAS J.
505.
45, Nov. 11, 1994, 1994 WL 8522981. For information regarding delimitation based on

the equidistance and median line principles, see infra 782-804 and accompanying text.
506. See id.
507. Nassibli, supranote 155, at 113 (explaining that Balms success at resisting
Russian pressure regarding the legal status of the Caspian is due in large part to U.S.
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Azerbaijan has not budged from its original position that only

sectoral division of the Sea based on the UNCLOS may define the
legal status of the Caspian Sea.
2. Kazakhstan: Flexibility and Finesse
Kazakhstan is the second most consistent party arguing for
general application of the UNCLOS, but its position is distinguished
from Baku's in that it has pursued diplomatic compromise in order to
ensure that its legal right to exploit its "sector" of the Caspian
remains in tact. 508 The official Kazakh position may be summarized
as follows: 1) the Caspian is a sea and thus falls under the UNCLOS
regime; 2) littoral state borders should include territorial waters
extending twelve miles offshore; 3) the rest of the Sea must be divided
into EEZs. 50 9 Like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan referred to Moscow's
1970 decision to administratively divide the Caspian among the
Soviet republics in order to bolster its position regarding
delimitation. 510 Based on this median-line division administered by
the Soviet Ministry of Oil Industry, Kazakhstan would receive the
most beneficial conditions-approximately 113,000 square km of the
Caspian surface. 5 11
Despite this official stance, however, Kazakhstan has pursued a
more nuanced diplomatic approach because of its relations with
Russia. Kazakhstan has taken a very careful position on the status of

support for sectoral division). Also, Baku has sought to undermine Russia's legal
position regarding common ownership of Caspian resources by tightening pollution
standards in its own "sector" of the Sea. Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 31.
This strategy is important because Russia [and Iran] rely on environmental arguments
to bolster their position that the Sea should be owned in common. Id.; see also infra
Part VI.C.3.c, for discussion of the validity of the environmental strategy as a means of
securing Iran's interests in the region.
508.
Mary Patterson, Kazakhstan Looks to Iran for Caspian Outlet, 44 OIL &
GASJ. 213, Aug. 12, 1996, 1996 WL 9112543.
509.
Babak, supra note 109, at 183. In 1996 Deputy Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Gizatov of Kazakhstan summarized Astana's position advocating sectoral
division: "[W]e took into consideration not only international standards .... but also a
practice formed decades ago by the USSR and Iran on the Caspian, where these
countries drilled for oil totally independently and without mutual consultations." Id. at
184; see also infra notes 754-58 (discussing the EEZ under the UNCLOS). But see
infra Part IV.A.3, for a critique of this view.
Babak, supra note 109, at 184. The Kazakhs further argued that since by
510.
mutual agreement of the ex-Soviet republics the administrative borders of the Soviet
era were recognized as international borders, the same should apply in the case of the
Caspian. Id. But see discussion infra Part IV.B. They also referred to the Constitution
of the USSR which formally recognized the Republics as sovereign states with
independent rights to their natural resources. Babak, supranote 109, at 184.
Babak, supra note 109, at 184. The division resulted in the following share
511.
of the Caspian: 1) Kazakhstan: 113,000 square km; 2) Azerbaijan: 78,000 square km;
3) Turkmenistan: 79,000 square km; and 4) Russia: 64,000 square km. Id.
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the Caspian because it does not want to escalate conflict with
Moscow.

512

In this regard, Astana has followed a delicate policy of

diplomacy aimed simultaneously at appeasing Moscow while also
strengthening its position regarding ultimate sectoral division of the
Sea. 5 13 President Nazarbayev has managed to successfully satisfy
both diplomatic goals by ensuring that Russia participates in Kazakh
joint-ventures and by executing several mutual declarations that
allow it to exploit hydrocarbon basins located in its "national
sectors."5 14 After a fair bit of diplomatic dancing, Astana was finally
successful in reaching a bilateral side-agreement with Moscow
regarding partition of the northern Caspian seabed on July 1998. 5 15
3. Turkmenistan: Playing the Waiting Game
Turkmenistan's legal position on the Caspian is difficult to
assess.5 1 6 In October 1993 it was the first littoral state to pass a law
5 17
that declared its jurisdiction over a twelve-mile territorial sea.
Since then Ashqabad has continuously switched views and alliances,
leaving an inconsistent trail of legal arguments in its path.51 8 In part
512.

Id. at 187.

513.

See Babak, supra note 109, at 188.90.

According to Babak Astana

employed a "strategy of tactical concessions" to realize its ultimate goals on sectoral
division of the Sea. Id. at 188. It did so by employing a two.pronged strategy that
assured Moscow that Kazakhstan would not neglect the former's Caspian interest and
would work toward joint cooperation on all regional issues while also keeping Moscow
on notice that it would unilaterally exploit resources in its "sector" if push came to
shove. See id. at 188-89.
514. Id. at 189, 191.
Russia signed several mutual declarations with
Kazakhstan which ultimately led to the signing of the agreement to subdivide the
northern Caspian seabed. Id. at 189-90. With each passing declaration Astana
adjusted Moscow's position so that it would ultimately be forced to accept the idea of
sectoral division. See id. In 1996 Moscow seemingly agreed with the principal that
each littoral state had a right to exploit the resources under its "national sector" but
maintained that the surface waters should be used in common. Id. at 189. Moscow
officialized this position in the 1996 meeting of the littoral states' foreign affairs
ministers in Ashqabad by drawing up the forty-five mile "doughnut proposal." Id. at
189-90. Both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, however, rejected the proposal because they
realized that the legal effects of the proposal would actually give Moscow substantial
veto powers over oil and gas development in the Sea. Id. at 190.
515. Id. at 192. The agreement divided the seabed but left the water surface
and the fish resources part of common property. Id. In return Astana pledged to
prevent other countries from constructing pipelines on the bottom of the Caspian
without the consent of all five littoral states. Id.; see also Upperton, supra note 226.
516. See generally Mesamed, supra note 121, at 213-19, for an analysis of
Ashqabad's confusing legal diplomacy regarding the status of the Caspian Sea.
517. Id. at 210. Legally this was a significant move because it indirectly
recognized the Caspian as a sea instead of a lake. Id.
518. See, e.g., Turkmenistan-Background of Caspian Disputes, 51 APS REv.
OIL MEr. TRENDS 10, Sept. 7, 1998, 1998 WL 9526571.
In February 1997
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan signed a statement calling for a division of the Caspian
based on Soviet era divisions until the littoral states agreed on a new legal regime. Id.
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Ashqabad's waffling on the legal status of the Caspian may have had
to do with the fact that unlike Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan has no urgent economic incentive to define the legal
status of the Caspian because its priority is the development of its gas
519
reserves, not its oil reserves.
In November 1995 Turkmenistan proclaimed the Caspian to be a
unique body of water to which all littoral states should have access.

520

A year later Ashqabad seemed to move closer to the Azeri and
Kazakh positions calling for sectoral division of the Sea. 52 1 In 1997

Niyazov assured Moscow and Tehran that until consensus on a legal
regime for the Caspian is reached Turkmenistan
would abide by the
522
provisions of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties.
Despite the generally ambivalent stance Ashqabad has taken on
the legal status of the Caspian, however, two events have forced it to
take a more vocal stand on the issue. The first event that caused
Ashqabad to reconsider its ambivalent views on the legal status of the
Caspian occurred in the summer of 1997 when Azerbaijan executed a
joint venture agreement with Russia over the development of the
disputed Kaipaz-Serdar oil field. 523 Baku had already rejected
Ashqabad's earlier claims that part of the Azeri and all of the Chirag
offshore fields actually fell within Turkmenistan's "sector" of the Sea;
it followed suit here as well. 524

This time Turkmen authorities

threatened to take their case to the United Nations or the
International Court of Justice. 525 They insisted that both the Azeris
and the Russians invalidate the development agreement over the
Kaipaz-Serdar field and hold off on any further agreements until the

519. Turkmenistan did not inherit much of an oil industry from the Soviet eraits huge natural gas reserves are substantially larger than its oil reserves. DeLay,
supra note 264, at 68. Ashqabad, however, has not totally neglected development of
Turkmenistan's oil resources. Id. at 69. In the early to mid-1990s it enacted a
comprehensive petroleum law and signed a number of on and offshore exploration and
development contracts with foreign companies. Id. There is a lot of work to be done in
this field, however. Id. As of mid-1998 Turkmenistan had not yet begun preliminary
work on any oil export pipeline projects. Id.
520.
Mesamed, supra note 121, at 215-16. As a result the Turkmens
temporarily adopted the idea of mutual or common ownership. Id. at 216.
521.
Id. at 216 (pointing out that at the conference Russia and Iran (the "Big
Two') formed an alliance against Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan (the
'Tripartite Union'), with the latter three advocating sectoral division of the Sea).
522.
Id. at 217.
523.
Id. at 214. In July 1997 an agreement valuing approximately $2 billion
was signed between the Russian companies LUKoil and Rosneft and SOCAR regarding
the exploitation of the Kaipaz oil deposit, known in Turkmen documents as Serdar. Id.
524. Id. at 215.
525.
Croissant & Croissant, supranote 23, at 34. At the request of Ashqabad an
interim group of experts from the American law firm of Hogan & Hartson
independently concluded that, pursuant to a median-line division of the Sea into
sectors, the Kaipaz-Serdar field actually fell into the Turkmen sector. Mesamed, supra
note 121, at 215.
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legal status of the Caspian is resolved. 526 In July 1997 the Russians
gave into Ashqabad's demands and backed out of the development
5 27
agreement
The second event involved the late-developing relationship
between Ashqabad and Washington regarding the possibility of
constructing a trans-Caspian gas line.528 By 1998 it seemed that
President Niyazov had become convinced that sectoral division of the
Caspian promised the best economic future for Turkmenistan. 529 In
part he was convinced of the utility of delimitation because of
agreements signed with major American oil companies for the
construction of the TCP. 530 It was clear that if Ashqabad wanted to
ally itself with Washington in order to tap into a trans-Caspian MER
for its gas, the seabed must be divided into "national sectors" to allow
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to lay pipelines across their respective
seafloors. 531 This is so because sectoral division provides the most
stable and predictable legal environment that preserves corporate
confidence in the legal validity of ambitious projects such as the
53 2
TCP.
The Turkmen-U.S. rapprochement regarding the construction of
the TCP has, more than any other diplomatic maneuver taken on by
Niyazov, caused a rift between the legal views of Tehran and Russia
on the one hand, and Ashqabad on the other.53 3 Prior to U.S.
overtures enticing Turkmenistan to consider a "western route" for its
gas Ashqabad desired close ties with Russia [and Iran] and its views
Though
were generally thought to be in line with theirs.5 34
Turkmenistan's Niyazov has shown his official support more than
once for a Russian-Iranian conception of the Caspian, Russia and
35
Iran could no longer rely on Turkmenistan after 1998.5

526.
Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 34. In a joint communiqu6
adopted by Moscow and Ashqabad before the former officially decided to back out of the
development agreement, it was said that "until the determination of a new status for
the Caspian, the issue of activities on the sea must be realized and strictly brought into
line with earlier treaties signed between the USSR and Iran on the basis of consensus
and a refusal to accept a kind of unilateral solution." Mesamed, supra note 121. at 215.
527.
Mesamed, supra note 121, at 214-15.
528.
Id. at 217-18.
529.
Id. at 217.
530.
Id. Washington also pledged to earmark $750,000 to Ashqabad for the
carrying out of a feasibility study on regional pipelines. Id. at 217.18.
531.
See supra note 435 and accompanying text (explaining that sectoral
division provides the most stable legal environment for the construction of a transCaspian pipeline).
532.
See id.
Mesamed, supra note 121, at 218; see also supra notes 420-38 and
533.
accompanying text (discussing Iranian and Russian objections to any trans-Caspian
pipeline route).
Mesamed, supra note 121, at 213.
534.

535.

Id.
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In some ways the above events highlight Ashqabad's acceptance
of the sectoral division approach. In other ways, however, they seem
to reinforce Ashqabad's more conservative approach calling for
multilateral consensus on the legal regime of the Caspian and
rejecting unilateral exploitation of the Sea's subsoil resources. Above
all they reveal the extent to which Turkmenistan (and the other
littoral state's) legal diplomacy is inextricably tied to changing
geopolitical motives and interest.
4. Russia: The Strategic Mastermind
Russia has always viewed the Caspian as a unique body of water
and has thus attached a "special rights" status to development of its
natural resources. 536 Legally, Moscow corroborated this stance in two
ways. First it based its argument on the theory that the continuing
validity of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties of 1921 and 1940 required joint
utilization of the Sea's resources. 5 37 This argument essentially
sought to link the prospect of hydrocarbon ownership rights to the
management of other Caspian resources, particularly the
environment, thus highlighting the need for joint cooperation on all
fronts. 538 Next, Russian legal arguments centered on the fact that
the UNCLOS was not applicable to the Caspian Sea because it is
essentially a landlocked lake. 539 Thus, Moscow argued that all
536. For analysis of the Moscow's establishment of a legal regimevia the SovietIranian Treaties, see infra Part IV; see also infra Parts IV.A.2-3, for Moscow's
interpretation of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties, especially its view of the Caspian as a
"closed sea."
537.
Validity of Treaties at Heart of Legal Disputes Over CaspianSea Rights, 94
OIL & GAS J. 1, Jan. 1, 1996, 1996 WL 8286280. The article also outlines Iran's
agreement with Russia that the Caspian is a lake with a "condominium" legal regime
pursuant to the Soviet-Iranian Treaties. Id. M. A. Mohaved, an Iranian legal
consultant, argues that in a legal conference in Tehran the NIS extended applicability
of the FSUs treaties when they signed the Almaty Declaration. Id. Mohaved claims
that the signing of this declaration means that the breakup of the FSU could have no
effect on either the factual or the legal realities concerning the Caspian. Id. W.E.
Butler, an international lawyer and professor of comparative law, questions this legal
analysis: 'The existing Soviet-Iranian bilateral treaty regime is, at best, fragile since
apparently only two of the Caspian Sea coastal states-Russia and Iranunequivocally recognize the treaties." Id. Butler also argues that if the bilateral treaty
regime has collapsed it is unclear that the 1982 UNCLOS of the Sea applies, although
it could help the countries construct a new legal regime. Id.; see also generally infra
Parts IV-V, for an in-depth legal analysis of the effect of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties
and a consideration of the different legal regime models available to the littoral states.
538. According to Cynthia and Michael Croissant, the official argument of
Russia [and Iran] in favor of joint sovereignty of the Caspian is that the latter is
necessary to protect the Sea's ecosystem from the rapid development of offshore oil and
gas deposits. Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 27. The real reasons for their
adoption of a common ownership principle, however, are geopolitical. Id. at 28.
539.
Clive Schofield & Martin Pratt, Claims to the Caspian Sea, 1996 JANE'S
INTELL. REV. 75, Feb. 1, 1996, 1996 WL 9483534. This view was embodied in a
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resources should be governed by a condominium system allowing
540
equal access to all littoral states.
Moscow, the original champion of the condominium theory, has
in recent years drastically changed its position on the status of the
Caspian. 54 1 The shifting Russian legal strategy is a result of several

internal and external dynamics motivating Russia to seriously
reconsider its policies in the Caspian.5 42 The internal dispute is
primarily a bureaucratic turf battle between the Russian Foreign
Ministry and the Ministry of Fuel and Power. 54 3 The former is
gravely concerned about Russia's decreasing geopolitical influence in
the Caspian region and the Caucuses and therefore sees legal
strategy as a means of blocking any foreign advancement and
participation in the region.5 44 The latter has a more subtle legal
approach: allied with the powerful LUKoil, it proposes to adapt to
changing circumstances, realizing that a one-dimensional "legal veto"
strategy will not only fail to prevent foreign involvement in the
Caspian but may also cost Russia valuable profits and a say in how

Russian memorandum, dated October 5, 1994, to the United Nations, in which Russia
emphasized that the law of the sea could not apply to the Caspian since it has no
natural connection with other seas. Id. Russia also maintained that the Soviet era
treaties with Iran remained in force as the existing legal regime for the Caspian. Id.;
see also Laurent Maillard, Iran, Russia Seek to Control Caspian Riches, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 23, 1995, 1995 WL 7871921; BUTLER, infra note 583, at 116-33
(discussing generally Moscow's view on the special legal regimes that control "closed
seas"-the Caspian being included in the latter category); Croissant & Croissant, supra
note 23, at 27-30 (analyzing the real geopolitical reasons for Russia's insistence that
the Caspian is a "lake").
540.
But see Schofield & Pratt, supra note 539. Schofield and Pratt argue that a
close reading of Part IX of the 1982 UNCLOS which deals with "enclosed or semienclosed seas" reveals that Russia's argument (above) may be faulty. Id. Article 122
defines an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea as: "a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or
more states and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting
entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more
coastal states." Id. The authors argue that the Caspian arguably qualifies under the
second requirement. Id. For more in-depth analysis of the UNCLOS provisions and
the condominium concept, see infra Parts V.A1-2. For a rejection of this interpretation
of Article 122, see infra notes 774-78 and accompanying text.
541.
The change has been gradual, with the turning point being Moscow's
"doughnut" compromise proposal and the consolidation being the execution of the
bilateral agreement on division of the northern Caspian with Kazakhstan. See
Upperton, supra note 226. For a more in-depth discussion of legal models similar to
the Russian "doughnut compromise," see infra Part V.
542.
See supranotes 70-79 and accompanying text.
543.
See, e.g., John Helmer, Central Asia Uncertain Currents in Caspian Oil
Game, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 1, 1997, at httpi/wwsv.rferl.org/ncai
features/1997/10/F.RU.971001135025.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof
TransnationalLaw) (commenting on the Russian Foreign Ministry's embarrassment at
not having been informed of Russian participation [via LUKoil] in the consortium to
develop the contested Kaipaz-Serdar field in dispute between Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan).
544.
See id.
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the legal status will be resolved.5 45 Though the Foreign Ministry
forced Russian oil companies to back out of a joint-venture with
Azerbaijan, the tension between it and Ministry of Fuel and Power
5 46
has not been fully resolved.
On November 12, 1996, Russia officially signaled its willingness
to consider sectoral division of the Sea by proposing to recognize a
legal regime that allowed an exclusive forty-five nautical mile (NM)
economic zone for all littoral states.5 47 Moscow also expressed
willingness to consider national jurisdiction of the Sea beyond the
forty-five mile limit where drilling had already begun.5 48 According
to the proposal, however, all other surface and subsurface areas of the
Sea would be commonly owned and managed through the
establishment of joint-stock companies of the five littoral states. 5

49

Also, the proposal included a "double-tender" system giving the
littoral states first bids to all development fields in the Caspian ahead
of non-littoral actors.5 50 Essentially this system would allow any one
of the littoral states to veto the entry and involvement of outside
5 51
national or corporate powers into the area.
In February 1998 Russian Foreign Ministry Special Envoy Feliks
Kovalev made the surprising announcement that Russia was ready to
carry out a "fair division of the Caspian seabed," and by July of the
same year Russia signed an agreement with Kazakhstan dividing the
northern part of the Caspian.5 5 2 In the face of Iranian concerns that
Russia was quickly abandoning its original stance on multilateral
consensus and common ownership, Moscow denied that the Kazakh
agreement created a "special status" for the northern part of the
Caspian.55 3 Yet after 1998 Russia continued to make official

545.
See id. This also addresses the external realization: that Moscow cannot
stop foreign involvement-it should instead get its own foot in the door. See id.
According to Cynthia and Michael Croissant Moscow's ultimate change in accepting
some form of sectoral division for the Sea was brought about because it realized that it
could not stop de facto delimitation. Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 34. The
only question was how the division would be formalized dejure. Id.
546.
Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 34.
547.
Id.; see also supra note 514 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.2, for
application of dual or "split regime" principles such as the one proposed by Russia.
548.
Id. at 34-35.
549.
Id.
550.
Id.
See supra note 514 and accompanying text (discussing Azerbaijan and
551.
Kazakhstan's rejection of the forty-five mile "doughnut proposal" because they realized
that the joint-stock and "double-tender" rules would only reinforce, not reject, a
common ownership principle).
552.
Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 35; see also supra note 515 and
accompanying text.
553.
Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 35.
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statements seriously undermining its earlier position rejecting any
554
sectoral division of the Caspian.
Many have argued that Russia's involvement in Caspian jointventures has also weakened the validity of its original legal
position.55 5 The present Russian legal position, however, though a
significant departure from previous proposals on division of seabed, is
not as revolutionary a paradigm shift as once thought. Russia still
contends that beyond a narrow territorial and an exclusive economic
rights zone (including fishing) the waters are to be joined in
common.556 In other words, any acquiescence regarding sectoral
division only applies to a limited area of the seabed. 557 Therefore,
such a dual-regime "compromise" may still pose a serious challenge to
the ownership rights of all littoral states because it would effectively
give Russia [and Iran] legal veto power over any development beyond
the exclusive zone.5 58 This challenge is particularly apparent in light
of Russia's strong commercial and naval presence in Caspian
559
waters.
5. Iran: The "Legal Veto"
Iran's legal stance is tempered by several geopolitical and
economic realities. 560 First is the realization that due to its relatively

554.
555.
556.

Id. at 36.
But see id. at 36-37.
Id. at 36-37; John Helmer, KazahhstanRussia: Caspian Oil Disputes

Linger, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, May 13, 1998, at http://vvw.rferl.orglnca
features/1998/05/F.RU.980513132231.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof
Transnational Law); see also Merhat Saripzhan, Central Asia: New Decelopments in
Russian Caspian Policy, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 17, 1998. at
http://www.rferl.orglncalfeatures/1998/04/F.RU.980417111243.html (copy on file with
the VanderbiltJournalof TransnationalLaw).
557.
Id.
558.
See infra Part V, for further analysis of the practical and legal effects of
such a dual or "split regime" proposal. It seems that subsequent to the Russian
turnaround Iran has been left out in the cold, but this is not the case because Russia's
"doughnut compromise" seeks to retain substantial control over surface waters. Id.
This may effectively render the legal right of the NIS to mine the seabed practically
void. Id.
559.
Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 37. According to one Russian
analyst, Moscow is attempting to maintain optimum conditions for commercial
operations in the strategically important region by promoting joint control over the
surface waters. Id. Such control would not only facilitate free trade and preservation
of natural resources but would also allow Russia to intimidate its neighbors because of
the size and strength of its naval presence in the area. Id.
560.
See, e.g., Houshang Ta'leh, The Caspian Sea and the Violated Interests of
Iran, 91 J. POL., Soc. IssuEs, EcoN. & Sci. 91 (Iran), July-Aug. 1998, at httpJlwww.
netiran.comHtdocsClippings/FEconomy/980722XXFE02.html (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw) (explaining why Iran has taken the most
obstinate stance regarding delimitation of the Caspian and why it should step up its
"mild protests" to ensure that its rights are protected).
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small Caspian coastline sectoral division based on the equidistance
and median line principles would give Iran a small piece of the
Caspian pie. 56 1

Second is the discovery that Iran's shores do not

appear to hold significant hydrocarbon reserves. 5 62 Third, even if
Caspian production off Iran's shores were to be profitable Tehran
concedes that it lacks the funds to allocate significant resources away
from its Persian Gulf production agenda. 5 63 Last but not least, Iran
does not want the Caspian to become another Persian Gulf-it fears
that an open door policy especially with regard to American
corporations means that direct American involvement in Caspian
affairs is not far away. 564 In Tehran's eyes this is a direct challenge

565
to Iran's sovereignty in the region.
Based on these conditions the Foreign Ministry has generally
followed the Russian lead in using a 'legal veto" strategy regarding
Caspian development. 566 Tehran's basic default position is as follows:
1) any unilateral action regarding mining and exploration of Caspian
oil and gas must cease until a comprehensive legal regime is set
up;5 67 2) all unilateral joint-venture contracts are invalid pursuant to

international law;5 68 3) the Caspian Sea and its resources should be

controlled by a legal regime pursuant to Soviet-Iranian bilateral
treaties which dictate a "condominium" theory of joint ownership;5 6 9
4) development of a legal regime must be reached via unanimity and
multilateral negotiation and not bilateral efforts;570 and 5) in the
alternative, the surface and seabed should be divided equally between
the five littoral states, with each state holding a twenty percent
571
share.

561.
Iran Opposes Any Trans-CaspianPipelines, DOW JONES INT'L NEWS, Mar.
11, 1999, 1999 WL 11284153.
562.
Id.

563.

Id.

564.

Michael Lelyveld, Caucasus: U.S. Military Presence in Caspian Appears

Inevitable, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Feb. 4, 1999, at http://www.rferl.org/
nca/features/1999/02/F.RU.990204132233.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt
Journal of TransnationalLaw) (explaining that Azerbaijan's alliance with the United
States may eventually lead to American military involvement in the Caspian).
565.
See id.
566.
Id. Throughout the remaining parts of the study, the author will often
refer to the term 'legal veto" as a littoral state's attempt to invalidate what it deems to
be unacceptable ownership and development of Caspian oil and gas reserves based
solely on legal principles.
These principles may include general principles of
international law, customary international law, and treaty law.
567.
Iran Protests Azerbaijan's Unilateral Exploitation of Caspian Sea, supra
note 215.
568.
Id.; see also supra note 215 and accompanying text.
569.
Id.
570.
Id.
571.
Consensus on the Caspian Sea, Sept. 2, 1998, at http://ftp.eurasia.org.ru/
english/september/EngOlO6.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law); see also Kazakh FM Hails Iran's Stance on Caspian Status,
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In 1998 after the Russian-Kazakh agreement to divide the
northern Caspian, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Postukhov
traveled to Iran and reassured officials there that Moscow "still
recognized the validity of the 1921 and 1940 treaties with Iran ...
[and it] would continue to do so until a new legal regime for the
landlocked body of water is devised. '572 The two countries, however,
also issued a joint statement supporting equal partition of the seabed
although they did not agree on how such delimitation should take
place.

57 3

Indeed, where Iran has failed to officially acknowledge
acceptance of some form of sectoral division, its actions indicate, like
Russia and Turkmenistan, de facto recognition of the validity of
interim bilateral agreements between the littoral states dividing up
portions of the Sea among themselves. 5 74 In late 1997 Iran
announced that it would soon open its sector of the Sea to
development by international oil companies. 575 In 1998 it announced
that Anglo-Dutch Shell and British Lasmo had singed a major deal to
develop oil and gas exploration in Iran's "sector."5 76 After the deal,
however, Azerbaijan issued a strong statement claiming that Iran's
actions were illegal because the proposed oil and gas fields fell within
Azerbaijan's "sector" of the Sea. 57 7 To spite Baku Iran rejected the

contention and sarcastically reminded Azeri officials that the
confusion was the result of the failure of the littoral states to reach
multilateral consensus on an acceptable legal regime for the
578
Caspian.
According to several legal commentators, Iran (and Russia's)
change of position from an original condominium approach represents
the triumph of politics over legal diplomacy. 579 It is important to
note, however, that both Russian and Iranian views still challenge a
blind application of the UNCLOS to the Caspian. They both seek to

WORLD NEWS CONN., Nov. 6, 1999, 1999 WL 26459002 (explaining that although Iran
had previously advocated the joint development of the Caspian, it is now considering

the possibility of dividing the sea and its floor into equal national sectors).
572. Entessar, supranote 57, at 169.

573.

Id.

574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In fact, some analysts have argued that the claims based on condominium

principles are legally unreasonable if not impractical. See, e.g., Caglett, infra note 584;
see also Oxman, supra note 22. Others have said that although these arguments may
be legally sound, the change in Russian and [Iranian] positions represents the ultimate
triumph of pressure politics and regional balance of power: "supporters of the

condominium lost the battle not in the courtroom, but in the boardroom of domestic
and international politics. Mehdiyoun, supranote 25, at 14.
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restrict pure sectoral sovereignty in order to increase their control
over regional energy issues-one by claiming joint sovereignty over
the waters of the Caspian, the other by rejecting the equidistance
principle of delimitation altogether.
In this context their new
diplomatic positions are far from diplomatic surrender and their legal
5 80
and practical effects may not be as divergent as once thought.
They do, however, reflect the inherent tension between Moscow and
Tehran and the degree to which their geopolitical interests diverge. 581
The practical and legal effects of Russian and Iranian legal
diplomacy on the status of the Caspian have not, as it as been argued
by some, severely undermined the legitimacy of arguments that the
Caspian is a unique body of water and that unilateral exploitation of
its resources may violate international legal norms. The pattern of
increasing bilateral agreements among the littoral states and Iran
and Russia's seeming acceptance of some form of delimitation,
however, suggest that a strict application of common ownership
principles is probably not a realistic option. Viewed within this
context, Iran needs to develop a more far-sighted legal strategy to
ensure that its geopolitical interests in the region are safeguarded.58 2
In a changing legal and geopolitical regional environment Tehran's
blind adherence to a 'legal veto" strategy officially rejecting the
validity of most if not all oil and gas development projects initiated by
the NIS has done little to promote its long-term interests in the
region.

IV. WAS THERE EVER

A SOVIET-IRANIAN REGIME?

A. The Soviet-IranianTreaties
Few legal scholars dispute the fact that prior to 1991 the only
body of applicable law regarding the status of the Caspian was a

580.
See Michael Lelyveld, Iran: Claim to Share of Caspian Oil Renewed, RADIO
FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, June 29, 1999, at http://www.rferl.org/ncalfeatures/
1999/06/F.RU.990629125537.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw).
581.
See Jamshid Momtaz, Iran's Views on Caspian Administration, 21 IRAN
TODAY; ECONOMIC MAGAZINE 47-48 (Iran), May-June 1998, at http://www.netiran.com/
Htdocs/Clippings/Fplitics/980501XXFP01.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt
Journal of TransnationalLaw), for an overview of Iran's legal position regarding the
Caspian. More specifically, Momtaz warns that Iran must not blindly follow the fickle
Russian 'legal veto" stance because it is not in its interests. See id.
582.
See infra Part VI.C (proposing and outlining a new legal-diplomatic
strategy which will better protect the geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of Tehran
in the Caspian region).
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series of treaties and agreements signed between Russia and Iran. 583

Therefore it is critical to analyze the legal effect of the treaties prior
to 1991. If the prior legal status of the Caspian is indeed inadequate
given changed circumstances in the region, the absence of any formal
legal consensus on the creation of a new regime means that the only
operative body of law in the Caspian is the series of Soviet-Iranian
bilateral agreements (Soviet-Iranian Treaties) signed decades ago.
Yet there has been very little serious legal thought given to the effect
of these Treaties because their relevance has been limited only to
their potential role in creating a new legal regime that better
accommodates changing geopolitical circumstances. 5" This approach
detracts from the legal consequences of the debate for a legal regime
in so far as it fails to recognize that, in the least, the Treaties may
offer default rules restricting certain actions by littoral states. 585 In
this sense, this section seeks to determine the extent to which these
Treaties and agreements define and restrict legal relationships
between the present littoral states.
There is little literature that actually refers to the Treaties as
establishing any sort of a comprehensive regime outside a limited set
of legal rules defining military and commercial relations between the
Soviet Union and Iran.586
As a result many scholars have
automatically dismissed the legal validity of the Treaties as entirely
inapplicable to defining ownership rights to subsoil resources,
including oil and gas. 587 Some have argued even further, positing
that other than the 1940 Treaty which specifically defined and
reconfirmed the principle of littoral exclusivity with respect to

583.

In 1971 before the collapse of the Soviet Union, William Butler declared:

"the regime of the Caspian is governed by Soviet-Iranian Treaties and agreements and
by the domestic legislation of each state. General norms of international law relating
to the high seas... and to research and exploitation of the natural resources of the

high seas do not apply to the Caspian." WILLIAM E. BUTLER, THE SOVIET UNION AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA 101 (1971).

584.
See, e.g., Brice M. Caglett, Ownership of Seabed and Subsoil Resources in
the Caspian Sea Under the Rules of InternationalLaw, 1 CASPIAN CROSSROADS 3, Fall
1995, at http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepageslusazerb/131.htm (copy on file with

the Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw). Although both Russia and Iran have
repeatedly argued that unilateral NIS action in the Caspian violates the only valid
rules of international law governing littoral activity in the region, most legal scholars
note that the treaties deal with limited issues and cannot be of help in determining the
ultimate shape of a legal regime. Id.

585.

"Default rules" are distinguished from a legal regime in so far as the former

only offers a limited legal guideline restricting state action, instead of a comprehensive

arrangement establishing a complex set of interrelationships.
Treaties,

while

not constituting

a

legal

regime,

may

The Soviet-Iranian

arguably

satisfy

the

characterization of "default rules."
None of the sources cited herein refer to the Soviet-Iranian Treaties as
586.
establishing a legal regime. But see Validity of Treatiesat Heart of Legal Disputes Over
CaspianSea Rights, supra note 537 (comments of Professor Butler).
587.
See, e.g., id, supranote 537 (comments of Professor Butler).
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Caspian naval presence and navigation, no other legal relationships
(including that of common ownership) actually exist between the two
signatories. 58 8 The question thus becomes: 1) what was the nature
and scope of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties; 2) how did Soviet and
Iranian legal scholars and politicians interpret the effects of the
provisions on the legal status of the Caspian; and 3) did actual state

practice and opinio juris58 9 of the states involved invalidate the de
jure effect of the Treaties and establish a different set of de facto legal
59 0
parameters?
After answering the above questions the broader aim of this
section is to determine the current validity and applicability of the

Soviet-Iranian Treaties in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the establishment of the CIS. In other words it is necessary to

establish whether any aspect of the Treaties applies to define the
current legal relationships among the littoral states, and if so,
whether the Treaties operate to restrict the [unilateral] actions of
individual littoral states in the energy exploitation context.59 1

1. Nature and Scope of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties Concerning the
Caspian Sea
Until 1991 the status of the Caspian region and the Sea itself
was shaped by the history of regional politics between the empires of
Tsarist Russia and Persia. 592 Following the successive defeats of
Qajar Persia to Russia during the Nineteenth Century the two
empires signed a series of treaties that established territorial
boundaries and regulated navigation and military positioning, often
in favor of Russia. 593 In 1813 the two empires were signatories to the

588.
Kochumov, supra note 154.
589.
Opinio juris refers to actual state practice and interpretation of written
laws. LoUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 56 (3d ed.
1993). Under the rules of international law the legal effect of written law can actually
be changed if the parties involved engage in a repeated pattern of practice that would
suggest a different interpretation of the laws. Id.; see also infra Part IV.A.3 (providing
more in-depth analysis of the legal requirements for establishment of opiniojuris).
590.
This refers to customary international law. See infra notes 638-43 and
accompanying text.
591.
See, e.g., Olbars A. Kepbanov, The New Legal Status of the Caspian Sea is
the Basis of Regional Co-Operationand Stability, PERCEPTIONS J. OF INT'L AFF., Dec.
1997, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/gupa/percept/ii4/ii4-2.htm (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw) (arguing that the Soviet-Iranian Treaties do
not exist any more as subjects of international law with the emergence of the NIS).
592.
See generally Kochumov, supranote 154.
593.
See generally Behnaz Assadi-Kiya, A Glance at the Legal Status of the Caspian
Sea, KAYHAN EVENING DAILY (Iran), May 16, 1995, at httpJ/www2.prestel.co.uldeman/
IRAN17.HTM (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw) (outlining
shipping, fishing, and general legal rights between Russia and Iran in the Caspian). A
review of Iran's activities in the Caspian Sea during the decades prior to the collapse of the
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Gulistan Treaty.59 4 Article 5 of the treaty stipulated that "except for
the Russian State, no other state may have a military flag on the
Caspian Sea."595 Persia, however, was allowed to retain commercial
shipping rights.59 6 Article 8 of the Turkmenchai Treaty of 1828
reaffirmed the exclusive right of Russian naval presence in the
597
Caspian.
The legal and territorial standing of Persia vis-a-vis Russia
improved after the Revolution of 1917 when the Russian Soviet

Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and Persia concluded a
friendship treaty in 1921 (1921 Treaty) which granted the parties
equal rights of free navigation "under their own flags."5 98 In 1935
and 1940 the two countries executed two more treaties attempting to
further define shipping operations in the Caspian.5 99
The 1940 Treaty on Trade and Navigation (1940 Treaty),
however, represents the most detailed and comprehensive set of rules
regarding legal relations between the two states in the Caspian. 60 0
First, the Treaty reserved a ten-mile fishing zone for each state
adjacent its coast and for its own flag vessels. 60 1 Second, Article 13

Soviet Union reveals that it was not able to exercise its rights fully and was often subject to
Russian political and economic hegemony in the region. Id.
594.
See Treaty of Peace and Perpetual Friendship, Oct. 12. 1813, Russ.-Persia,
62 Consol. T.S. 435 [hereinafter Gulistan Treaty], [applicable sections] reprinted in
Assadi-KMya, supranote 593.
595.
Id. art. 5.
596.
Id.
597.
See Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Feb. 21, 1828, Russ.-Persia, ch. 8, 78
Consol. T.S. 105 [hereinafter Turkmenchai Treaty], reprinted in Assadi.Kiya, supra
note 593. Chapter 8 reads: "Iran's commercial ships, as before, could navigate the
Caspian and sail to the Russian shores . . . " Id. As to warships, however, it
mentioned that only ships bearing Russian flags could journey into the Caspian. Id.
598.
Soviet-Persian Treaty of Friendship, Feb. 26, 1921, RSFSR-Persia, ch. 11,
12 L.N.T.S. 381, reprinted in Assadi-Kiya, supra note 593 [hereinafter 1921 Treaty].
Chapter 11 reads: "Both countries, as of the time of the signing of the treaty, have the
right of free navigation in the Caspian Sea under their own flags." Id. Chapter 7 of the
Treaty reads: "In case of the presence in the Iranian naval force, of citizens of a third
government and who use their presence to pursue hostile purposes against the USSR,
the Soviet government has a legitimate right to ask the Iranian government to
discharge such harmful elements." Id. ch. 7.
599.
The rules governing shipping operations in the Caspian were specified in
bilateral treaties in August 1935 and March 1940. Assadi-Kiya, supra note 593
[hereinafter 1940 Treaty].
600.
Treaty on Trade and Navigation, Mar. 25, 1940, U.S.S.R.-Iran, 68 LN.T.S.
222, [applicable sections] reprinted in Assadi.Kiya, supra note 593 [hereinafter 1940
Treaty].
601.
The only zone that was specified as a legal limit in the Caspian Sea on the
basis of the commercial and navigational agreement was a ten-mile coastal zone. Id.,
ch. 12, art. 14. Article 14 of the twelfth chapter statedAny one of the contracting parties has earmarked for its own ships an area for
fishing in its territorial waters to a limit of 10 nautical miles, and preserve[s]

770

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:681

reemphasized earlier notions of Caspian exclusivity by declaring that
only the ships of the two littoral states belonging to their citizens and
trading agencies were authorized to navigate the Sea. 60 2 Notes
attached to the 1935 and 1940 treaties reinforced this notion of
exclusivity by declaring that the Caspian "is regarded by the two
60 3
Governments as a Soviet and Iranian sea."
As can be seen from the significant provisions of the above
Treaties, the intent of the parties was to define the status of relations
between the signatories primarily with respect to commercial and
military access. 60 4 None of the Treaties referred to delimitation or
partition of the Sea except as relevant to exclusive fishing rights. No
boundary issues relating to the Caspian were ever defined. Likewise,
commercial provisions did not cover mining rights or subsurface
economic rights and were not amended even after significant oil
discoveries and production activities took place off the Azeri coast
60 5
during the early 1900s.

The inadequacy of the Treaties especially in light of changed
circumstances after 1991 prompted many scholars addressing the
legal issues of the Caspian to dismiss the limiting effect of these
Treaties on unilateral exploitation of sub-soil resources, and more
importantly, any notion that the Sea was owned in common by both

this right for itself that the import of the fishes caught by the crews of the ships
navigating under its flag, are subject to special discounts and benefits.
Id. In practice, while Iran was limited to its ten-mile fishing zone the Soviets often
fished beyond their territorial zone and within the zone of common ownership. AssadiKiya, supranote 593.
602.
Assadi-Kiya, supra note 593. On the basis of Article 13 the two countries
agreed that only the ships of these two littoral states or vessels belonging to their
citizens and trading agencies would be allowed to navigate across the Caspian. Id.
According to Assadi-Kiya, the existing treaties and agreements between the Soviet
Union and Iran emphasized common ownership of the Sea because there had been no
notification about the demarcation of maritime boundaries. Id. In line with this
argument, William Butler asserts that "there are no territorial waters in the Caspian,
only the 10-mile fishing zone." BUTLER, supra note 583, at 101. But see Croissant &
Croissant, supra note 23, at 25 (asserting that Russia's claim regarding the validity of
the Soviet-Iranian Treaties (especially the 1940 Treaty) is shaky because the language
only implies that the Caspian should not be divided between the two littoral states"in no place is it spelled out explicitly that the sea was to be treated as a common body
of water....") (emphasis added).
603.
Assadi-Kiya, supra note 593. The legal framework of cooperation between
the Soviet Union and Iran was further addressed in a number of contracts including
The Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation of July 1963 and the 1971
Scientific and Technical Agreement. Id. A third Soviet-Iranian conference on marine
cooperation in 1971 sought to address common port and sea problems regarding
navigation and commercial traffic. Id.
604.
See generally 1921 Treaty, supra note 598; 1940 Treaty, supranote 600.
605.
See generally 1921 Treaty, supra note 598; 1940 Treaty, supranote 600.
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littoral states. 60 6 According to some the only applicable treaty with
respect to the Caspian's legal regime is the 1940 Treaty which
specifically dealt with technical delimitation issues, albeit in limited
scope. 60 7 All other agreements and pacts between the Soviet Union
and Iran have tangential and indirect legal effects on the status of
the Caspian Sea and at best define the parties' intent to cooperate
and clarify their commercial and military relationship in the
Caucuses and Central Asia.6 08 Other scholars downplay even the
importance of the 1940 agreement, asserting instead that the Treaty
merely intended to reflect the parties' understanding that no third
states have any rights (including navigation) in the Caspian Sea. 6 9
Regardless of the continuing legal debate about the overall
comprehensiveness of the Treaties, certain legal principles may be
drawn out from both the text and language of the bilateral
agreements and from the absence of other significant provisions more
clearly defining legal rights between the two states. 6 10 First, the
texts of the Treaties clearly establish exclusive navigational,
economic, and military rights for both states. Second, the 1940 Treaty
clearly establishes an exclusive ten-mile territorial or fishing zone for
both states adjacent to their coastlines. It does not, however, further
delimit the exact boundaries of these coastlines. 61 1 Also, there is no
textual restriction on fishing rights beyond the ten-mile zone
6 12
suggesting common ownership of the Sea's resources in that area.
Third, the Treaties do not address any other economic issues beyond
commercial fishing and navigation; there is no mention of the
exploitation of the Sea's hydrocarbon resources.6 13 Last but not least,
the Treaties do not delimit the surface and seabed beyond the tenmile territorial zones, either for purposes of boundary delimitation or
the establishment of exclusive economic zones.

614

The absence of significant provisions addressing delimitation
and economic rights between the two littoral prevents a clear and
precise understanding of the legal status of the Caspian pursuant to
the signing of the Treaties. More specifically, the interplay of the two
significant legal effects of the Treaties (on navigational and fishing

606.
See, e.g., Caglett, supra note 584 (arguing that fishing regimes are very
different than mining regimes).
607.
Id.
608.
Id.
609.
Id.
610.
Note that any textual analysis of the Treaties relying on the absence of
particular provisions arguably establishes a series of implicit rights between the two
littoral states.
611.
See generally 1940 Treaty, supra note 600.
612.
See id.
613.
See 1921 Treaty, supranote 598; 1940 Treaty, supra note 600; Assadi.Kiya,
supranote 593.
614.
See supranote 611-13 and accompanying text.
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exclusivity issues) begs the question whether the waters of the
Caspian extending beyond the ten-mile zone were indeed truly owned
in common as a matter of law. In other words, does the absence of
delimitation rules taken together with the general exclusivity
principles referred to above set up a default presumption that joint
ownership existed at the time of the signing of the Treaties and up
until the collapse of the Soviet empire?
615
2. Municipal Interpretations of Treaty Law

International legal jurists are often forced to look beyond the text
of treaties and agreements in order to fill significant gaps in the
treaties and find the true intent of the signatories.6 16 In this regard,
jurists may turn to official government or juridical evidence offered
independent of the treaties themselves to further support or weaken
a prima facie interpretation of their provisions. Within this context,
the development of Soviet legal doctrine on the laws of the sea and
the Soviet Union and Iran's interpretation of the Treaties pursuant to
national implementing legislation may be particularly helpful.
a. The Soviet Legal Doctrine of the "Closed Sea" and the "Continental
Shelf'
There is considerable evidence that Soviet jurists officially
617
viewed the legal regime of the Caspian as that of a "closed sea."
The Russo-Soviet doctrine of the "closed sea" is a highly controversial
one that aims to limit commercial and military activities in certain
bodies of water only to the nationals of the littoral states. 618 The
characterization of the Caspian Sea as a "closed sea" is important for
the following reason: if Soviet legal jurists interpreted the SovietIranian Treaty provisions as codifications of the "closed sea" doctrine
and Soviet exercise of sovereignty over the Sea reinforced such a
view, proponents of the condominium theory could legally argue that
exclusivity precludes any de facto delimitation arrangement that
would prevent Soviet or Iranian exercise of sovereignty beyond a ten-

615.
This section deals primarily with de jure legal and legislative
interpretations of the status of the Caspian Sea by both the Soviet Union and Iran. For
a more detailed analysis of the political and economic practices of the littoral states as
evidence of their de facto interpretations of the legal status of the Sea, see infra Parts
IV.A.3-B.
616.
See generally HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 51-148 (discussing sources
and evidence of international law other than treaties).
617.
BUTLER, supranote 583, at 121, 124-25.
618. Id. at 132.
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mile fishing zone. 61 9 This limitation would effectively require
620
adoption of some form of a condominium regime.
The "closed sea" principle, however, was highly contested by the
West, which successfully barred its inclusion in the draft 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas. 62 1 Though the validity of the
"closed sea" doctrine is in dispute and its practical applications
suspect, there is no doubt that Soviet law officially recognized the
Caspian and Aral seas (both of which were completely landlocked) as
"closed seas." 62 2
The Caspian Sea, however, attained a unique
"special treaty regime" status under Soviet law because it was also
623
regulated by the series of Soviet-Iranian Treaties outlined above.
More importantly it would seem that Article 13 of the 1940 Treaty
effectively incorporated this legal doctrine into the official status of
the Caspian Sea in so far as it granted the two littoral states
6 24
exclusive economic and navigational rights to the Sea's resources.
The other significant effect of Soviet legal theory regarding the
Caspian Sea regime concerned views of the Continental Shelf.6 ' The
Soviet-Iranian Treaties governing the regime of the Caspian do not
explicitly refer to the Continental Shelf.626
Indeed, geologically
speaking, the Caspian Sea may simply be viewed as a depression in

619.
See id.
620.
See id,
621.
GARY KNIGHT & HUNGDAH CHIU, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA:
CASES, DOCUMIENTS, & READINGS 325-26 (1991). At the 1958 UN Conference on the

Law of the Sea, Romania and the Ukraine proposed an addition to Article 1 of the
Convention on the High Seas providing that "for certain seas a special regime of
navigation may be established for historical reasons or by virtue of international
agreements." Id. The subsequently withdrew their proposed amendment and the
"closed sea" doctrine was never integrated into the Convention's language. Id. In
short, the "closed sea" doctrine has found little favor in international law. BUTLER,
supra note 583, at 131. For a review of the text of the Convention, see the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. Some would argue that
analysis of the effect of the "closed sea" doctrine is a moot point because the principle
never gained international acceptance and was thus never elevated to the level of
customary international law. See infra Part IVA3 (outlining the legal requirements
for the establishment of customary international law). The author's reference to the
"closed sea" principle thus serves not as an argument for its legal validity and direct
applicability to the Caspian Sea context but for its potential value as tangential
evidence offered to support or weaken the notion of common ownership between the
Soviet Union and Iran. See infra.
622.
BUTLER, supranote 583, at 124-25.
623.

See id.

624. See Assadi-Kiya, supra note 593 and accompanying text. In addition.
Butler points out that the Caspian was effectively relegated to the status of a "closed
sea" as far back as the Nineteenth Century since under the treaties of Gulistan and
Turkmenchai, Persia ceded exclusive rights of dominion over the Caspian to Russia.
BUTLER, supranote 583, at 119.
625. See generally BUTLER, supranote 583, at 134-51.
626. See 1921 Treaty, supranote 598; 1940 Treaty, supra note 600.
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the continental land mass. 627 As William Butler points out, however,
at least one Soviet international law manual has observed that "the
resources of the continental shelf also belong to each Party [USSR
and Iran] within the limits of its respective area of the sea."628
The interplay between the Soviet-Iranian Treaties and the Soviet
doctrines of the "closed sea" and the "continental shelf' create a vague
and seemingly contradictory legal picture for the Caspian Sea. On
the one hand, the Soviet-Iranian Treaties bolster the notion of
exclusivity between Russia and Iran and arguably create an implicit
common ownership status beyond the ten-mile territorial zone. The
doctrine of the "closed sea" further supports the notion of exclusivity
and taken together with the "special regime status" of the Treaties
strengthens the view that a common ownership understanding
existed between the Soviet Union and Iran. 62 9 On the other hand, the
Soviets' reference to the possible existence of a continental shelf (and
its delimitation) seems to offer evidence that, in the least, challenges
or undermines a common ownership understanding between the
63 0
littoral states.
b. Iranian National Legislation
It appears that Iran's municipal law also recognized the Caspian
as a "closed sea." 63 1 The Iranian Law of May 19, 1949, on the
Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf effectively
asserted national jurisdiction over the natural resources of the seabed
and subsoil of the continental shelf in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf
of Oman. 63 2 The law, however, was silent on continental shelf
delimitation in the Caspian Sea. 633 Six years later a note was added

to Article 2 of the law which read in its entirety: "As regards to the
Caspian Sea, the rules of international law relating to closed seas are

BUTLER, supra note 583, at 136.
627.
628.
Id.
629.
See supra notes 617-18 and accompanying text. The fact that Soviet
government officials acknowledged that the legal status of the Caspian was dictated by
the "closed sea" doctrine and the Soviet-Iranian Treaties provides further evidence that
the they officially recognized that only the Soviet Union and Iran had exclusive control
of the Sea and its resources. See id.
See supra note 627 and accompanying text. Usually, under international
630.
law, an acknowledgement of the existence of a continental shelf signals the parties'
intent to implement some form of sectoral division. See infra notes 738-46 (providing a
description and analysis of differing delimitation strategies regarding the continental
shelf under the UNCLOS model).
631.
CHARLES G. MACDONALD, IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA & THE LAW OF THE SEA:
POLITICAL INTERACTION & LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF 160 (1980).

632.
633.

Id.
Id. at 162
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applicable. '634 In light of the contested nature of the doctrine the
6 35
intent of the Iranian legislature is not clear.
With respect to the continental shelf, however, it is noteworthy
that Iranian lawmakers recognized that the terms of the SovietIranian Treaty of 1940 were inapplicable to the delimitation of the
continental shelf and subsoil resources of the Caspian.6 36 Thus, the
legislation neither mentions the 1940 Treaty nor applies the common
637
ownership principle.
3. Custom, State Practice, and the Opinio Juris
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
recognizes international custom, as evidence of a general practice
638
accepted as law, to be a legitimate source of international law.
According to this article the definition of custom comprises two
distinct elements: 1) general state practice, and 2) its acceptance as
law. 63 9 The definition has not, however, settled the debate regarding
the parameters of custom as a source of international law-many
highly controversial questions remain regarding the exact meaning of
these two elements.6 40 What is clear is that consistent state practice
may elevate to the level of customary international law if such
practice is generally followed by the international community and the
latter accepts such practice as law.6 41 This second requirement of
subjective acceptance or recognition of the practice as law is defined
as the opinio juris.64? Finally, a state may exclude itself from the
binding effects of customary law if it "persistently objects" to the
64 3
customary practice while the law is still in a state of development.
The above analysis is applicable to the Caspian context in the
following manner: despite the de jure effect of the Soviet-Iranian
Treaties, state practice and political realities severely restricted
Iranian commercial and military prowess in the Caspian for almost

634.
Id.
635.
Id.
636.
Id.
637.
Id.
638.
STATUTE OF THE I.C.J., art. 38(b), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note
589, at 51; see also RESTATEMIENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 102(1)(a),(2)
[hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT], reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 51.
639.
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 55.

640.

Id. at 55-57. These questions include, but are not limited to: 1) what

constitutes state practice?, 2) how much practice is required?, 3) how much time is

required?, 4) how much consistency is required?, and 5) what evidence is required for
opinionjuris,the requirement that practice be accepted as law? See generally id.
641.
See generally id. at 54-86.
642.
Id. at 78-86.
643.
See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 638, § 102 cmt. b; see also HENKIN ET
AL., supranote 589, at 88.
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seventy years. 644
More importantly, the Soviet Union never
consulted Iran nor offered any compensation based on the proceeds of
oil and gas exploration taking place off Baku and other Caspian areas
managed under the de facto [exclusive] control of Moscow. 645 Iranian
commentators point out that the reason behind Iran's acquiescence to
these unilateral Soviet actions, which may have breached any
existing "common sea" principles pursuant to the Treaties, was Iran's
reluctance to antagonize its powerful northern neighbor by lodging
diplomatic protest. 646 In short, the history of unilateral Soviet action
and Iranian acquiescence would seem to weaken the effect of any
647
arguments by Iran that the Sea is in fact held in common.
Implicit in the argument that state practice actually invalidates
the Treaties' principle of joint ownership, however, is the assumption
that consistent practice by the Soviet Union and its satellite Caspian
republics in their "sectors" of the Sea elevated the principle of sectoral
division to the level of customary law. This argument is flawed for
several reasons. First it is highly improbable that the Soviet Union's
consistent practice of unilateral exploitation of hydrocarbon basins in
the Caspian rises to the level of customary law because neither of the
two elements required to establish custom are satisfied. Activities in
the Caspian can hardly be characterized as "general state practice" on
an international level. 648
Even on a more regional level this
argument is hardly valid.649 Also, there is no evidence of opinio
juris-that either the Soviet Union or Iran ever accepted these
unilateral activities as defining the legal status of relations between
them. 650 Second, the argument assumes that a failure of notification
or consent regarding unilateral actions outside of the ten-mile
exclusive fishing zone actually violates the principle of common
ownership.
Though it is true that Iran cannot be deemed a
"persistent
objector"
to
unilateral
Soviet
activities
under
international law, it is equally probable that it was not required to
object, or better yet, felt that no objection was necessary since the
65
Treaty provisions had not been violated. '

644.
Russian naval and military supremacy meant that Iranian navigational
sovereignty over the seas was severely restricted to a narrow zone close to its southern
shores while Russian naval presence covered almost all corners of the sea. See Assadi.
Kiya, supra note 593.
645.
See id.
646.
See id.
647.
See id.
648.
See HENKIN ET AL., supranote 598, at 55.
649.
See id.; see also e.g., Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, for a
general understanding of regional customary law and the legal requirements that need
to be proven in order to establish its operation.
650.
See Assadi-Kiya, supra note 593.
651.
See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 598, at 88-90.
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In short, under a customary law argument seeking to invalidate
the notion of common ownership of the Caspian Sea, the burden of
proof clearly lies with those seeking to prove that the de jure effect of
the Soviet-Iranian Treaties was vitiated or altered by subsequent
action or inaction on the part of the Soviet Union and Iran. 652 This is
a tough burden of proof to overcome since advocates of the argument
will have to prove that Iran's silence indicated subjective
acknowledgment that unilateral Soviet action elevated to the level of
customary law.653 At best proponents of delimitation may point to
equitable principles of international law, including estoppel, to prove
that Iran's silence during the Soviet era amounted to an implicit
acknowledgment that the legal status of the Caspian had changed
654
from common ownership to that of sectoral division.
B. CaspianBoundariesand the Legal Effects of State Succession
The collapse of the Soviet Union has prompted proponents of
sectoral division to mount a more credible challenge directed at the
legal validity of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties. The legal challenge
operates primarily on two fronts. First, proponents of sectoral
division advance the argument that although official delimitation of
the Caspian Sea did not occur during the Soviet era, the Soviet Union
and Iran practically divided the Caspian pursuant to several
boundary and aerial agreements consistent with state practice.
These proponents further argue that in practice, the Soviet
government divided the Sea between Russia and the NIS, allocating
specific sectors of the Sea to be managed and operated by Baku,
Almaty, and Ashqabad. Second, proponents of sectoral division
question the continuing validity of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties,
especially in light of the fundamental change in the geopolitical

652.

See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and

Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, [applicable sections] reprinted in
HENRIN ET AL., supra note 598, at 82-85 (providing the standard legal procedure for
placing the original burden of proof on the party arguing for the existence of customary
international law). On a related but important point, simple violation of the rules of
international law, even under repeated circumstances, does not, in and of itself,
invalidate the rules' applicability and de jure effect on concerned states. See
InternationalLaw Commission Report, [1966] 11 Yb.I.L.C. 169, 253-55, reprinted in
HENKIN ET AL., supranote 598, at 507:
The great majority of jurists recognize that a violation of a treaty by one party
may give rise to a right in the other party to abrogate the treaty to suspend the
performance of its own obligations under the treaty ....
[A] Breach of a treaty,
however serious, does not ipso facto put an end to the treaty ....
(emphases
added).
653.
654.

See supra notes 640-42 and accompanying text.
See Caglett, supranote 584 (advancing such an estoppel argument).
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environment and a significant redistribution [and reorganization] of
Caspian boundaries. This challenge directly calls into question the
validity of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties pursuant to the succession and
independence of the NIS from the Soviet Union.
1. Caspian Sea Boundaries: Internal Administrative Delimitation or
International Borders?
Under Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS Treaty) 655 and the preamble of the Almaty
Declaration, 656 the signatories recognized the principles of respect for
the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders existing
within the Commonwealth. 657 According to this requirement, the
legally established administrative territorial division among the
former Soviet republics officially acquired the status of international
borders after independence. 658 Article 5, however, only refers to the
land boundaries of the NIS-it does not refer to division of the
Caspian Sea. 659 In fact, such delimitation never officially occurred,
either among the Soviet republics, or between the Soviet Union and
Iran 660
With respect to Soviet-Iranian delimitation or partition of the
Caspian, the NIS often refer to a boundary treaty executed by the two
littoral states in 1956 establishing a land boundary on both sides of
the Caspian. 66 1 The boundary delimitation designated the port of
Astara as the common boundary on the west and the port of

655.
Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 8,
1991, 31 I.L.M. 143, 144 (hereinafter CIS Treaty). This agreement technically
dissolved the Soviet Union. Id. at 143. The governments of Russia, Belarus, and the
Ukraine then established the CIS. Id. On December 21, 1991, a protocol was attached
to the above agreement that allowed Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to join the CIS. See Protocol to
the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991,
31 I.L.M. at 147. Georgia later joined the CIS in December 1993. HENKIN ET AL.,
supra note 589, at 540. Another agreement executed on the same day acknowledged
the CIS members' rights to apply for UN membership, although Russia, Belarus, and
the Ukraine had already attained membership status. See generally Decision by the
Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991,
31 I.L.M. at 151. Finally, on June 22, 1993, the CIS member-states adopted an official
CIS Charter. See Commonwealth of Independent States: Charter, June 22, 1993, 34
I.L.M. 1279 (1995).
656.
Almaty Declaration, Dec. 21, 1991, pmbl., 31 I.L.M. 148 [hereinafter
Almaty Declaration].
657.
CIS Treaty, supra note 655, art.5, at 144; see also Kochumov, supra note
154.

658.
659.
660.

Kochumov, supra note 154.
See id.; see also Mesamed, supra note 121, at 209.
Kochumov, supra note 154.

661.

Id.
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Hosseingholi as the one on the east. 662 The treaty was silent on
demarcation of the Sea itself.663 In 1964, however, a Soviet-Iranian
aerial agreement for determination of flight information zones
established the traditional line of demarcation between the two
countries by extending an imaginary line across the southern
Caspian based on the Astara-Hosseingholi delimitation. 66 4 Both
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have produced maps and documents
showing that such a Soviet administrative division was indeed
66 5
officially recognized.
While the notion of boundary delimitation between the Soviet
Union and Iran under their bilateral treaties is directly relevant to
the topic at hand, the relationship between the Soviet Republics (now
the NIS) and Iran may also bear some light on the weight of legal
arguments for and against a specific legal regime for the Caspian. In
this respect, it is important to analyze the legal obligations of the NIS
to each other and ultimately to Iran, particularly with respect to
continuing legal obligations after state succession and state practice
regarding the administration of internal boundaries and the latter's
effect on the formalization of international boundaries after
disintegration.
As early as 1920 the Soviet Ministry of Oil Industry arbitrarily
partitioned the waters of the Caspian between the five littoral
republics. 666 In 1970, however, the Ministry of Oil Industry executed
a more comprehensive delimitation based on an approximation of the
median line separating the four republics into de facto "national
sectors."6 67 According to some legal scholars, however, such division
took on a symbolic rather than realistic character and had no
practical significance for the economic life of the post-Soviet
republics. 668 Yet state practice indicates that both before and after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Republics consistently
adopted the practice and custom of observing the internal
administrative boundary lines in the Caspian Sea. 669 In recognition
of the legal validity of state practice in observing the de facto
boundary lines to the waters of the Caspian, President Heydar Aliyev
of Azerbaijan proclaimed that the Sea "was divided into sectors, each

662.
Shoumikhin, supranote 63, at 132. This line, however, was never formally
agreed upon by inter-governmental agreement. Id.
663.
Id.
664.
Id.
665.
Babak, supranote 109, at 185.
666.
As early as the 1920s the Ministry of Oil Industry of the USSR had
arbitrarily divided the Soviet zone of the Caspian between Russia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Shoumikhin, supranote 63, at 132.
667.
Kochumov, supranote 154.
668.
Mesamed, supranote 121, at 109.
669.
See Kochumov, supranote 154.
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of which belongs to a particular Caspian country. '6 70 In addition,
both Baku and Almaty have produced Soviet government maps
corroborating the existence of such delimitation and each has relied
on the Soviet Constitution which formally recognized the Republics as
sovereign states with the right to independently use their natural
6 71
resources on the land and water territory belonging to them.
The foregoing arguments, although seemingly persuasive, are
nonetheless flawed for several reasons. First, any delimitation of the
Sea that occurred between and among the Soviet Republics was solely
and directly a result of central administrative decisions carried out
primarily by the Soviet Ministry of Oil Industry pursuant to the
Union's constitutional laws. 672 Despite the practice of conformity
with internal administrative boundaries and their application within
the Caspian Sea context, state practice and recognition of de facto
boundaries never rose to the level of Soviet law because the sectoral
division was often implemented by sector ministries which were
limited in their jurisdiction. 6 73 In other words, there was never
formal recognition and implementation of boundary demarcation
under Soviet agencies-they were only authorized to exercise
functional jurisdiction over internal boundary decisions, thereby
making their actions binding only on the territory of all Soviet
Republics. 674 Second, according to Soviet law, the continental shelf
and ownership of its resources was the property of the USSR, not any
of its constitutive republics. 675 In support of this contention, Russian
legal scholars point to the fact that the shelf could not be developed
without the permission of competent Soviet authorities. 67 6 The
Caspian's oil fields were, therefore, owned and administered by oil
producing enterprises, institutions, and organizations subordinate to
the central government of the USSR. 677 Third, these internal and
external administrative boundaries were not in fact recognized by
Iran and cannot therefore operate to limit its sovereignty over the
6 78
Caspian's water and resources.
All this would strongly suggest that under international legal
principles, the Caspian partition was solely administrative in nature
and did not divide the Sea either between the Soviet Union and Iran
or the NIS republics. More importantly, however, the internal
administrative divisions among the Republics are legally inapplicable

670.
671.
672.
673.
674.
675.
676.
677.
678.

Id.
Babak, supra note 109, at 184.
See Kochumov, supra note 154.
Id.
See id.
Id.; see also supra notes 625-28 and accompanying text.
Kochumov, supra note 154.
Id.
See id.
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to Iran and were never officially acknowledged by either it nor the
Soviet Union-its operation was limited to the management functions
of the Soviet central government under Soviet constitutional and
administrative law. As such, the internal divisions were rendered
legally obsolete and constitutionally void with the collapse of the
USSR.
2. Are the NIS Bound by Soviet Era Treaty Obligations?
a. The International Juridical Personalities of the NIS [Republics]
during the Soviet Era
To better understand the Soviet Republics, juridical personalities
under the USSR and international law it is important to briefly lay
out the political arrangements within the Soviet Union. Under
Article 60 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution the parliaments of the
RSFSR, the Turkmen SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR, and the Kazakh SSR
had the right to establish their own representations in international
organizations. 67 9 After 1944 the federal Constitution was amended so
that the USSR had the right to establish a common procedure for
foreign relations but allowed each Republic to exchange diplomatic
and consular representatives. 68 0 A simultaneous reorganization
occurred in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that allowed each
Republic to advance its individual foreign policy interests within a
joint cooperative arrangement. 681 Finally, under Article 80 of the
1977 Soviet Constitution, each republic was granted increased foreign
policy powers allowing them the right to directly participate in
international organizations and administer relations with foreign
682
states.
With respect to the continuing validity of the Soviet-Iranian
Treaties after the collapse of the Soviet Union, analysis may be
divided into three main parts: 1) whether under international law
and the Soviet constitutional structure the NIS Republics had legal
capacity to enter into or ratify foreign policy treaties; 2) whether a
fundamental change in circumstances has rendered the legal status
of the Caspian prior to 1991 obsolete; and 3) whether the Treaties
were either terminated or suspended as a result of state
683
succession.

679.
680.

Kochumov, supranote 154.
Id.

681.

Id.'

682.
683.

Id.
State succession generally refers to the fact of replacement of one state by
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory. HENKIN ETAL.,
supra note 598, at 530-43. Succession may occur either as a result of simple
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b. Capacity to Enter into Treaties Under International Law
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCOLT)6 84 is the
68 5
principal authoritative source of the law of international treaties.
Under this Convention every state possesses treaty-making capacity
only so far as it is a sovereign, and parties that are not full sovereigns
may only become parties to treaties they are competent to conclude
pursuant to domestic or constitutional law. 686
In practice, it is
difficult to apply a hard and fast rule to determine whether a state
qualifies as a sovereign since the answer depends heavily upon the
factual specificities of each case. 681 It is noteworthy, however, that
there are many examples of component states in federal unions which
have the capacity to enter into foreign agreements with other
international entities, although this practice is often dependent on
the constitutional law of the unions concerned. 688 Another approach
acknowledges a political subdivision's foreign treaty capacity upon
the latter's exercise of such a power, pursuant to consent by the
6 89
dominant entity.
c. The Principle of Rebus Sic Stantibus
Under Article 62 of the VCOLT the principle of rebus sic
stantibus or fundamental change of circumstances may suspend or
terminate an international treaty obligation. 690 Upon a cursory look

replacement of one state by another, the formation of a newly-independent state, or the
union and separation of states. Id.
684. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCOLT]. The
Convention is regarded in large part declaratory of existing law, and on that basis it
has been invoked and applied by tribunals and by states even prior to its entry into
force and in regard to nonparties as well as parties. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 598, at
416-17.
Some of its provisions have gone beyond existing law or have altered
previously established rules. Id. These provisions are generally characterized as
"progressive development." Id. Also, many states tend to refer to all of the provisions
of the Convention as an authoritative source of law, thus gradually transforming even
its innovative features into customary law through application. Id.
685.

HENKIN ETAL., supra note 598, at 416.

686.
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1217-20 (Jennings & Watts, eds., 9th ed.
1992), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 598, at 431.
687.
Id.
688.

See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 598, at 433-34.

689.
Lissitzyn, Efforts to Codify or Restate the Law of Treaties, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 1166, 1183-84 (1962), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supranote 598, at 435. But see
First Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 [19621 Yb.I.L.C. 27, 37, reprinted in HENKIN ET
AL., supra note 598, at 435 (rejecting such a notion).
690. VCOLT, supra note 684, art. 62, [applicable provisions] reprinted in
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 598, at 517-18. For an application of this principle, see
generally Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3.
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the doctrine seems to favorably support the NIS' position regarding
the invalidity of the Soviet era Treaties. 6 91 A more in-depth analysis
of the five conditions that must be met before this clause is triggered,
however, reveals several problems with such a position.
First, and perhaps most importantly, Article 62 does not apply to
settlements
of a territorial
nature,
including
boundary
arrangements. 6 92 This places the NIS in a "catch-22" situation: if
they argue that the Soviet practice of de facto delimitation of the
Caspian and partition of the Sea between the Soviet Union and Iran
qualified as de jure boundary settlements they would undermine their
chances of success under this theory. 693 Second, there is a plausible
argument that although the geopolitical nature of the Caspian Sea
has fundamentally changed, the continuing validity of the Treaties
does not legally affect the parties' ownership rights. 694 On a third
and related point, it may be argued that the unforeseeability
requirement is weak within the context of littoral ownership rights
despite the discovery of huge oil and gas finds, particularly off the
Azeri coast.6 95 This is so because all parties were aware of the
existence of rich hydrocarbon basins in the Caspian since the early
Nineteenth Century-continuing de facto operation of the Treaties

would not preclude the NIS Republics from continuing to exploit the
Sea's resources within their "national sectors. '6 96 Last but not least,
the relative precarious status of the rebus sic stantibus principle in
international law and the massive complexity of legal issues and

691.
The five conditions which must be met under Article 62 before a
fundamental change of circumstances can be invoked as a ground for termination
include: 1) a change of fundamental character;, 2) an unforeseeable change; 3) a change
the circumstances of which must have been an essential basis of the consent to be
bound by the treaty, 4) a change which radically transformed the extent of the parties'
obligations; and 5) the obligations in question are still to be performed under the
treaty. HENKIN ET AL., supranote 598, at 517-18. The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the resulting geopolitical change seems to facially satisfy the first, second, third, and
fifth conditions. See id.
692.
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 598, at 518; see also infra note 694 and
accompanying text.
693.
See id.
694.
Of course on a practical political level Iran recognizes that the collapse of
the Soviet Union allows it the ability to more effectively exercise its sovereignty rights,
particularly against the NIS. In this sense, therefore, the disintegration of the USSR
does, in fact, significantly or fundamentally change the parties' ownership rights to oil
and gas deposits in the Caspian. Furthermore, Iran may have a tough time advancing
this argument because it runs contrary to its long term interest unless it can advance
the nuanced argument that the Treaties' provisions allowed flexibility during the
Soviet era when it looked the other way but allow it to more fully exercise its rights
now.

695.
See supra Part ll.B.1.a. Note, however, that this argument is stronger if
applied to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, an event which very few if any
international experts would have predicted.
696.
See generally supraPart II.B.l.a.
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conundrums surrounding the collapse of the Soviet empire probably
6 97
preclude its use by any international legal tribunal in the future.
In conclusion, despite the changed circumstances (particularly with
respect to improved technology and increased Caspian hydrocarbon
potential and capacity), the new conditions were not of such a nature
as to render obligations under the Treaties invalid.
d. The Effects of State Succession on the Soviet-Iranian Treaties
Under the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect
of Treaties (VCSSRT) 698 and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations, newly-independent states are generally not bound or
obligated to maintain in force their predecessors' treaties in their
respective territories. 699 This presumption against continuance of
70 0
legal obligations is often referred to as the "clean slate rule.1
Moreover, according to the International Law Commission, "the
fundamental rule to be laid down for bilateral treaties appears to be
that their continuance in force after independence is a matter of
agreement... between the newly-independent State and the other
State party to the predecessor State's treaty. 701 As such, the newlyindependent state is under no obligation to be bound by the former
treaty-it only has the right of option to be a party to that treaty if it
so chooses. 70 2 (Again, territorial treaties are excepted from the
international rules invalidating treaties based on state succession.
Territorial treaties touch on matters as diverse as international
boundaries, rights of transit on international waterways, the use of
70 3
international rivers, and demilitarization of particular localities.)
There is, however, another line of precedent recognized under
the VCSSRT that distinguishes between separating states and states
gaining independence from colonial powers. 70 4 This line covers cases
where a part or parts of the territory of a state separate to form one

697.
698.

See id.
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,

opened for signature Aug. 23, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.80/31

(1978) [hereinafter

VCSSRT. Like the VCOLT, this Convention is in large part intended to codify
customary international law. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 533.
699.
See generally HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 532-33. See also THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 638, § 210, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at
533.
700.
HENKIN ETAL. supra note 589, at 537-38.
701.
Id. at 538.
702.

Id.

703.
See InternationalLaw Commission Report, [1974] 11 (1) Yb.I.L.C. 157, 196,
201, 206 [hereinafter 1974 ILC Report], reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at
533-34.
704. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 539; see also 1974 ILC Report, supra note
703, at 157, 260, 265, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 542-43.
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or more independent states. 705 For separating states the principle of
706
treaty continuity is the default rule.

Considerable debate surrounds the issue of whether the NIS
qualify as newly-independent states or separating states under
international law.70 7 Proponents of the former view assert that none

of the former Soviet Republics were actually self-governing; the "clean
slate rule" would, therefore, apply. 708

The alternative view is that

although state power in the USSR was concentrated in the
Communist Party and Russia was dominant, the other Republics
were not excluded from having a say in the policies of the central
government. 70 9 Such a theory finds support in the actual political
organization of the Republics within the Soviet system, particularly
within the context of foreign policy.7 10

Also several of the newly-

independent states, including Belarus and the Ukraine, were actual
members of the United Nations prior to their integration into the
USSR, and their functional capacity was no different than that of the
NIS. 711 Finally, the "clean state rule" is generally applied to newlyindependent former colonies-the NIS cannot be characterized as
712
such.
e. The Almaty Declaration and the NIS' Exercise of the "Right of
Option"
Any presumption against the continuity of international
obligations of the MS is severely restricted as a result of the Almaty
Declaration of 1991.713 Under that agreement Russia and the NIS
explicitly agreed that the latter would recognize the validity of all
international treaties and agreements signed under the Soviet Union
and honor their binding effect on subsequent state action and

705.
1974 ILC Report, supra note 703, at 253-58, reprinted in HENKIN 1TAL.,
supranote 540, at 540-41.
706.
See HENKIN ET AL., supranote 589, at 539.
707.

See id.; see also generally Saxer, The Transformation of the Souiet Union:

From a Socialist Federationto a Commonwealth of Independent States, 14 LoY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 581, 691-92 (1992).
708. Id.
709. Id.
710.
See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
711.
Bunn & Rhinelander, Who Inherited the Former Soviet Union's Obligations
Under Arms Control Treaties with the United States? Memorandum to the Committee
on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 1992), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at
1042-43 (analyzing the legal effects of state succession on U.S.-Soviet arms treaties).
712. Id. Furthermore, the VCSSRT recognizes an exception to this continuity
rule in cases where the object and purpose of the treaty would be frustrated by
continuing legal obligations.

Bunn & Rhinelander, supra note 711, reprinted in

HENKIN ETAL, supranote 589, at 1043. Such is not the case here. See id.
713.
See generally Almaty Declaration, supranote 656, at 148-49.
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diplomacy. 7 14 As such they can be deemed to have exercised their
"right of option" to accede to the legal effect of the Soviet-Iranian
Treaties, regardless of whether they were released of such obligations
under the VCSSRT. 715 Therefore, there is a strong argument that
even if the NIS did not sign the Soviet-Iranian Treaties, they are
bound by the Treaties' provisions via the provisions of the Almaty
716
Declaration.
C. Viewing the Treaties as a Set of Interim Default Rules
There are several conclusions that may be reached as a result of
the foregoing legal analysis regarding the Soviet-Iranian Treaties.
First, the Soviet-Iranian Treaties are still valid law with respect to
all Caspian littoral states. Under the Almaty Declaration of 1991 the
NIS agreed to abide by all Soviet era treaties. Second, the SovietIranian Treaties cannot be characterized as a legal regime, because
they do not substantively address the unique issues surrounding
hydrocarbon ownership rights. Third, the Treaties may, however,
impose a set of interim default rules (or legal parameters) upon the
littoral states that may indirectly prohibit unilateral annexation of
ownership rights in the Sea. Fourth, even though the Treaties never
discussed common ownership of hydrocarbon resources, a
condominium regime did in fact apply to the Sea for the purposes of
fishing and navigation. Fifth, the Treaties never delimited the
Caspian Sea into Soviet and Iranian sectors and any internal
administrative decisions to divide the Caspian waters among the
Soviet Republics never rose to the status of international or treaty
law. Sixth, municipal interpretation of treaty law corroborates the
contracting parties' understanding that the Caspian was a "closed
sea" and therefore fell under a unique legal status. Last but not
least, state practice does not invalidate the legal effect of common
ownership imposed upon the Sea's waters. Whatever the Iranian
reasons for neglecting to protest the Soviet Union's seemingly
unilateral exploitation of hydrocarbon resources off Baku, an objective
interpretation of Iranian silence would suggest that for the purposes
of legal effect, Tehran simply did not view the unilateral actions as
violative of the Treaties' common ownership principle.
All this would strongly suggest that while the Soviet-Iranian
Treaties may not be viewed as a legal regime because of the
fundamental change in political and economic circumstances, they do
continue to serve as a legal set of prohibitive rules upon the littoral
states.
As such, from a purely legal perspective, unilateral

714.
715.
716.

Almaty Declaration, supranote 656, at 149.
See supra notes 698-702 and accompanying text.
Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 25.
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exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea may well
violate international law depending on the nature and scope of the
action. Furthermore, the more intrusive the unilateral actions
become, the stronger the presumption that international law has
been violated.

V. LEGAL REGIME MODELS AND ENERGY RIGHTS

A. The Competing Macro-Models
So far legal analysis of the current status of the Caspian Sea has
focused solely on the nature and effect of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties.
More specifically, this study has sought to address the issue of
whether, in the absence of a comprehensive legal regime defining
territorial relations between the Caspian littoral states, there are
nonetheless a set of legal parameters that limit or prohibit certain
[unilateral] activities by the littoral states. The conclusion reached
strongly suggests that in the least, there are a set of legal limitations
operative today-the legal effect of the Treaties, though not
establishing a legal regime per se, may very well prevent any littoral
state from taking unilateral action to declare any part of the Caspian
Sea and its waters as part of its "national sector."
The legal effect of the Treaties as prohibitive default rules does
not, however, address the more pressing concern of what the future
legal regime of the Caspian Sea may look like. Surely, all states,
including Russia and Iran, agree that the littoral states must reach
consensus on a new comprehensive set of legal rules that vail
accommodate the changed geopolitical circumstances in the region.
More importantly, they realize that the nature of any proposed legal
regime for the Caspian Sea bears directly on the littoral states' ability
to exercise ownership rights over the Sea's hydrocarbon resources.
The question then becomes: what legal models must the littoral
states employ in order to construct a new legal regime for the
Caspian? Should they simply import an existing macro-model such
as the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea, or does the
unique status of the Caspian require new and innovative approaches
to solving the legal regime puzzle?
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1. The Third United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea
(UNCLOS)
a. The Legal Effects of the UNCLOS
With Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan taking the lead in declaring
that the Caspian's legal status should be governed by the
UNCLOS, 717 it becomes necessary to briefly address the major
relevant features of this body of law, especially as they pertain to the
Caspian Sea. Before that, however, it is necessary to briefly outline
the current legal effect of this body of law.
The law of the sea was primarily customary law until it was
codified by the International Law Commission in a series of United
Nations Conferences on the Law of the Seas, culminating in the final
Draft Convention of the third conference. 7 18 The codification of these
laws represented a gradual shift from a mare liberum notion of the
seas, highlighting the sea as a natural resource enjoyed by all, to
derogations from commonage principles focusing on the exclusive
rights of coastal states in exercising certain types of jurisdiction over
waters adjacent to their shores. 719 The shift away from commonage
principles was prompted by the noticeable absence of an agreement

717.
After many sessions in the period 1972-82 the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea adopted a convention on April 30, 1982. IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC
DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (Ian Brownlie ed., 4th ed. 1995). The
convention represents the most ambitious scheme of codification and progressive
development of international law ever attempted. Id.
For a list of signatures,
ratifications, accessions and successions, see Law of the Sea Bulletin, UN Division for
Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs, No. 25 (June 1994), at 7; see
also supra Parts III.B.1-2, for the positions of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on the
applicability of the UNCLOS to the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
718.
HENKIN ETAL., supra note 589, at 1232. For the complete text of the treaty,
see U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 33
I.L.M. 1309 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter Convention]. HENKIN ET
AL., supra note 589, at 1232. The first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was
convened in Geneva in 1958. The meeting resulted in the adoption of four conventions
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, the
High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311, and the Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. As of January 1993 the Convention on the High
Seas had fifty-seven parties, the Territorial Sea Convention had forty-five parties, the
Continental Shelf Convention had fifty-three parties, and the Fishing and
Conservation Convention had thirty-six parties. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at
1232. The conventions are considered to be a codification of customary international
law and are therefore binding on states that have not ratified them. Id. The
Convention has also contributed to the development of international law. Id. A second
Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in 1960 for the sole purpose of reaching
consensus on the breadth of the territorial sea. Id. It did not, however, succeed. Id.
719.
Id. at 1231.
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among the international community regarding the ownership of the
720
seabed and subsoil resources.
There is some confusion regarding the legal applicability of the
UNCLOS as an international body of law especially in light of the
failure of key states to ratify the treaty.72 1 Most notably, the United

States refused to ratify the treaty because it objected to certain

provisions limiting a state's rights to deep seabed mining. 722 In 1983,
however, President Reagan acknowledged the legal applicability of
virtually all the treaty provisions except those relating to deep seabed
mining of the UNCLOS as a codification of customary international
law.7 23 Although this view has been questioned if not challenged by
some nations, many international law scholars agree that many of
the UNCLOS provisions duplicate provisions of the 1958
Conventions, and many others are clearly established as customary
7
law of the sea. 2

Id. Other factors, namely the recognition that coastal states had special
720.
interests in controlling their shores, helped identify and establish the different degrees
of controlling jurisdiction enjoyed by coastal states over their offshore waters. Id. at
1232.
HIENKIN ET AL., supranote 589, at 1233.
721.
722.
Id. at 1232-33. The Conference on the Law of the Sea began in 1973 and
after eight years of negotiation it produced the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Id. at 1232. The Draft Convention was considered virtually complete until the Reagan
administration proposed a number of changes to Part IX of the treaty relating to deep
seabed mining rights. Id. The proposals were rejected and the final draft was
approved on April 30, 1982, by a vote of 130 states in favor, four against, and seven
abstentions. Id.; see also infra notes 764-68 and accompanying text (analyzing the
UNCLOS' limitations on deep seabed mining).
723.
Id. at 1233. The President did so by express and tacit agreement when he
exercised the United States' legal right to establish a 200-mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) pursuant to the UNCLOS, while simultaneously proclaiming that the United
States effectively agrees with the substantive provisions of the UNCLOS. Id. at 123334.
Id.
Some developing states rejected the United States' contention that
724.
parts of the treaty reflect agreed customary international law while others do not if
[the United States] decides to opt out of them. Id. They advanced a "package deal"
notion of the UNCLOS, arguing that they had agreed to provisions favorable to
developed nations (including the United States) in order to achieve agreement on
provisions they desired, particularly the regime for deep seabed mining. Id. They
argued, therefore, that some sections cannot be treated as customary international law
unless the entire treaty is recognized as such. Id. Despite this view, however, the
Restatement (Third), Part V, concludes that while the UNCLOS is not the law of the
United States, many of its provisions closely follow the 1958 Conventions to which the
United States is a party and which largely restate customary international law. THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 638, § 102, Report's Note 2, reprinted in HENKIN El AL.,
supra note 589, at 1234. It also acknowledges that other provisions of the UNCLOS
have become customary international law since that time, thus binding all nations
apart from the Convention itself. Id. Last but not least, the Restatement identifies
certain principles of the UNCLOS that may be deemed customary law because they
"were adopted without any objections," and others that have not risen to the status of
customary law because they have not been expressly or tacitly agreed upon. Id. § 514,
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b. The Basic Principles of the UNCLOS
The controlling foundation of the UNCLOS is the idea of
delimitation. 725 Delimitation is the legal science of dividing sea
territory between neighboring coastal states that share common
waters, especially if they are geographically positioned adjacent or
opposite of each other. 726 Delimitation, however, also creates varying
degrees of control for individual coastal states-the further one
travels from the littoral states' coastline the less jurisdictional control
727
the state can exercise over the waters and subsurface resources.
As such, the UNCLOS is important in so far as it codified a process of
development in the customary international law of the seas that
generally confirmed the authority of the coastal states over certain
coastal zones, but introduced a specific delimitation regime that
728
recognized differing jurisdictional zones in different coastal zones.

Important zones of national jurisdiction under an UNCLOS
regime include the territorial sea, the continental shelf, and the
EEZ. 729 Article 2 of the UNCLOS grants full sovereignty of coastal
states to an adjacent area (called the territorial sea) which includes
complete control over air space and the seabed (including subsoil
resources). 730 Article 3 further defines the breadth of such a territory
731
as being limited to twelve nautical miles.
The territorial sea also encompasses the concept of an adjacent
"buffer zone"-called the contiguous zone.7 32 According to Article 33

Reporters' Note 4, cmt. b. Those principles that have been elevated to the status of
customary law include, but are not limited to, the provisions concerning the territorial
seas and the EEZs. See id. In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Chamber of the
International Court of Justice echoed the Restatement's sentiments regarding the
UNCLOS' effects as customary international law. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at
1234.
725.
See generally HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1238-97, for a
comprehensive legal survey of the concepts of delimitation embedded in the UNCLOS.
See also Caglett, supra note 584; Oxman, supra note 22.
726.
Caglett, supra note 584.
727.
See, e.g., THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 638, § 511, cmt. a, reprinted in
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1238-39.
728.
See id.
729.
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1238.
730.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 2, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note
589, at 1240.
731.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 3, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note
589, at 1243. Although states had commonly recognized their right to exercise
sovereignty over a territorial sea pursuant to customary international law and state
practice, the UNCLOS finally laid to rest the long-standing controversy on the breadth
of the territorial sea which remained unresolved after the 1958 Geneva Convention and
the 1960 Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. For an in-depth explanation of
the technical principles of delimitation of the territorial seas, see Convention, supra
note 718, arts. 5-7, 11, 14.
732.
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1266.
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a state may "prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration,
or sanitary laws and regulations within its territorial sea.1733 The
coastal state may do this by exercising its right of "hot pursuit," a
pursuit which may be undertaken when the competent authorities of
a coastal state have good reason to believe that the ship has violated
the laws and regulations of the state.734 The contiguous zone allows
for an extra twelve-mile cushion, bringing the total width of the
7 35
territorial sea to twenty-four nautical miles from the coastline.
As per the continental shelf, Article 76 of the UNCLOS defines
the shelf as "the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin
..... 736 The shelf includes the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, but
specifically excludes the "deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or
737
the subsoil thereof."
The practical exercise of delimitation of the continental shelf
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts has continued to
plague the international community even after the adoption of the
UNCLOS. 738 The international community first addressed the legal
ramifications of delimitation in a series of important cases before the
International Court Justice (ICJ) dubbed the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases.739 In those cases the ICJ denied Denmark and the
Netherlands' contention that the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf had elevated the principle of equidistance
regarding delimitation of the shelf to the status of customary
international law, binding nations that were not parties to the
Convention. 740
The Court further held that the overriding
consideration in delimitation was equity, defined loosely as maritime
space that was proportional to the length of relative coastlines. 74 1 In
effect, the ICJ's decision underscored the fact that neither the

733.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 33, reprintedin HENKIN ET AL, supra note
589, at 1267-68.
734.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 111, reprinted in HENIMN ET AL., supra
note 589, at 1273.
735.
Convention, supranote 718, art. 33, reprintedin HENKIN ET AL, supra note
589, at 1267-68.
736.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 76, reprintedin HENIMN ET AL, supra note
589, at 1279. Article 76 also states that the continental shelf may extend to a distance
of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that
distance. Id.
737.
Id.
738.
See generally HENKIN ETAL., supranote 589, at 1280.86.

739. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.M.G. v. Neth.). 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 29).
740. Id. at 38.80, reprintedin HENKIN ETAL, supranote 589. at 1281.
741. Id. at 53, reprintedin HENKIN ET AL, supranote 589, at 1281.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

792

[VOL. 34:681

equidistance principle or any other delimitation principle was
7 42
obligatory.
Indeed, this notion is incorporated in Article 83 of the UNCLOS
which does not refer to the equidistance rule but instead calls on
party members to decide delimitation pursuant to international law
and equity.7 43

Article 83's departure from the equidistance rule

enunciated in the 1958 Geneva Convention represented the inability
of states to achieve an acceptable legal formula for maritime
boundary delimitation between continental shelves. 744
In the
Continental Shelf Case between Libya and Tunisia, for example, the
ICJ relied on equitable principles to divide the shelf but gave no clear
7 45
guidelines as to the applicable operating principles to be used.
Similarly in the Gulf of Maine Case,
the Chamber seemed to abandon
7 46
any quest for equitable principles.
Finally with respect to the continental shelf, Articles 77 and 78
further define the rights of coastal states to their respective
continental shelves.7 4 7 Coastal states have exclusive rights of
exploration and exploitation of natural resources. 748
Natural
resources are defined as mineral and other non-living resources of the
749
seabed and subsoil, and living organisms.
The last important delimitation zone under the UNCLOS is the
EEZ.75 0

The notion of the EEZ finds support long before its

indoctrination in the UNCLOS. 751 States claimed exceptions to the
rule of mare liberum primarily to exploit fishing grounds and declare

742.
The ICJ further opined that: 1) delimitation is to be effected by agreement
and in accordance with equitable principles in such a way as to leave each Party all
those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land
territory into and under the sea without encroaching on the prolongation of the land
territory of the other Party; 2) if the above delimitation leaves the Parties' areas to
overlap, they are to be divided in agreed proportions, or failing agreement, equally
unless they decide to adopt a regime of joint jurisdiction over the overlapping area; 3)
during negotiations, the Parties should take into account the general configuration of
the coasts as well as unusual features. Id.
743.
Convention, supranote 718, art. 83, reprintedin HENKIN ET AL., supra note
589, at 1282-83.
744.
HENKIN ETAL., supranote 589, at 1283.
745.
See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Tunis.), 1978 I.C.J. 13.
746.
See Gulf of Maine (U.S. v. Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 246.
747. Convention, supra note 718, arts. 77-78, reprintedin HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 589, at 1287.
748. Convention, supra note 718, art. 77, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note
589, at 1287.
749.
Id. The Article states that "the natural resources referred to in this Part
consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil
together with the living organisms belonging to sedentary species ....
" Id.
750.
See generally Convention, supra note 718, arts. 55-73 (outlining the major
provisions of the EEZ under the UNCLOS).
751.

HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1288.
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national fishing zones. 752 The push for incorporation of these
principles during UNCLOS came primarily from coastal states that
had little continental shelf margins and asked for compensation in
the form of rights over the deep seabed extending miles from their
753

shores.
Article 55 of the UNCLOS defines the specific legal regime of the
EEZ as an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea. 54 Article
56 further defines the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal
state in such a zone, allowing coastal states the right to explore,
exploit, conserve, and manage living and non-living natural resources
of the seabed and subsoil (including "production of energy from the
water). 75 5 Article 57 promulgates that the breadth of the EEZ shall
not extend beyond 200 miles of the territorial sea. 75 6 Article 58,
however, specifically allows all states, whether coastal or landlocked,
to enjoy navigation, overflight, laying of submarine cables, and
pipelines. 757 Furthermore, international legal scholars note that
Article 74 of the UNCLOS addressing delimitation of the EEZ
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is identical with
Article 83 dealing with delimitation of the continental shelf and
75 8
presents many of the same problems associated with the latter.
Beyond these zones of national jurisdiction the principle of
commonage has retained its historical and legal significance in the
regime of the high seas. 75 9 The high seas are open to all states,

752. Id. In 1974 the ICJ decided the FisheriesJurisdictionCase, (U.K v. Ice.),
1974 I.C.J. 3, wherein the Court acknowledged an increased and videspread
acceptance of preferential fishing rights for coastal states but noted that such rights
were not absolute where non-coastal states had established historic claims to fish in
particular waters. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1289. The ICJ thus concluded
that Iceland could not unilaterally exclude the United Kingdom from its historic fishing

grounds, prompting both to resolve their dispute via negotiation. Id.
753.
HENKIN ET AL., supranote 589, at 1288-89.
754.

Convention, supranote 718, art. 55, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note

589, at 1292.
755.

Convention, supranote 718, art. 56, reprinted in HENKIN ST AL, supra note

589, at 1292-93.
756.
Convention, supranote 718, art. 57, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note
589, at 1293.
757.
Convention, supranote 718, art. 58, reprinted in HENKIN ST AL, supra note
589, at 1293. The text of the Article reads in part: "In the exclusive economic zone, all
States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy ... the freedoms referred to in article 87
of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and
other internationally lawful uses of the sea ....(emphasis added)."
758.
See Convention, supranote 718, art. 74.

759.
See Convention, supranote 718, art. 86, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 589, at 1297, for a definition of the "high seas" which excludes the territorial sea,
the EEZ, and a state's internal and archipelagic waters. But see HENKIN ET AL, supra
note 589, at 1297 (explaining that under the UNCLOS, the extent of the high seas is
reduced by further concessions to coastal states including the widening of the
territorial sea, the special status of the EEZ, and the establishment of additional rights
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whether coastal or landlocked. 760 The rights and privileges enjoyed
by both coastal and landlocked states in the high seas include
freedom of navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, fishing, and scientific research. 761 Articles 88 through 90
further solidify the principle of commonage and freedom of the high
seas by reserving the latter for "peaceful purposes," prohibiting any
state from exercising sovereignty over any part of the high seas, and
762
allowing all states the right of free navigation, respectively.
The UNCLOS high seas regime does, however, impose certain
limitations on the basic principle of commonage and freedom. 763 For
the purposes of this study, the regime specifically covers the issue of
deep seabed mining beyond the 200-mile national jurisdiction.7 64 In
1969 the international community's decision to impose a moratorium
on exploitation of deep seabed resources set the tone for the notion
that the high seas should not be governed by a laissez-faire regime, as
favored by technologically advanced nations. 765 Later in 1970 the UN
General Assembly passed a Declaration of Principles governing the
seabed and the ocean floor (including its subsoil resources). 766 The
resolution declared the seabed and ocean floor beyond national
jurisdiction to be the "common heritage of mankind," and prohibited
appropriation or any exercise of sovereignty by any state over these
areas. 767 The resolution also established that exploitation and
exploration of deep seabed resources (including acquisition of rights
over such areas) shall be exercised only in conformity with the
provisions of an acceptable international regime to be established in
the future. 768

for coastal states allowing them to set up special-purpose zones, continental shelf
jurisdiction, and new regimes for pollution control and scientific research).
760.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 87, reprintedin HENKIN ET AL., supra note
589, at 1297-98.
761.
Id. at 1298.
762.
Convention, supra note 718, arts. 88-89, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 589, at 1298.
763.
See generally HENKIN ETAL., supra note 589, at 1299-1306.
764.
See, e.g., Convention, supra note 718, arts. 136-40, reprinted in HENKIN ET
AL., supra note 589, at 1315-16. The regime also limits the right to fish on the high
seas. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1317. Article 116 provides the general right to
fish on the high seas. Convention, supra note 718, art. 116, reprinted in HENKIN ET
AL., supra note 589, at 1317. Articles 117-18, however, impose a duty on all states to
take measures (including inter-state cooperation) to ensure conservation of the living
resources of the high seas. Convention, supra note 718, arts. 117-18, reprinted in
HENKIN ETAL., supra note 589, at 1317-18.
765.
Moratorium on Exploitation of Resources of the Deep Sea-Bed, G.A. Res.
2574D (XXIV) (1969), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1310.
766.
Declarationof Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2794 (XXV)
(1970), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supranote 589, at 1310-11.
767.
Id.
768. Id.
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Under the UNCLOS the UN position prohibiting limitless use of
the high seas, particularly with respect to the deep seabed, is legally
codified.7 6 9 Article 136 declares the deep seabed to be the "common
heritage of mankind. ' 770 Article 137 further prohibits sovereignty
and appropriation of the deep seabed but allows alienation of its
resources subject to the rules, regulations, and procedures of the soon
to be established International Sea-Bed Authority (Authority). 7"
Last but not least, Article 139 addresses the responsibility of all
states and other bodies in ensuring that their activities adhere to the
rules of the UNCLOS and customary international law, and assigns
772
liability for damages resulting from unlawful action in the area.
Article 140 reemphasizes the need for activities in the area to be
carried out for the "benefit of mankind," and calls on the Authority to
provide for the "equitable sharing of financial and other economic
benefits derived from activities in the Area . . . on a nondiscriminatory basis ....,,773

c. Applicability of the UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea
Having laid out the general provisions of the UNCLOS as a
possible macro-model for the Caspian Sea, it becomes important to
address the question of whether and to what extent this regime binds,
authorizes, or encourages the littoral states of the Caspian to adopt
769.
See Convention, supra note 718, arts. 136-40, reprinted in HENUN ET AL.
supra note 589, at 1315-16. The years after the UN Resolutions and before the
UNCLOS saw a multitude of states, including the United States, enacting 'interim"
national legislation authorizing nationals to mine the deep seabed beyond the national
jurisdiction zones. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1312-13. For an example of U.S.
legislation effecting such rights, see Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L
No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980). These unilateral laws were challenged by the Group of
77 primarily on legal grounds reflected in the majority vote on the Moratorium
Resolution. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1313. While the developed states
essentially sought an international licensing system monitored by an
intergovernmental authority dominated by states with high capital resources, the
developing Group of 77 states wished to establish an International Sea-Bed Authority
organized principally on the basis of majority rule. Id. After a series of compromises
leading up to the 1982 UNCLOS the developing nations were successful in retaining
the prohibitive character of the Convention regarding deep seabed mining. See id. at
1313-14. The Reagan Administration thus rejected signing the Convention primarily
because of the moratorium on deep seabed mining. Id. at 1314.
770.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 136, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 589, at 1315.
771.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 137, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 589, at 1315-16.
772.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 139, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 589, at 1316.
773.
Convention, supra note 718, art. 140, reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 589, at 1316. It is interesting to note that the Article also defines "benefit of
mankind" in relation to the "interests and needs of developing States and of peoples
who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status...."
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its provisions, in part or in whole. Based on a strictly technical
application of the UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea, it is important to
note that the UNCLOS is only applicable to seas and oceans pursuant
to Articles 1 & 2 establishing its jurisdictional capacity. 7 74 The
geological, functional, and legal history of the Caspian would
arguably place it outside the purview of such a regime. 775 Although
Part IX of the Convention extends applicability of the UNCLOS to
"Enclosed or Semi-Enclosed Seas," Article 122 defines the above
terms as to exclude bodies of water that have no outlet to "another
sea or the ocean. ' 776 Again, the Caspian's landlocked geology would
seem to exclude it from the UNCLOS characterization of an enclosed
or semi-enclosed sea. 77 7 In this regard, therefore, the Caspian Sea's
current legal status may presumably be regarded as analogous to
778
that of a lake.
Next there is the question of legal obligation to the treaties
pursuant to the international rules of treaty law. None of the littoral
states are parties to the UNCLOS, 77 9 although the Soviet Union is a
party to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention which authorizes
application of the equidistance principle regarding the continental
shelf in the absence of agreed upon delimitation. 780 The applicability
of the 1958 Convention to the Caspian Sea is, however, suspect

774.
Convention, supra note 718, arts. 1-2. The law of the sea recognizes that
"internal waters," which include rivers and lakes, are subject to the full sovereignty of
littoral states. Oxman, supra note 22; see also infra Part V.A.3 (discussing the future
applicability of the International Law Commission's Draft Convention on NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses). Traditionally the right to regulate
activities in rivers and lakes bordered by more than one state has been secured
through agreement by the littoral states and may be subject to special legal regimes
designed to accommodate the states' navigational, non-navigational, and
environmental interests. Oxman, supra note 22.
775.
See supra Parts II.A. 1, III, IV.
776. Caglett, supra note 584. Oxman further contends that none of the classic
definitions of the "semi-enclosed sea" apply to the Caspian Sea perfectly, since it is
considered neither a judicial or historic bay. Id. Therefore, unlike semi-enclosed
marine seas of comparable size, the Caspian is subject in its entirety to the sovereignty
of its littoral states. Id.
777. See supra Part II.A.1. Some legal theorists argue that Article 122's
language actually covers the Caspian Sea because it [also] defines a "semi-enclosed" or
"enclosed sea" as an area "consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal states." See supra note 540 and
accompanying text. This interpretation, however, is highly suspect because although
there are a fair number of lakes bordered by more than one state, they are not the
specific object of generally accepted codification under international law. Oxman,
supranote 22.
778. Oxman, supra note 22; see also supra Part IV.C (arguing that the current
legal status of the Caspian, though not constituting a legal regime per se, operates as
an interim set of default rules restricting certain unilateral actions by littoral states).
779. Neither the Soviet Union, the NIS, nor Iran have ratified the 1982
UNCLOS. Caglett, supra note 584, n.12.
780.
Caglett, supra note 584.
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because there is no geological consensus on whether the
Sea contains
78 1
a continental shelf or merely a continental depression.
Even if the UNCLOS is not applicable to the Caspian Sea
directly as a matter of treaty law, its provisions may still bind the
littoral states because they have elevated to customary or general
principles of international law.78 2 There is considerable commentary
regarding the applicability of at least some of the regime's principles
regardless of treaty law, including the general principle of
delimitation of seas based on principles of equity. 78 3 Indeed, as
stated before, the UNCLOS itself strongly suggests that although
delimitation via equidistance is not required by the littoral states,
division based on equity is nonetheless required as a matter of
customary law. 78 This line of argument asserts that the littoral
states are bound by the Convention's specific delimitation
principles. 78 5 The real question, however, is whether the strong legal
presumption for delimitation overrides the Convention's explicit and
implicit language to directly bind the littoral states to the UNCLOS
regime model. The answer would seem to be no-customary
international law cannot erase the basic fact that the UNCLOS is
probably not applicable to the Caspian Sea because the latter does
not fall under the definition of enclosed, semi-enclosed, or open seas
as set out in Articles 1, 2, and 122.786 In other words, although the
legal solutions and delimitation techniques employed in such a
macro-model are always available to all states wishing to establish a
multilateral legal regime, the Convention's rules do not apply 78to7
lakes, bays, and other hydro-geological features as a matter of law.

781.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
782.
See generally HENIN ET AL., supra note 589. at 54-94. 104-19 (analyzing
customary and general international law as legitimate sources of international law).
International law, however, recognizes the possibility that a state actor may exclude

itself from the binding effects of customary law principles if it persistently objects to
the practice of other states continuously adhering to the provisions of the law in

question. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 69, 88-90. Therefore, to the extent that
Soviet jurists developed their own body of law-including the doctrine of the "closed
sea"-and officially applied it to the laws of the sea generally and the Caspian Sea
specifically, there is a valid argument that the Soviet Union (and perhaps Iran) may
qualify as persistent objectors to the custom of delimiting closed seas. including the
Caspian. See supra Parts IV.A.2-3.
Caglett, supra note 584.
783.

784.
785.

See supra note 728 and accompanying text.
See id.

786.

But see supra note 540 and accompanying text (advancing a reading of

Article 122 that arguably places the Caspian Sea within the purview of the UNCLOS).
787.

See Oxman, supra note 22 (arguing that while the laws of the sea are not

directly applicable to the Caspian Sea situation, the principles of UNCLOS may be
helpful in drawing up a legal regime for the Caspian); see also Caglett, supra note 584

(arguing that the reason why the law of the sea is not directly applicable the Caspian
Sea in its entirety is that the freedom of navigation, a "cardinal principle of the law of
the seas," is not applicable to the Caspian). But see id. (asserting that despite the
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At best, the regime is a highly persuasive model that should be
implemented in the Caspian because it is the most applicable model
available.
At worst, it represents a regime that does not
accommodate the historical and practical realities of the parties and
bears no legal weight on their decision to adopt a specific legal

regime.
Putting aside the technical issue of whether the UNCLOS
applies to the Caspian Sea as a matter of law, it is nonetheless
important to analyze the legal effects of delimitation on the rights
and practices of the littoral states were the UNCLOS provisions
applied to the Sea. 788 This is so because even if the UNCLOS does
not apply to the Caspian Sea as a matter of international law, it may
still present the best legal regime model for the Caspian. 789 In other
words, the basic principle of delimitation may still be the most
practical and equitable solution even if the Caspian is characterized
790
purely as a landlocked lake.
As noted above the UNCLOS does not require de jure application
of the equidistance principle, but instead calls for delimitation based
on principles of equity and proportionality. 79 1 Indeed, the strongest
proponents for application of the UNCLOS do not advance a
straightforward application of the equidistance principle to the
Caspian Sea. 792 The Convention's flexibility regarding delimitation
allows for the general application of delimitation principles while
ensuring that reservations be made for peculiarities concerning the
793
unique geological and historical characteristics of the Caspian Sea.
It is important to note, however, that such an approach is essentially

direct inapplicability of the UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea there is no reason why certain
provisions, including delimitation rules regarding the seabed and subsoil resources,
should not be applied to the Caspian context).
788.
Oxman contends there is no persuasive evidence that a position favoring
delimitation under the UNCLOS or condominium use under a res communis regime is
decisively affected by the question of whether the area's legal status is that of a sea or
a lake. Oxman, supra note 22. Oxman believes that the specific geography and history
of the Caspian are more likely to be dispositive of the legal status issue. Id.
789.
Both Caglett and Oxman adopt this general argument. See supra notes
787-88 and accompanying text.
790.
See infra Part V.A.2 (analyzing the possible inadequacies of the
condominium regime model as applicable to the Caspian Sea). According to Caglett,
while states bordering lakes and inland seas are free to agree to any boundary
delimitation arrangements they wish, the overwhelming majority of treaties that
delimit lake and inland sea boundaries have adopted the median-equidistance line,
occasionally modified to take account of historic or other special circumstances.
Caglett, supra note 584. This is so because delimitation by equidistance has the
"obvious virtue of fairness and equity." Id.
791.
See supranotes 741-43 and accompanying text.
792.
See, e.g., Oxman, supra note 22; Caglett, supra note 584.
793.
See supranotes 741-43 and accompanying text.
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UNCLOS-based even if it represents a modified application of the
794
UNCLOS' delimitation principles.
An example of [a practical] 795 delimitation approach taking into

account a multitude of legal, geological, and historical factors is the
UNCLOS-based model advanced by Brice Caglett.796 Caglett's model

takes into account several delimitation tools 797 and the general
principle

of

equity

and

proportionality

as

required

by

the

UNCLOS. 798 Caglett posits that a hypothetical international tribunal
assigned the task of delimiting the Caspian will approach the matter

by drawing equidistance lines between all littoral states, regarding
such lines as the tentative boundaries. 799 The court will examine the
tentative boundaries from the standpoint of equity and
proportionality.8 0 0 It will conduct this study by first determining the

794.
Indeed, Caglett flatly contends that under international law the natural
resources of the Caspian seabed and subsoil should be divided in accordance with
equidistance lines with some minor modifications taken into account. Caglett, supra
note 584.
795.
Caglett concedes that the history of the Caspian establishes special
historic rights, titles, and de facto boundaries that require modification of a
straightforward equidistance delimitation, but asserts that the general equidistance
model can accommodate these peculiarities by allowing the littoral states to enter into
negotiations to establish more flexible boundary lines that satisfy their unique needs.
Id. More specifically, Caglett points out that in the former USSR each Soviet Republic
was allocated a sector of the sea to administer, and that the NIS have up to now
respected these de facto delimitations. Id. After drawing the boundary lines pursuant
to a straightforward application of the equidistance principle, Caglett contends that a
hypothetical court would adjust the lines to ensure that "boundaries exist with
reference to these historic and traditional administrative areas of responsibility- that
the administrative internal boundaries were 'transformed into international frontiers'
on the dissolution of the USSR, and that those boundaries should be respected
pursuant to established precedents and the principles of acquiescence and estoppel."
Id. But see discussion supraPart III (rejecting the validity of such an argument).
796.
See id.
797.
Other than the equidistance principle, international law cases have
historically referred to two other methods of delimitation. See, e.g., Arbitration
Tribunal for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and GuineaBissau, 25 I.L.M. 252 (1986); Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 LC.J. at 246. These two other
methods are primarily considered for delimitation between adjacent states. Caglett,
supra note 584. They include the drawing of lines perpendicular to the general
direction of the coast and the bisection of an angle formed by the coastline of the two
states. Id. Where the contesting states are opposite rather than adjacent, however,
and where the lengths of their coastlines are not grossly disproportionate to each other,
equidistance remains the preferred method of delimitation. Id.
798.
See supranotes 741-43 and accompanying text.
799.
Caglett, supra note 584. Caglett asserts that the court would regard the
equidistance line drawn down the middle of the Sea as having a strong presumption of
validity. Id. The court would also note that an application of the equidistance line to
adjacent boundaries would yield virtually identical results to an application of the
perpendicular and angle bisector approaches. Id.
800.
Id. The paramount requirement for the proportionality test is that there
should be a reasonable degree of proportionality between the lengths of the relative
coasts of the state parties (measured by general directional lines) and the quantity of
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lengths of the coastlines it considers relevant and then deciding what
maritime space to assign to each coastline. 80 1 Next the court will
calculate how much of the relevant maritime space is assigned to
each party by the proposed boundaries it is considering. 802 The
measurement will produce the following results:
Azerbaijan:
21,999.0 nautical square miles of coastline (nsm), 20.7 percent of total
Caspian Sea (percent); Iran: 15,470.7 nsm, 14.6 percent; Kazakhstan:
31,706.9 nsm, 29.9 percent; Russia: 16,560.0 nsm, 15.6 percent;
Turkmenistan: 20,379.8 nsm, 19.2 percent. 80 3
Finally, it will
compare the ratios between the two pairs of figures (lengths of
coastlines and maritime space assigned) and determine whether an
80 4
adequate degree of proportionality exists.

So given the above outline, what can we expect the legal regime
of the Caspian to look like if the UNCLOS model were applied?
Straightforward application of the UNCLOS model to the Caspian
establishes navigational and other freedoms and rights that may be
exercised by all states, including non-littoral ones. 80 5 An example of

such a regime is the Persian Gulf, a semi-enclosed marine sea where
all states enjoy freedom of navigation, overflight, related rights in the
EEZ beyond the territorial sea, the right of transit passage through
the territorial sea, and the right of innocent passage within the
territorial sea. 80 6 Such an application, however, is highly unrealistic
given the geographic and geopolitical history of the Caspian. 80 7
Instead, application of the UNCLOS to the Caspian context is
most significant because of the legal relationship it imposes among

maritime space assigned to those states. Id. Proportionality need not be precise. Id.
nn. 40-41.
801.
Caglett, supra note 584. When the coastlines of the littoral states are
measured according to general directional lines, the results are as follows: Azerbaijan:
259.1 nautical miles (nm), 15.2 percent of total coastline (percent); Iran: 319.1 nm,
18.7 percent; Kazakhstan: 526.4 nm, 30.8 percent; Russia: 315.0 nm, 18.5 percent;
Turkmenistan: 285.4 nm, 16.8 percent. Id. tbl.1.
802.
Id.
803.
Id. tbl.2.
804.
Id. According to Caglett the comparative results of the above two tables
strongly indicate that the tentative boundaries produce an acceptable degree of
proportionality well within the range found satisfactory by the ICJ. Id.
805.
Oxman, supra note 22.
806.
Ironically, this "open door" policy is exactly what Russia, and particularly
Iran, are trying to avoid. See generally supra Part II.A.2. Both states consider littoral
exclusivity of the Caspian to be perhaps the most sacred feature of its current (and
future) legal regime. See, e.g., supra Parts III.B.4-5. Thus, both would consider an
"open door" policy a serious security breach and would vigorously reject any application
of the UNCLOS model that would allow non-littoral states access to Caspian waters
under any capacity. See id. As it is, Russia and Iran have begrudgingly accepted the
reality that even a legal regime founded upon littoral exclusivity allows states like
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to grant access to Western and American corporate
interests. See generally id.
807.
Oxman, supranote 22.
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the littoral states, not between them and non-littoral states.80 8 Under
such a regime each of the five littoral states would retain full
sovereignty over a twenty-four nautical mile territorial sea (including
the contiguous zone). Each littoral state will have exclusive control of
air space and subsoil resources within such a twenty-four mile buffer
zone. Beyond the territorial sea, each littoral state will have an EEZ
where they may exercise the right to explore, exploit, conserve, and
manage living and non-living (or hydrocarbon) natural resources of
the seabed and subsoil.8 0 9 All littoral states, however, will enjoy the
right of free navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines. 810 Beyond the agreed upon EEZ, however, the
811
principle of commonage would apply to the Caspian's waters.
2. The Condominium
a. Res Communis: The Elusive Macro-Model
Whereas the international legal community has comprehensively
sought to address questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction regarding
open seas and oceans, other bodies of water, including lakes, have
been left untouched by the UNCLOS regime. 812 Perhaps neglect in
this area reflects the geographic and political realities of fully
enclosed bodies of water-it is easier to identify affected parties and
economic interests in fully enclosed marine areas because the limits
813
and boundaries of access are limited to the littoral states.
Therefore, regimes governing international lake boundaries have
usually been dealt with through bilateral and multilateral

808. In other words, even a straightforward application of the UNCLOS could
not realistically apply the models provisions regarding non-littoral access to the
[Caspian Sea].

809. For a general outline of a possible delimitation of the Caspian, see supra
notes 795-804 and accompanying text. Note that Caglett's model does not specifically
refer to delimitation of the Caspian waters and seabed within an EEZ or continental
shelf context. This is so because delimitation of the EEZ is a highly technical exercise,
the analysis of which is beyond the scope of Caglett's model and this study. No
mention of continental shelf delimitation is made in either Caglett's model or this
study because there is uncertainty as to whether any of the littoral states actually have
a continental shelf.
810. Convention, supra note 718, art. 58, reprintedin HENKIN ET AL, supra note
589, at 1293.
811. All the privileges and limitations applicable to the "high seas" would also
apply to the Caspian. Most notably, a straightforward application of the UNCLOS

would impose a moratorium on exploitation of seabed (hydrocarbon] resources in the
"high seas." The author notes, however, that almost all proposed legal regimes based
upon delimitation of Caspian waters and the seabed partition the whole Sea, leaving no
commonage or "high sea" zones. See generally infra Part V.B.
812. See Oxman, supranote 22.
813. See Oxman, supranote 22.
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agreements between concerned states. 814 Furthermore, the principle
of exclusivity makes more practical and legal sense when applied to
fully enclosed marine areas and "internal waters" than it does for
open or semi-enclosed seas.8 15
Russian and Iranian legal claims regarding the existence of a res
communis regime in the Caspian are primarily based on three
factors: 1) the Soviet-Iranian Treaties of 1935 and 1940 (as discussed
above); 2) the argument that the Caspian constitutes a single
ecosystem requiring common environmental protection; and 3)
general historical and practical considerations, and international case
8 16
law and precedent.
The principle of res communis or condominium may be thought
of as a doctrinal outgrowth of the commonage principle of the laws of
the sea. 817 According to international law scholars, however, the
principle has rarely been drawn upon as a regime governing economic
relations between lake littoral states. 818 Shared ownership of seabed
resources finds very little support in international case law and state
practice because states have usually relied on delimitation or
partition in order to resolve legal disputes concerning lakes and semienclosed areas, though partition has often been accompanied by
various degrees of cooperation and joint management. 819 Therefore,
those arguing for condominium bear a substantial burden.8 20 With
respect to hydrocarbon and mineral deposits, partition is supported
by overwhelming state practice, prompting one commentator to note
that examples of common ownership of lakes and inland seas "do not
'821
...actually exist."
Indeed there is very little case law actually supporting
condominium regime use. 822 The only case advancing the notion of
condominium use is the Gulf of Fonseca Case.823 There, the ICJ

814.

Id.

See id.
815.
816.
Caglett, supra note 584. Although Russia's diplomatic and legal strategy in
recent years has lay doubt as to whether it officially regards the Sea as a condominium,
Iran has, with some modifications, been the most consistent champion of such a
regime. See supra Parts III.B.4-5; infra Part VI. Notably lacking from this list is a
reference to well established international case law and precedence, although
proponents of the res communis do point to some international case law for support of
their position. See, e.g., infra notes 823-26 and accompanying text.
817.
Oxman, supra note 22.
818.

J.H.W. VERZIJIL, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19

(1970).
819.
Oxman, supranote 22.
820.
Id.
821.
VERZIJIL, supra note 818, at 23.
See Oxman, supra note 22.
822.
823.
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar.
intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 [hereinafter Gulf of Fonseca Case]. Situated in the Pacific
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found that El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua were each entitled
to three-mile belt off their coastlines, beyond which the waters of the
Gulf were to be shared in common.8 24 The ICJ based its ruling on
several factors unique to the situation at hand.82 5 Most importantly,
it seems that the ruling was motivated by the realization that
in
division of the Gulf would create difficulties for at least one state8 26
that it would prevent it from having a deep-water outlet to the sea.
Proponents of the principle of condominium sometimes cite the
regime governing Lake Constance in Germany in support of their
argument.8 27 Lake Constance, which is surrounded by Germany,
Switzerland, and Austria, is subject to the 1867 Bergenz Treaty.8 28
In 1920 when the German Federal Court, or Reichsgericht was
presented with the question of the legal regime of the lake, it held
that Lake Constance was to be divided based on equidistance
"the view must be preferred
boundaries.8 29 The court held:
according to which the middle line constitutes the frontier. The
of international law are against the theory of
general rules 830
condominium."
b. Applicability of the Condominium Model to the Caspian Sea
While the debate surrounding the applicability of the UNCLOS
primarily involves the issue of whether a future Caspian legal regime
should incorporate parts of the macro-model in whole or in part, the
debate surrounding the applicability of a res communis model
concerns not only its future characteristics, but also its current
constitution.8 31 As stated above, both Russia and Iran base their
Ocean, the Gulf of Fonseca is surrounded by three countries that were all previously
part of the Spanish Empire. Mehdiyoun, supranote 25, at 12.
See generallyGulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 I.C.J. at 351.
824.
Caglett, supra note 584. The Gulf of Fonseca Case is unique; the ICJ relied
825.
heavily on the fact that the Gulf had long been owned by a single state (the Spanish
Empire) and, even after the three littoral states became independent, its waters were
treated as common property among them. Id.; Mehdiyoun, supra note 25, at 12-13. In
essence, the Court deemed the Gulf to be a historic bay, a rare legal classification in
which coastal states have acquired title by prescription over a long period of time.
Oxman, supranote 22; see also Convention, supra note 718, art. 10.
Caglett, supranote 584.
826.
827. Mehdiyoun, supra note 25, at 11.
828. Id.
829. Id.
830. Id.
It is important to realize that the debates regarding the current and future
831.
legal status of the Caspian, though related, are independently significant issues. As
already outlined, the debate regarding the current legal status of the Caspian largely
concerns the continuing validity of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties. As was already argued
in Part IV, supra, the Soviet-Iranian Treaties may be viewed as a general set of interim
default rules imposing certain limitations on unilateral exploration and exploitation of
Caspian resources. As such, they may not be characterized as legal regimes primarily
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arguments regarding legitimacy of a condominium regime on two
main factors: 1) that the condominium defines the current status of
the Sea pursuant to the Soviet-Iranian Treaties, and 2) that any
future regime should also be based on a condominium because the
Sea's historical, geographic, and environmental characteristics
warrant such an approach.
Though the validity of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties has already
been addressed, further analysis in this regard is helpful. Several
scholars have argued that the history of the littoral states' practice in
the Caspian weakens the argument that the Soviet Union and Iran
regarded the Caspian as a common sea.8 32 As already mentioned in
preceding sections, the Soviet Union exploited the Sea's oil and gas
83 3
reserves off Baku's coast without acquiring the consent of Iran.
The reasons for Iran's thirty-year silence may well be
understandable, but they may nonetheless estop it from rising legal
and environmental concerns regarding unilateral action in the
8 34
Caspian Sea.
Further evidence suggests that despite the wording of the SovietIranian Treaties actual Soviet practice adhered to the principle of
8 35
sectoral division for the purposes of natural resource exploitation.
There is also evidence that the Soviet Union regarded the northern
part of the Caspian as part of its sovereign territory. 836 Thus, a
Soviet International law manual published in 1966 noted that "the
resources of the continental shelf also belong to each Party [the USSR
8 37
and Iran] within the limits of its respective area of the sea."
Furthermore, as discussed above, the Soviet Union administratively
divided its portion of the Caspian among Azerbaijan, Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.8 38 All this would seem to suggest
that whatever the current legal and practical effects of the SovietIranian Treaties may be, they cannot be characterized as having
established a strict res communis regime in the Caspian.

because they did not explicitly, adequately, or comprehensively address key issues
regarding ownership and management of hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian. The
debate regarding the future legal status of the Caspian, however, concerns the adoption
of an appropriate and comprehensive legal regime, It is, therefore, a wholly separate
matter which resolution is largely unrelated to determining the current legal status of
the Caspian. Instead of concerning itself with the question of what the legal regime of
the Caspian is as a matter of law, this debate focuses on what the most effective,
practical, and ideal legal regime for the Caspian should be.
832.
See, e.g., Mehdiyoun, supra note 25, at 13.
833.
Palaz, supra note 154.
834.
Oxman, supra note 22.
835.
Mehdiyoun, supranote 25, at 13.
836.
Id.
837.
BUTLER, supra note 583, at 106.
838.
See supra Part III.B.2.
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The more significant issue, however, revolves around whether
the condominium approach represents a more sound legal regime
than partition or delimitation of the Sea in the future. Here, it is
important to remember that condominium proponents have little in
the way of international precedent on their side. Indeed, none of the
unique peculiarities of the Gulf of Fonseca Case seem to exist in the
Caspian Sea case.8 3 9 The strongest arguments available to pure
condominium proponents include: 1) the fact that the Caspian is, for
all practical purposes, a landlocked lake and probably does not fall
under the UNCLOS as a matter of law, 2) that the Sea has never
been partitioned or delimited de jure, and 3) that environmental
factors require common ownership.840 None of these arguments,
however, operates to convincingly bolster Russian and Iranian
arguments that notwithstanding interim default rules, the Caspian's
future legal regime should incorporate a pure condominium macromodel.841
Simply put, straightforward application of a pure condominium
regime is simply impractical in the Caspian context because it allows
joint ownership and management of both surface and subsurface
(including seabed and subsoil) resources. This impracticality is
magnified when the prospect of rich hydrocarbon reserves is
introduced into the formula-one could easily imagine a situation
where vague and undetermined ownership rights ultimately lead to
chaos and possible military conflict. This does not, however, mean
that aspects of a condominium macro-model cannot effectively be
regime containing aspects of joint cooperation
incorporated into8a4new
2
management.
and

839.
840.

See supranotes 823-26 and accompanying text.
See supraParts III.B.4-5, IV.

841.

All these arguments are unpersuasive if not unresponsive if the operative

issue to be addressed is not what is the current legal status of the Caspian Sea, but

what should the future legal regime of the Caspian look like. See supra note 774 and
accompanying text. The first argument is unresponsive because regardless of whether
the UNCLOS is applicable as a matter of law, it may still be the most effective and
practical regime model available. Id. The second is unpersuasive because there is at
least a legitimate argument that state practice, custom, and estoppel all operated to
establish a de facto partition of the Caspian during the Soviet era. See supra Part
IV.A.3. Finally, the third is unpersuasive for two reasons: 1) because the
environmental argument is essentially a smokescreen utilized by Russian and Iranian
foreign policy experts to hide the real geopolitical reasons behind their advancement of
a condominium regime, and 2) because a it is not necessary to establish a pure
condominium regime to ensure that environmental problems are adequately addressed.
See supra note 538 and accompanying text. But see infra Part VI.C.3 for legitimacy of
environmental arguments.
842.

See infra Parts V.B.2, VI.B.
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3. The Draft Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International
8 43
Watercourses
There is a possible third macro-model that may have a
significant impact on the future of legal relations in the Caspian Sea,
particularly with respect to hydrocarbon ownership rights. The
International Law Commission has been at work on the law of
"internal waters," which includes rivers and lakes that have
8 44
traditionally been subject to the sovereignty of the littoral states.

Furthermore, unlike the sea, rivers and lakes are subject to national
sovereignty without regard to distance from shore, and their use for
navigation or any other purpose is subject to exclusive authorization
and control of the littoral states. 845 The applicability of this regime
will depend on the pace of progress associated with it.
B. The Unique Caspian and the Tailor-MadeModel
1. Limiting the De Jure Effects of the Macro-Models
The debate concerning the status of the Caspian Sea often
revolves around the littoral states' invoking the analysis of legal
scholars as to whether such an arrangement is legally allowed by
international law. This has created the illusion that the littoral
states are obligated to restrict their options to the dichotomous world
of the UNCLOS or its antithesis, the res communis. According to
Professor Oxman, a leading expert on the international laws of the
sea, however, there is no doubt that the littoral states are free to
choose what model controls their legal relations in the Caspian.84 6 In
other words, reference to legal macro-models for a Caspian regime are
merely attempts to legitimize the soundness of such options.
The unique status of the Caspian does not require the
application of any one model, and any use of available regime models
must be accommodated to account for the geological and geographical
characteristics of the Sea. Most likely the contours of any future

843.
For a text of the draft articles, see generally Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session: Draft Articles on the Law of
the Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at 199, UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994). The UN General Assembly decided to begin
work on a convention on the matter in 1996. Oxman, supra note 22, n. 8. For an in.
depth analysis of the draft convention, see generally Aaron Schwabach, The United
Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, Customary InternationalLaw, and the Interests of Developing Upper
Riparians,31 TEXAS INT'L LAW J. 761 (1998).
844.
See generally Schwabach, supra note 843.
845.
Id.
846. Oxman, supra note 22.
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Caspian legal regime will draw heavily from many sources, including
the three major macro-models explained above, practical and
historical considerations, and political and economic realities. The
precise substance of such a regime, however, will depend upon the
littoral states' effective use of legal diplomacy-their ability to
substantiate legal arguments via geopolitical and geoeconomic
posturing.
2. Toward a New Regime:
7
Regime ModelsM

Conceptualizing A Legal Spectrum of

Given the conclusion reached above that the littoral states are
under no legal obligation to apply a pure UNCLOS or condominium
model, it becomes necessary to evaluate the range of possibilities that
the littoral states may entertain. Putting aside more technical
questions regarding the exact science of delimitation,84 8 the nature
and character of a hypothetical Caspian Sea legal regime model is
most simply illustrated by identifying three primary concerns and
evaluating the interplay among them. The concerns include: 1) the
degree of sovereignty,84 9 if any, exercised by a littoral state over its
share of the Caspian's waters (including surface and sub-surface
rights); 2) the degree of sovereignty, if any, exercised by a littoral
state over its share of the Caspian seabed (including all subsoil
resources); and 3) the existence, if at all, of a commonage area either
comparable to that of the UNCLOS "high seas" where limitations are
placed on the exercise of sovereignty over the seabed and its
resources, or analogous to a straightforward condominium zone. In
essence, this exercise employs a simple regime spectrum model that
explores the different numerical combinations that result when the

847.

The Legal Spectrum of Regime Models is a rough conceptual model

developed primarily by the author. Essentially, the Spectrum Model employs a
conceptual gradient seeking to import characteristics from both the UNCLOS and res
communis macro-models outlined above. As such, this section will primarily use crossreference citations where applicable and will only cite authority where the author has
directly relied upon a source offered to prove the matter asserted in the text.
848. For a discussion of technical issue of allocation of a specific portion of the
Caspian Sea (in terms of percentage of total area) to a littoral state including different
delimitation techniques, see supranotes 796-804 and accompanying text.
849. Please note that the presence of the term "sovereignty" always signals the
existence of a sectoral or delimitation arrangement. Therefore, "no sovereignty" means
there is no delimitation, while "full sovereignty" means that the littoral state is granted
complete control of its full share of the Sea's water or seabed pursuant to agreed upon
delimitation principles. Also note that this spectrum does not take into account the
actual percentage share afforded each littoral state should delimitation occur. That
concerns a more technical issue that was touched upon in the above sections and is
beyond the scope of this study.
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ratios between water and seabed sovereignty are manipulated, taking
850
into account the existence or absence of a commonage area.
When all these factors are plugged into the spectrum, twelve
possible regime models result.85 1 Each model's characteristics will be
analyzed, with particular attention being paid to the effect of each
arrangement on a) navigation and commercial (including fishing)
concerns, b) ownership of hydrocarbon and mineral resources, c)
commercial transportation concerns (including the construction and
management of pipelines), and d) environmental protection concerns.
Note that each regime model advances a unique architectural design
which automatically imposes a set of default parameters on all
littoral states. The technical specification and final design of each
regime model, however, will depend upon bilateral and multilateral
negotiation and diplomacy between the littoral states. These
specifications will include, among other things, the breadth and size
of each zone of sovereignty and any existing commonage area. Also
note that regardless of the regime model adopted, any trans-Caspian
pipeline project would undoubtedly run into numerous legal [and
practical]
problems,
although
sectoral
division
probably
accommodates such ambitious plans best because diplomatic
difficulties may be solved via bilateral or multilateral transportation
85 2
agreements.
a. Model One:
Commonage Area

No Sovereignty Over Waters and Seabed; No

This regime model represents the condominium model in its
purest and most extreme form. Under this regime model none of the
five littoral states exercise any degree of sovereignty over any of the

850.
Another way of looking at this analytical approach is to conceptualize a
model continuum exploring the range of possible regime models available to the littoral
states. Here, two factors must be taken into account: 1) the tension between the
common ownership (as exemplified by res communis) and the exclusive control (as
embodied by the delimitation provisions of the UNCLOS) approach, and 2) the tension
between a dual-regime system versus a unified regime system with respect to the
seabed and its surrounding waters. A superimposition of the two approaches may
reveal a conceptual model that places a uniform condominium approach at one end of
the spectrum, and a uniform sectoral model at the other end.
851.
A cursory look at most of the twelve regime models offered for analysis will
reveal that most of them are either highly impractical or will be rejected by most if not
all of the littoral states because they do not meet fundamental geopolitical and
geoeconomical interests. They are, nonetheless, discussed and analyzed regardless of
their impracticalities because the nuanced variations between and among them allow
the reader to fully understand the practical consequences of the differing legal regime
models on the littoral states' individual and collective interests.
852.
See supra notes 420-38 and accompanying text (analyzing the difficulties
associated with the process of such multilateral negotiations).
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Caspian's water or seabed resources.8 53 This is not to say, however,

that each littoral state will not have the right to explore and exploit
the Sea's surface and seabed. On the contrary, a pure condominium
regime, while not recognizing de jure partition or delimitation of the
Sea itself, grants all littoral states equal rights of access to all surface
and subsurface areas of the Sea.8 54
Individual littoral states may,
pursuant to bilateral and multilateral negotiations and agreements,
acquire limited title to certain navigational, communication,
hydrocarbon, and transportation interests.8 55
From the perspective of navigation and commercial rights a pure
condominium regime will largely have positive consequences. As a
default rule, each littoral state will have the right to freely navigate
any area of the Sea for commercial and non-commercial purposes.5 6
Modifications may be made pursuant to bilateral and multilateral
agreements addressing specific concerns, including military and
naval security measures.8 57
From a purely practical and
management perspective, however, such a regime model will possibly
lead to diplomatic friction and possible conflict.
The regime model's consequences for hydrocarbon and mineral
ownership rights are largely negative since the seabed and its subsoil
resources will be jointly owned by all littoral states. A pure
condominium regime, however, will not necessarily preclude littoral
states from exercising a certain degree of ownership over exploration
and exploitation of the Sea's subsoil resources.
These rights,
however, will not receive the measure of ownership security
guaranteed by sectoral division since at the most, a littoral state will
exercise ownership rights over the extraction of the resources, not a
particular portion of the Sea itself.8 58 The acquisition of title over
extraction rights will principally follow in one of two ways: either the

853. That is to say that none of the littoral states will be granted a "national
sector" upon which it may exercise full sovereignty rights.
854.
See generally supraPart V.A.2.
855.
See infra notes 857-59 and accompanying text (describing the difference
between outright ownership of the Sea's resources and acquisition of title to the right to
extractsuch resources).
856. This freedom of the seas right is analogous to mare liberum notions--that
the sea belongs to everyone and to no one-traditionally advocated by the renowned
international legal scholar Hugo Grotius. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 589, at 1236.
857.
Indeed such modifications and exceptions were made even during Grotius'
time for times of war. Id.
858. Arguably, such an arrangement highlights the tension within any
condominium regime-the fact that the waters and the seabed are jointly owned by all,
but no individual littoral state has the right to own a particular area of the sea
unilaterally. As a practical solution to such a legal conundrum it is highly likely that
the states, through multilateral negotiation, will eventually allow some entity (whether

public, private, or quasi-public) the right to extract the subsoil resources, but will not
allow that entity to claim ownership of the seabed from which such extractions are
made. See, e.g., infra supranote 859 and accompanying text.
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littoral state will secure its rights through bilateral and multilateral
negotiation with all other littoral states thus granting it limited
rights to the seabed and its subsoil resources, or it will purchase an
ownership share for its extraction rights from a joint-stock company
in which all five littoral states own equal shares. 85 9
This is
significant because this limited degree of ownership allows all other
littoral states to exercise veto power over exploitation of the
hydrocarbon basin in question should they object for any reason. 860
Many of the same consequences affecting ownership rights also
apply to transportation interests, especially with regard to the
construction and management of pipelines carrying the Caspian's oil
and gas to the open seas. Successful and effective management of
pipelines requires a secure and stable legal environment that
guarantees the uninhibited flow of oil and gas.
This type of
guarantee will undoubtedly only result if full ownership interests are
clearly defined and exercised.
The pure condominium's effects on environmental interests will
likely yield positive results. 861 This is especially true with respect to
environmental concerns because solving the Caspian's unique
environmental problems will require comprehensive management
solutions and joint cooperative efforts on the part of all littoral
8 62
states.
In conclusion, however, the overall consequences of such a
regime will have a detrimental impact on diplomacy in the Caspian
Sea region because the model does not adequately address key
economic and security questions regarding navigation, ownership of

859.
This arrangement represents a possible compromise and solution to the
ownership problems presented by a pure res communis model. Notice that under either
option, the drilling entity will only exercise limited ownership rights pursuant to
temporal, territorial, production, and management limitations imposed upon it through
multilateral agreement. In the first scenario, the exploiting entity will probably only
acquire exclusive legal title to extraction rights, although it may, through multilateral
consensus, acquire actual but temporary ownership of a sector of the seabed. Given the
strict legal architecture of this model, however, the former possibility is more likely. In
the second scenario, no ownership of the seabed is possible. Also, no exclusive right to
extract resources is available-the entity must instead purchase a stake in a joint.
stock company or consortium composed of private corporations, and most importantly,
public interests as advanced by the five littoral states. The extracted oil will, therefore,
be owned only in part by each participant, and a share of the proceeds will be
distributed to it upon the sale of the oil in the international market.
860.
This arrangement resembles the Russian "doughnut proposal," which
allowed the littoral states' veto power by participating in joint-stock companies and by
adhering to a strict double-tender system. See Babak, supranote 109, at 189-90.
861.
But see Croissant & Croissant, supra note 23, at 27-28 (arguing that only
sectoral division and absolute ownership rights will guarantee environmental security
because it will be in the littoral states' self-interest to ensure adherence to
environmental standards).
862.
See id.
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hydrocarbon resources, and transportation rights. 86 3
It is no
surprise, therefore, that none of the littoral states have advanced
such a radical proposal. Even under the seemingly lax Soviet-Iranian
Treaties, de facto state practice suggests that neither the Soviet
Union or Iran seriously viewed their relationship under a pure
864
condominium regime model.
b. Model Two:
Commonage Area

No Sovereignty Over Waters and Seabed;

This regime model will have the exact same effects and
consequences on navigation, communication, transportation, fishing,
and environmental interests as the previous model.8 65 The only
difference will be the creation of a commonage zone preferably located
in the middle of the Caspian where drilling and exploitation subsoil
resources is less likely to occur. 866 Like the UNCLOS "high seas"
zone, the Caspian regime model equivalent will probably extend
many surface and subsurface water benefits enjoyed throughout the
pure condominium regime to the commonage area. The major
exception, however, will likely be an imposed moratorium on most
economic activities, including exploration and exploitation of
hydrocarbon and mineral resources. 86 7 As such, the commonage area
may be regarded as an economic-free zone dedicated to environmental
and scientific research and cooperation among the littoral states.
The practicality of such a regime is unclear given the vast
variety of interests that can be exercised throughout the rest of the
condominium zones. It is highly improbable that any of the littoral
states will advance a proposal based on such a regime model,
primarily because many of the same economic and political
shortcomings identified in the previous model will not be resolved
with the introduction of a commonage area.

863.
Most importantly, this regime places a high burden of responsibility on
states to engage in effective multilateral cooperation and agreement. This is unlikely
to occur given the present political and economic situation in the Caspian region.
864.
The 1940 Treaty, for example, allowed an exclusive ten-mile fishing zone.
See generally Part IV.A.I.
865.
See supraPart V.B.2.c.
866.
The author has included the possibility of some form of commonage area
because it is likely that any future Caspian legal regime will employ such an area to
both to appease Russian and Iranian interests and to ensure multilateral cooperation

in certain areas, particularly the environment.
867.

See, e.g., supra notes 765-69 and accompanying text.
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c. Model Three: No Sovereignty Over Waters and Full Sovereignty
Over Seabed; No Commonage Area
Under this regime model each littoral state will be able to
exercise complete sovereignty over its full share of the Caspian's
seabed, while absolutely no sovereignty is available over the Sea's
waters. In effect this means that each littoral state must forego the
luxury of a coastal buffer zone similar to the UNCLOS' territorial and
contiguous seas with respect to sovereignty over surface waters.
The consequences of such a regime model on navigation and
commercial interests are similar to those outlined in Model One. This
regime model will maximize free navigation to all parts of the
Caspian but will do so at a potential [security] price. This is a price
that the NIS (and perhaps even Iran) may not be able to afford given
Russia's superior military, naval, and commercial capabilities in the
region. 868 The regime model's effects on hydrocarbon ownership
rights will be a relatively positive one. Full sectoral division of the
seabed will maximize each littoral state's exercise of sovereignty over
its share of the Caspian's oil and gas resources-a goal vigorously
pursed by Azerbaijan and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan. 869 This
aspect of the regime model also increases ownership security by
clearly defining and delimiting national sectors, but only with respect
to the seabed. Note, however, that full sectoral division may
eventually lead to disputes as littoral states explore more productive
870
hydrocarbon basins located further away from their shores.
A more pressing concern with this regime model, however,
involves the degree to which seabed sovereignty is dependent or
reliant upon some measure of sovereignty over the surface waters.
First there is the practical intimidation factor detailed above;
Azerbaijan, for example, will constantly have to deal with commercial
and non-commercial vessels owned and operated by Russia, Iran, and
the other littoral states. Second, there is the legal factor-it is
arguable that even if the Sea's waters are owned in common, any
littoral state will be able to veto or at least make difficult the
placement of oil drilling platforms and the like above the water,
especially if such platforms are located further from the [Azeri]

868.
See, e.g., Babak, supra note 109, at 187-90 (explaining Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan's concerns with any proposal that would allow a Russian naval presence to
interfere with their ownership rights of the Sea's seabed resources).
869.
See supra Parts III.B.1-2.
870.
See, e.g., supra notes 523-27 and accompanying text (describing the longrunning ownership dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the KaipazSerdar oil fields despite the two countries' full de facto delimitation of the Sea pursuant
to administrative boundaries established during the Soviet era).
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It is, therefore, unclear whether a littoral state can

effectively exercise its seabed sovereignty if it lacks such powers over
the waters located above the seabed.
Finally, pure sectoral division of the seabed has little dire effect
for environmental rights and concerns. This is so because scientific
management and cooperation can be well accommodated if all littoral
states have access to the surface and sub-surface waters of the Sea.
This regime model will probably be rejected by all littoral states
because it does not allow for even a limited coastal buffer zone for the
individual littoral states. More likely than not, any regime model
that does not recognize some measure of littoral sovereignty over the
waters will be rejected by some if not all the parties.
d. Model Four: No Sovereignty Over Waters and Partial Sovereignty
Over Seabed; Commonage Area
Like the previous regime model, this model does not allow any
exercise of sovereignty over the Sea's waters. Partial sovereignty,
however, will be exercised over the seabed extending from the littoral
state's coastline to the area delineating the existence of a commonage
zone.
The existence of a condominium over the Sea's waters maximizes
navigation and communication interests for all the littoral states, but
the same problems inherent with Models One through Three also
apply here. s 72 With respect to hydrocarbon ownership rights, sectoral

division of the seabed is not as favorable as that proposed in Model 3
because of the existence of a commonage area. This may not be as
much of a problem, however, if the commonage area is treated more
like a condominium zone rather than a high seas zone imposing a
moratorium on all deep sea drilling.87 3 The same problems associated
with the lack of sovereignty over surface waters and its potential
practical and legal effects on subsoil exploitation rights also apply
here. As for its impact on the environment such a regime would, like
its previous variants, provide a suitable climate for scientific and
management cooperation.
Notwithstanding contrary diplomatic assertions, the lack of any
sovereign rights over surface waters will likely discourage both
Russia and Iran from ever adopting such a regime model. The NIS
would naturally be staunchly opposed to such a regime model.

871. See, e.g., Babak, supra note 109, at 189-90 (describing similar consequences
flowing from the adoption of the Russian "doughnut proposal)."
872. See supraParts V.B.2.a-c.
873. Remember that under the Spectrum Model, the existence of a commonage
area may either signal a zone analogous to the UNCLOS "high seas" or a zone
incorporating features of the res communis macro-model. See supra Part V.B.2.
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e. Model Five: Partial Sovereignty Over Waters and No Sovereignty
Over Seabed; Commonage Area
Like Models One and Two, this model provides no sectoral
division of the seabed, and like its counterparts, it is doomed to fail
for that very reason. Unlike the first four models, however, this
model actually delimits the waters of the Caspian up to the
commonage zone.
Overall flexibility with regard to freedom of navigation and
commercial rights is limited with this model because each littoral
state is restricted to its assigned water-sector of the Sea. The model
does, however, avoid the unstable legal environment evidenced in the
first several models.87 4 Depending on the breadth of each littoral
state's sovereign water zone the area may be analogized to the
territorial or contiguous seas of the UNCLOS model, although no
simultaneous sovereign right of seabed exploitation may be
exercised.8 75 Exclusive fishing and other commercial activities solely
limited to the Sea's waters may, however, be pursued under this
arrangement.
Hydrocarbon ownership rights and interests, however, suffer
greatly under this regime model. As in the condominium models,
littoral states may exercise acquisition rights over any part of the
Caspian seabed, but these rights are severely restricted due to the
prospects of joint ownership and control by all littoral states in those
same areas. That each littoral state has full sovereignty over certain
areas abutting its coastlines is no consolation-without full
ownership rights to the seabed itself, control and management of the
87 6
surface waters means little to nothing.
Transportation interests are moderately accounted for under this
regime model although any legal arrangement prohibiting

874.
Up until now analysis has assumed that a res communis regime model
prohibiting ownership of the Sea's waters has a positive impact on navigation rights
because, in principle, it allows all littoral to navigate where they please. From a
alternative [practical] viewpoint, however, this may be seen as a negative impact
precisely for the same reason: a state has no exclusive right to deny any other state's
ships from areas close to its coastline.
875.
Note that a territorial zone under the UNCLOS allows full sovereignty over
all areas of the Sea lying within such zones. See supra notes 730-35 and accompanying
text.
876.
This arrangement is essentially the flip situation to one where sovereignty
may be exercised over the seabed but not the waters above. Note that both
arrangements severely restrict or vitiate any right to explore and exploit seabed
resources. But see supra notes 552-54 and accompanying text (outlining the effect of
the July 1998 agreement between Astana and Moscow that presumably divided the
northern Caspian seabed but not the waters above).
Arguably, however, an
arrangement allowing sovereignty only over the waters above is preferable because it
comes with all the rights and privileges attaching to such an arrangement while also
allowing the exercise of veto power over any entity seeking to exploit the seabed below.
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sovereignty over the seabed jeopardizes the prospects of laying oil and
gas pipelines over the seabed.8 77 This is especially true if, as in this
regime, littoral states have no guarantee of sovereignty even over
offshore areas close to their coastlines.
Finally, any sectoral division of Caspian waters vill have
detrimental effects on environmental management and cooperation
concerns. The degree of this negative impact will depend on many
factors, including the breadth and size of the water-sovereignty zone
(and alternately, the breadth and size of the commonage area) and
the littoral state's ability to ensure that sovereignty will not prevent
multilateral cooperation aimed at solving the region's ecological
problems.
f. Model Six: Full Sovereignty Over Waters and No Sovereignty Over
Seabed; No Commonage Area
This model will probably be unacceptable to the NIS because it
does not provide for any sovereignty over the seabed. Despite any
diplomatic gestures to the contrary, it will also be unacceptable to
both Russia and Iran because it fully delimits the waters of the
Caspian between all five states and provides for no commonage area.
g. Model Seven:
Commonage Area

More Sovereignty Over Waters than Seabed;

Model Seven has the peculiar effect of establishing zones
whereby a littoral state may not exercise sovereignty over the seabed
despite its ability to exercise sovereignty over the waters above.8 78 In
essence this model provides an extra navigational and commercial
cushion beyond the littoral state's seabed zone of sovereignty. This
zone also provides a security advantage for smaller littoral states like
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan who can ensure [legal] protection
against Russian and Iranian incursion into their prized economic
zones. Its practical effect, however, may be to limit future expansion
of the seabed sovereignty zone beyond already established water
sovereignty zones.81 9 As such the NIS, particularly, may worry about
the future implications and consequences of such a regime model.

877.

See generally supranotes 430-34 and accompanying text.

This effect is only "peculiar" in light of already existing regime models
878.
including the UNCLOS, since in theory the littoral states are free to set up whatever
regime model they please. The reader, however, will find scant evidence of a sea or
lake regime that allows sovereignty over the waters without extending such
sovereignty to the seabed below. The opposite arrangement, however, is the hallmark
of the EEZ under the UNCLOS. See supranotes 750-58 and accompanying text.
879.
This limitation may be imposed upon the NIS, for example, because the
regime model's default architecture automatically prohibits any arrangement where
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As already touched upon, the regime model's overall effects on
ownership rights are primarily positive, though its specific makeup
will reveal more telling clues about the degree to which practical
consequences may actually interfere with legal sovereignty rights.
For example, a slight variant on this model may provide that all
littoral states will have joint ownership access to seabed areas lying
within a state's water-sovereignty zone but outside its exclusive
seabed zone. For the practical reasons already discussed above, this
result may be more preferable than a regime model inverting the
ratio between sovereign waters and sovereign seabed.88 0 For states
like Azerbaijan, however, it will certainly not be a favorable
arrangement because its ownership prospects over hydrocarbon fields
located miles outside its coastal waters may be severely
jeopardized. 8 8' Likewise, the unequal and inverted sovereignty ratio
between waters and seabed may cause unforeseen problems for
pipeline construction on the seabed.
The existence of a commonage area will surely bode well for
environmental protection. The water-sovereignty buffer zone may,
however, allow uncooperative littoral states to effectively block
multilateral attempts to enter the area for the purposes of scientific
research and study.

seabed sovereignty either equals or surpasses water sovereignty. Therefore, the
breadth and size of any littoral state's territorial sea (the zone upon which it can
practice both water and seabed sovereignty) is dependent upon the breadth of the
water sovereignty zone. The breadth of the latter, however, will be limited by the
existence of a commonage area.
880.
See supra note 876 and accompanying text. "Inverting the ratio" simply
means altering the ratio between water sovereignty and seabed sovereignty. For
example, we may have an arrangement where water sovereignty rights exceed seabed
sovereignty. (Note that this arrangement establishes an exclusive territorial sea zone
where sovereignty over both elements may be exercised, and a zone where only
sovereignty over surface and subsurface waters may be exercised.) An arrangement
producing an inverted ratio would do the exact opposite: instead, we have a regime
model where seabed sovereignty exceeds water sovereignty, similarly creating an
overlapping territorial sea zone. An example of the latter arrangement would result in
a zone similar to the EEZ. See supra notes 750-58 and accompanying text. Finally, an
arrangement where water sovereignty equals seabed sovereignty produces a 1:1 ratio.
Full sectoral division of the Caspian would result if such a ratio were achieved
(provided there is no commonage area). See infra Parts V.B.2.k.l.
881.
Any arrangement that establishes such an inverted ratio between water
and seabed sovereignty jeopardizes Azerbaijan's ownership prospects over a good
percentage of its claimed hydrocarbon basins. See supra Part III.B.1. Also, unlike
Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan does not have the navigational, commercial, and military
resources to make use of the practical conundrum caused when a littoral zone has
exploitation rights to the seabed but ro sovereignty over the waters above. See supra
note 876 and accompanying text.
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h. Model Eight:
Full Sovereignty Over Waters and Partial
Sovereignty Over Seabed; No Commonage Area
An inverted sovereignty ratio is also the hallmark of this model,
but unlike its Model Seven counterpart, this regime allows full
sectoral division of the surface waters. As such it will probably be
preferable to the NIS over Model Seven, but this "split regime"
variant will no doubt cause the NIS some trepidation and alarm. 88 2
Overall, however, this regime model may even be preferred over any
UNCLOS-related model that provides for an EEZ because the latter
does not guarantee a minimal breadth for critical water sovereignty
rights.8 8 3 On the contrary, adoption of this regime model will
guarantee the NIS absolute control over their share-this sovereignty
may not be threatened or disturbed by negotiations seeking to alter
the breadth of such a zone.
i. Model Nine:
Commonage Area

Less Sovereignty Over Waters than Seabed;

This regime model represents the essential architectural
features of the UNCLOS. 8 84 It also highlights the important legal
effects of unequal sovereignty ratio between water and seabed
ownership rights. Though it creates a dual or "split regime" effect
between surface waters and the seabed, unlike the previous model it
increases the breadth of the seabed sovereignty zone relative to that
of the water zone. This extension creates an area similar to the
UNCLOS EEZ, where a littoral state may exercise economic control
over the seabed and its resources but must nonetheless allow other
littoral states to enjoy access to navigation, overflight, and the laying
of submarine cables and pipelines.88 5
It also establishes an
overlapping zone of water and seabed sovereignty abutting the
littoral state's Caspian coastline that is analogous to the territorial
sea. Finally, similar to the UNCLOS, there is a commonage area that
may or may not impose a moratorium on seabed activities, but will
undoubtedly retain certain condominium rights and features.

882. A "split regime" occurs anytime one sovereign exercises exclusive control
over one part of the sea, for example, the surface and subsurface waters, and [anjother
sovereign[s] exercises control over another part, for example, the seabed located below
the aforementioned waters. In essence, this dual or "split regime" creates a zone of
mixed sovereignty.
883.
Full water sovereign rights means that the default architecture of this
regime model prohibits any tinkering with the breadth of such a zone after technical
delimitation-assignment of Caspian share-has occurred.
884.
See supraPart V.A.1.
885.
See supranote 757 and accompanying text.
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The model's consequences for navigation, commercial activities,
and ownership and transportation rights is largely discussed in the
section analyzing the UNCLOS macro-model and its application to
the Caspian context.88 6 The more interesting analytical query for the
international legal scholar is this: if Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan both
insist that the UNCLOS apply to the legal status of the Caspian Sea,
why have they both rejected proposals
which seem to contain the
887
underlying features of such a model?

One readily available answer is that a "dual-regime" model
opens up the possibility of manipulation by Russian and Iran
regarding the breadth of sovereignty zones.8 8 8 Understandably this
is a highly risky proposition for the NIS. Another is that these states
implicitly advance the argument that although the Sea should be
treated as a sea for the purposes of delimitation, it should not be
treated as such with regards to a strict application of the UNCLOS
macro-model.8 89 This is not a far-fetched argument since it has
already been explicitly advanced by both Russia and Iran.
More to the point, however, is Baku and Astana's realization
that any Caspian "split regime" will be fundamentally different than
an UNCLOS EEZ provision operating in an open seas environment.
There are several practical and legal reasons for this. First and
perhaps most importantly, the Caspian is an isolated, landlocked
body of water with no direct access to the open seas. Its unique
geographic and geopolitical location in an area exclusively controlled
by two littoral states simply reinforces the body of water's lake-like
characteristics. 890 Second, the Sea has historically been controlled by

886.
See supraPart V.A.1.c.
887.
This rejection can be explicitly evidenced by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan's
rejection of the "doughnut proposal" where Russia allowed a forty-five mile territorial
sea zone to all littoral states but insisted that the rest of the waters and seabed should
be joined in common. See supra notes 514, 551 and accompanying text. The rejection
can also be implicitly evidenced by the fact that to date, Azerbaijan and to a lesser
extent Kazakhstan have called for full sectoral division of the Caspian's waters and
seabed, which does not accord fully with the commonage principles of the UNCLOS
macro-model. See supra Parts III.B.1-2.
888.
See supra note 514 and accompanying text.
889.
This is a very plausible understanding of the Azeri legal position. Baku's
argument that the UNCLOS should apply to the Caspian has always focused on the
sectoral and delimitation aspects of such a model, though it has curiously ignored
acknowledgement of its commonage features. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.1. Therefore,
it is accurate to assert that Baku and Kazakhstan want the spirit of the UNCLOS to
apply (calling for delimitation and sectoral division), but do not wish strict adherence to
the substance of its provisions (calling for commonage zones). The result is a legal
diplomatic agenda that seeks to establish full sectoral division of the Sea.
890. This is significant because to the extent that all sides of the debate rely
upon the Caspian's characterization as a sea or a lake to bolster and legitimize their
legal positions, the "lake supporters" seem to have a more convincing position: they
have history, geography, and arguably custom on their side.

20011

IRAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA LEGAL REGIME

powerful and intimidating sovereigns with considerable economic,
political, and military resources which make it difficult for the NIS to
effectively appeal to international legal authority to ensure full
compliance with any agreed upon legal regime.89 1 Third, the legal
history of the Sea has simply never accommodated the idea of
delimitation as proposed by the UNCLOS. 892 Finally, there are fewer
guarantees that the legal provisions of the UNCLOS can be
effectively incorporated in the Caspian Sea context. In other words,
the NIS realize that a simple superimposition of the UNCLOS model
without stringent provisions ensuring full compliance with agreed
upon legal principles will probably not adequately protect their
ownership interests in the Caspian.8 9 3 For all the foregoing reasons,
a "split regime" arrangement such as this will probably not be an
optimal choice for the NIS.
j. Model Ten: Partial Sovereignty Over Waters and Full Sovereignty
Over Seabed; No Commonage Area
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan will probably find this version of the
UNCLOS model more to their liking. It's consequences and effects
are similar to the previous model, with one major exception: there is
no commonage area. In other words, each littoral state -ill be
allowed to exercise full sovereignty over its share of the Caspian
seabed, but a good portion of this sovereignty zone will lie beneath
waters jointly and commonly owned by all the littoral states. Even in
the absence of a commonage area allowing the NIS a greater share of
the Caspian seabed, however, these states will still be highly wary of
any delimitation resulting in a dual or "split regime."

891.

The isolated location of the Sea and the huge potential for conflict due to

regional instability in the Caucuses and Central Asia renders any enforcement of an
agreed upon legal regime very difficult, especially if such a regime is not supported by
the Russians and the Iranians. See, e.g., Greenlee, supra note 51 (describing the tense
geopolitical and military situation in the Caspian region).
In other words, regardless of the general acceptability of the provisions of
892.
the UNCLOS and given the above arguments with respect to the past and current
validity of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties, strict adherence to an UNCLOS.based macromodel lacks legal inertia.
The concern here is that the unique geological, geopolitical, environmental.
893.

and historical characteristics of the Caspian truly set it outside the UNCLOS model, or
in the alternative, that it is impossible to simply import and superimpose the features
of the latter onto the Caspian context.
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Equal Sovereignty Over Waters and Seabed;

This regime model allows each littoral state to exercise full
sovereignty over true "national sectors," limited only by the presence
of a commonage area. As such, each littoral state may treat its
national sector as a territorial sea analogous to that provided for in
the UNCLOS. In its purest form, the littoral state may exercise fully
exclusivity rights in this area.
The model's effects on navigation and commercial rights are
positive for the same reasons outlined above. It is the regime model's
consequences for oil and gas ownership rights, however, that make
this model highly attractive to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. More
specifically, the equal ratio parity between water and seabed
sovereignty ensures that the practical and legal uncertainties
encountered in other models are fully avoided. 894 Furthermore, it is
in the interests of both these states that their national sectors extend
as far out into the middle of the Caspian as possible, thus limiting the
breadth of the commonage area. This is especially important for
Azerbaijan because many of its hydrocarbon basins lie miles
offshore. 895 The same could be said of the model's consequences for
896
transportation rights.
With respect to environmental concerns, any sectoral division of
the Caspian's waters damages the prospects for multilateral
cooperation and management of the Sea's resources.
This is
especially true where littoral state's attain true national sectors
whereby they may exercise complete sovereignty over their share of
the Sea. The regime model's commonage area feature may limit the
dire consequences of such a regime model.
For Russia and Iran the adoption of such a model is highly
unfavorable because it effectively bars them from access or veto
power over the NIS' rich oil and gas. In order to minimize the

894.
In other words, the 1:1 ratio avoids the legal and practical problems
associated with the dual or "split regime" arrangement.
895.
See supranote 503 and accompanying text.
896.
In the absence of comprehensive pipeline regimes and arrangements
guaranteeing the uninhibited flow of oil and gas, the best any Caspian littoral state
with rich oil and gas deposits close to its shores could hope for is an arrangement
allowing a 1:1 water-seabed sovereignty. This is so because such an arrangement
maximizes the state's exclusive control over its allocated share of the Caspian. Such
sectoral division, however, does not solve the legal problems associated with a transCaspian pipeline. See supra notes 428-34. Littoral states wishing to implement such a
construction project will still have to rely on multilateral and bilateral negotiation and
diplomacy in order to guarantee safe passage of the oil and gas through multiple
national sectors. See generally id. Also, they will have to deal with the existence of a
commonage area that may or may not prohibit the laying of pipelines on the seabed.
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detrimental effects of such a regime, Moscow and Tehran must
engage in a two-pronged diplomatic strategy. First, they must exact
bilateral or multilateral concessions out of the NIS so as to render
their exercise of full sovereignty conditional upon the satisfaction of
certain predetermined criteria.8 97 Second, they must maximize the
breadth of the commonage area through diplomatic hardball.
Regarding the latter strategy, both states should seek to establish a
commonage area that retains a truly condominium nature in case of
future hydrocarbon discoveries in the middle of the Caspian.8 98 For
the foregoing reasons, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and perhaps even
Turkmenistan may view this regime model with some skepticism.
1. Model Twelve:
Commonage Area

Full Sovereignty Over Waters and Seabed; No

A model providing full and equal sectoral division of the water
and the seabed is the ideal arrangement for the NIS, especially
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Under this regime all littoral states are
guaranteed maximization of sovereignty over their allocated share of
the Caspian's water and seabed resources. The sovereignty zones
essentially act as unconditional territorial seas where the rights of
the sovereign may be interfered with only through negotiation or
authorization.
Furthermore, the practical and legal problems
associated with a dual or "split regime" arrangement are nonexistent
here. Thus it is fair to assume that Baku and Astana's ultimate goal
is to ensure that the future legal regime of the Caspian will most
closely resemble, if not duplicate, this model.
For Russia and Iran, this arrangement presents numerous
problems regardless of whether they can successfully persuade the
NIS to abandon delimitation based solely on equidistance
principles,8 9 9 although Iran has shown signs that it will accept a "fair

897.

For example, they may draw up side accords or agreements that restrict

certain unilateral activities even inside the national sectors. Once the essential default
architecture of the regime model is established, however, Russia and Iran will have a
tough time forcing concessions out of the NIS (and each other) which unreasonably

restrict the exercise of full ownership control. Their sovereignty-limiting proposals
must be restricted to solving comprehensive regional problems and externalities that
affect all littoral states. Examples of such problems are demilitarization and
environmental safety standards.
898. A commonage area that strictly adheres to the UNCLOS "high seas"
principle is not as desirable as a condominium commonage zone because it prevents
Russia and Iran from maximizing their veto powers against the other littoral states.
899. The technical delimitation principle only changes the littoral states'
percentage share or allocation of the Sea's resources. It does not change the fact the
Sea will be fully partitioned, and that most likely, most of the productive hydrocarbon
basins will still be located with the NIS' "national sectors."
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and equal" partition of the Sea. 900 Straightforward delimitation into
true "national sectors" almost guarantees that Russia and Iran will
have little to no say in the future exploitation of the majority of the
currently discovered hydrocarbon basins in the Caspian Sea.
Furthermore, full delimitation does little to increase Moscow and
Tehran's hydrocarbon resource base, since few productive basins have
901
been discovered off their shorelines.
Like other regime models permitting full sovereignty and
delimitation of Caspian waters and the seabed, Model Twelve has
potentially disastrous consequences for an already bleak
environmental situation in the region. 90 2 Though most legal scholars
and political analysts reject the legitimacy of Russian and Iranian
insistence on a condominium regime that allows cooperative
management of the Sea's environment and resources, 90 3 there is little
question that sectoral division severely undermines an effective
environmental protection agenda. This is, of course, not to say that
joint and multilateral cooperation cannot occur under full
delimitation, or that the parties may not establish an independently
operative environmental regime. The prospects for such cooperation
surely exist-but the NIS' desperate need for foreign capital and
investment will no doubt relegate environmental concerns to an
inferior position.

VI. SYNTHESIS: ADAPTING IRAN'S LEGAL ARGUMENTS
TO ITS REGIONAL INTERESTS

So far the geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of the littoral
states have been largely analyzed separately from the abstract legal
analysis surrounding the Caspian Sea legal regime. This section
aims to integrate the two major lines of analysis into a cohesive
agenda adapting legal arguments to regional interests. It will use
Iran as the primary test case for developing the integrated agenda
and will present a legal diplomacy strategy aimed at insuring that
Tehran is not isolated from the regions oil and gas developments.
The section will generally proceed by first outlining Iran's
geopolitical, economic, and security interests in the Caspian region.
The analysis will then shift to focusing on Iran's specific energy

900. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. An equal partition of the
Caspian means that each littoral state would be allocated twenty percent of the Sea's
resources. For more in-depth analysis of Iran's effective use of legal diplomacy
regarding equal partition of the Caspian Sea, see infra Part VI.B.
901.
See supranotes 41-46 and accompanying text..
902. This problem is amplified since the regime model does not provide a
commonage area "safe haven."
903.
See, e.g., supra note 538 and accompanying text.
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interests in the Caspian basin. Finally, the last section will outline a
general policy of legal diplomacy that Tehran should follow in order to
ensure that its comprehensive regional interests are satisfied. This
section will synthesize legal and non-legal analysis in such a way as
to highlight the need for Iran to focus on its regional oil and gas
transportation capacity. More specifically, it will call on Iran to
abandon a 'legal veto" strategy focused on preventing the exercise of
ownership rights by other littoral states and instead link any
development of a Caspian Sea legal regime to its interests in the
transportation sector.
A. CaspianGeopolitics and Iran's DiplomaticInterests
1. National and Regional Security
Iran's geopolitical goals may best be understood by analyzing
Tehran's foreign policy relations with its Caspian, Central Asian, and
Eurasian neighbors on a strictly zero-sum context. As such Tehran's
paramount concern may be defined as national and regional security,
and its main threat the use of military force from either Russia or the
United States. 90 4 On a practical level, Iranian officials realize the
staging of Russian troops in most of the CIS means that Iran's
northern Caspian frontier is essentially a permanent militarized
zone. 90 5 Though Tehran harbors no ambitious military designs on
any territories in the Caspian region, political and economic
instability primarily in the Caucuses threaten to unnecessarily
embroil Iran in a regional arms race and ultimately military
906
conflict.
Therefore, it is in Tehran's interest to play the role of
peacemaker in the Caucuses and Central Asia, and to seek a
diplomacy of appeasement with a powerful northern neighbor that
still considers the area its backyard playground. 90 7 Thus far a
diplomacy of appeasement has only led to Iran's participation in a
loose security alliance between Tehran, Moscow, and Yerevan which
904.
905.
906.

See supranote 564 and accompanying text.
See Lepingwell, supranote 65, at 65-67.
See, e.g., Jean Christophe-Peuch, Caspian: Dispute Highlights Poor State

of Azerbaijani-IranianTies, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Aug. 9, 2001, at
http'J/vww.rferl.orgncafeatures/2001/08109082001.asp
(copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw) (recounting a recent incident between an
Iranian naval warship which allegedly violated Azeri "sector" of the Sea and
threatened to fire upon an oil exploration vessel operated by BP Amoco, and several
other incidents where Iranian fighters violated Azeri airspace allegedly to threaten
Azerbaijan in the face of aggressive unilateral development of its offshore oil and gas
basins).
907. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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seeks to counter the political ambitions of Ankara, Baku, and
Washington. 90 8 Though it is in Iran's security interest to continue
"membership" in this loose tripartite alliance in order to appease
Russian interests, Tehran must realize that its regional interests may
significantly differ from those of Moscow. 90 9 More specifically,
Tehran must clearly identify its own unique interests so that it does
not blindly follow Russia down a path detrimental to its long-term
910
interests in the region.
Though less of a practical threat to Iranian security and
territorial integrity, the threat of force from the United States is
always a political reality for Tehran. 91 ' Such threats may indeed be
exaggerated due to years of political mistrust and damaging
diplomacy between the two former allies. 912 Yet the heavy presence
of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region and Turkey means that Iran
is essentially sandwiched between politically hostile forces to its
south and west, and unstable and erratic military might to its north.
Placed in such a predicament, Iran's biggest fear is the direct or
913
indirect involvement of U.S. military forces in the Caspian region.
The prospects for direct U.S. military involvement are not highly
likely, and the threat of direct military incursion into Iranian
territory from U.S. forces stationed throughout the region is rather
slim, but the probability that Washington might use its forces there
as leverage to ensure Iranian concessions in the Caspian region is not
so far-fetched. 9 14 This scenario may be especially applicable where
the U.S. acts either to safeguard its own interests by proxy through
its NATO ally Turkey, or threatens the use of military force in order
to protect a Caspian ally such as Azerbaijan.
Therefore, it is in Tehran's interest to stand firm against any
hint of U.S. military involvement in the Caspian region. It can do
this by continually affirming and reaffirming Russia and Iran's
historical interests in the region primarily with regard to the
exclusivity principle espoused by the Soviet-Iranian Treaties, by
reminding the international community that the legal status of
boundary disputes in the Caspian is a regional problem that requires
regional solutions, and that the territorial integrity of the Caspian
littoral states should in no way be violated or compromised by outside

908.
909.
910.
911.
912.

See
See
See
See
See

supra note 146 and
supra note 135 and
id.
supra note 107 and
generally JAMES A.

accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.

BILL, THE EAGLE AND THE LION: THE TRAGEDY OF
AMERICAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1988) (chronicling the history of amicable political

relations between the United States and the eventual souring of relations between the
two nations after the Iranian revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis).
913.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
914.

See id.
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military and diplomatic interference.
In order to ensure
minimization of outside interference by the United States and the
West, Tehran can accomplish the above objectives by relying on its
loose alliance with Moscow and by adopting the role of
"whistleblower"--playing up the threat of U.S. military involvement
in the region to Moscow and free-riding off Russia's own insecurities
regarding an American presence in the region.
2. Cultural and Economic Cooperation
Iran's geopolitical interests with regard to the Caucuses and
Central Asia are primarily cultural and economic in nature. As
mentioned before, international political scientists severely
exaggerated the consequences of a showdown between Ankara and
Tehran for political influence in the region. 9 15 When one looks at the
current political climate in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, there is little to suggest that either Iran
or Turkey have significantly influenced the political culture in a
noticeable way. 916 Instead, the countries are primarily ruled by
former Communist leaders exercising tight control over political
power-the collapse of communism has not clearly opened the gates
to full democratic participation. 917 In short, the FSU Central Asian
countries exhibit the continuing legacy of Soviet political culture
rather than Iran's Islamic theocracy or Turkey's "progressive"
secularism. 918

All this is not to say that Tehran is not interested in fostering
certain cultural and Islamic interests in the region. These interests,
however, should have less to do with direct political influence and
involvement in the Central Asian states' affairs than with nuanced
inspirational support. Tehran already recognizes the futility of
spreading its revolutionary zeal to the CIS-it's failure to officially
support Islamic resurgence in the Caucuses, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan proves that Tehran is more concerned with potential
destabilizing political effects of such movements than with the fact
that they are "Islamic" in nature.9 19
On the economic front, Tehran must not allow its national and
regional security alliances to limit its flexibility in dealing with its
unique economic interests. In other words, Tehran must realize that
its economic interests call for regional involvement and integration,
not entrenchment and isolation. This policy agenda is facilitated by

915.
916.
917.
918.
919.

See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
See generally id.
See BARYLSKI, supranote 65.
See supranote 65 and accompanying text.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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the fact that, with the exception of Azerbaijan, Iran has no existing or
potential security concerns with any of its Central Asian neighbors to
the north and east. 920 It must convince the NIS and other Central
Asian states that it is a worthy economic and trade partner, since its
ability to tap into the Caspian and Central Asian economy not only
increases its regional trading status but allows it to use its
established economic relations to branch out further into South and
East Asia.
A great organizational vehicle for the advancement of these
cultural and economic interests in the region is the ECO, the CCO,
and the CEC, already mentioned above. 921 The ECO allows Iran the
opportunity to satisfy its regional goals in several different ways.
First, it presents an effective means of linking Islamic culture to
economic progress, thereby stripping the former of its threatening
fundamentalist qualities. 92 2 This is important because it weakens
Iran's international image as a supporter of fundamentalism and
terrorism and undermines the United State's efforts at isolating
Tehran, especially through the use of economic sanctions. 923 More
significantly, however, it increases Tehran's credibility in the eyes of
the NIS, whose leaders have staunchly promoted secularism, while
simultaneously strengthening the countries' faith in more
economically powerful Islamic societies. Second, it stresses Iran's
desire to cooperate with Turkey and Pakistan, the other two founding
members of the organization with whom Iran has historically had
numerous political problems. 924 Third, it encourages the Central
Asian states to look to Iran as a regional leader not only in the
cultural sense, but also in the financial and economic sense. Finally,
the ECO expansion allows Iran to use the Caspian region as a way to
establish more meaningful economic and political links with Eurasia
925
and South Asia.
3. Unilateral Sanctions and the Threat of Regional Isolation
Iran's third major geopolitical interest is to counteract the threat
of regional and international isolation as a result of the effects of U.S.

920.
See generally supra Part II.A.3.
921.
See supra notes 94-95, 133 and accompanying text.
922. This is especially important because Iran's more reactionary brand of
Shi'ite Islam as propagated by Khomeini has successfully separated itself from other
more "mainstream" Islamic polities advanced by conservative Arab regimes in the
Middle East. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
923.
See supra Part II.B.3.
924.
See Entessar, supra note 57 at 157.
925.
See id.
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economic sanctions, particularly the ILSA. 92 s

Here, Tehran should

realize that the Caspian's unsolved transportation and pipeline
conundrum presents it with a golden opportunity to seriously
undermine the political and economic logic of the sanctions regime.
This diplomatic strategy is a long-term one that requires Iranian
officials to abandon excessive focus on ownership rights issues in the
regional and
Caspian and instead focus on Iran's ability to satisfy
927
international energy distributionneeds in the region.
Iranian officials can satisfy this policy agenda by mounting an
intensive public relations campaign aimed simultaneously at
exposing the impracticality of the sanctions regime and highlighting
Iran's important political and economic role in the region. Again, this
policy agenda calls for active diplomatic and economic integration
within the region, even if substantial economic and trade relations
are not established for years to come. On a more specific level,
Tehran must mount an official legal challenge to the imposition of
such sanctions at the United Nations and various international trade
bodies, echoing the EU and Japan's belief that the sanctions regime
violates international trade law. 92 8 Second, Tehran must more
aggressively sell itself to Astana and Ashqabad as a reliable political
and economic partner who is sensitive to their unique regional needs.
Third, Tehran must make more of an effort at establishing
meaningful relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Turkey has
already proven more than willing to look to Iran as a significant
economic partner despite the threat of U.S. sanctions. 92 9 The same
could follow with Baku if Tehran increases the pressure such that it
will no longer be in Azerbaijan's political and economic interest to
ignore Iran as a strategic partner in the region. Last but not least,
Tehran must continue to rely on the international community,
primarily Europe and Japan, to make its case for the illegality and
Given Iran's
impracticality of the U.S. sanctions regime. 93 0
Tehran
sector,
transportation
potentially huge role in the Caspian
for
need
growing
community's
the
international
must begin to stress
and
world
markets,
more efficient means of distributing oil and gas to
Iran's role in satisfying such demands. Furthermore, Tehran must

See generally supra Part II.B.3. Note that the general policy agenda
926.
outlined below does not solely call for head-on conflict with Washington. Iranian

officials must also realize that their long-term interests require that some form of
rapprochement be established with the United States, since Washington vill no doubt
continue to be a player in the Caspian and the Persian Gulf for years to come.
See generally infra Part VI.C.
927.
928.
See generally Bhala, supra note 285.
See, e.g., supranote 303 and accompanying text.
929.
See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
930.
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also look to other areas such as South Asia, where consumption
demands are increasing at a faster rate than in Europe. 931
B. The Caspianand Iran's Energy Interests
1. The Caspian as Production Side-Show
An overriding reality that shapes Iranian Caspian policy is the
realization that the Caspian will not and cannot compete with
Persian Gulf oil production. 932 The country's limited resources
simply cannot be diverted to the Caspian to compensate for the lack
of Iranian involvement in regional energy production during the last
century or so. 9 33

This is especially true given the lack of direct

foreign investment and economic inefficiency that has plagued Iran in
the last two decades. 934 In light of these limitations, however, Tehran
must realize that the Caspian presents it with a unique opportunity:
a means of meeting its own domestic energy needs while also
establishing the foundation for it to play an even more instrumental
role in meeting the world's energy distribution needs.
2.
Satisfying Short-Term Transportation Needs and Domestic
Requirements
Due to its location, history, and existing infrastructural capacity,
Iran represents the ideal agent for Caspian oil swap programs
mentioned above. 935 More importantly for Tehran, oil swaps are a
means of getting around the legal barriers of the ILSA and other
economic sanctions prohibiting or limiting direct foreign involvement
in Iran's oil and gas sector, while allowing an early test case for its
936
transportation potential in the region.
Implementation of the oil swap model represents an ideal
solution addressing both Iran and the NIS' major energy concerns.
As stated before, the landlocked NIS require a way to transport their
oil to the open seas and world markets. Though planning of MER and

931.
932.
933.
934.
935.

Babak, supra note 109, at 202.
See Mehdiyoun, supra note 25, at 6.
Id.
See generally BILL, supra note 912.
See Tehran Proposes Regional Oil Talks: Central Asian, Transcaucasia

Energy Links Sought, PLATT's OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 25, 1992, 1992 WL 2464759. Iran

has seriously sought to involve itself in the Caspian transportation market as early as
the early 1990s. Id. See also Michael Lelyveld & Sarah Martin, Caspian Sea: Some
See Iran Oil Route Unlikely, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY, Jan. 13, 2000, at
http:/Iwww.rferl.orglncalfeatures2000/OllF.RU.000113151422.html(copy of file with
the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw).
936.
Sobhani, supra note 364.
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pipelines is a long-term and permanent solution to these problems,
the countries' cash-starved economies cannot wait that long-most
MERs are only in the planning stages, and feasibility concerns have
continuously hampered the smooth execution of construction
timetables. A more immediate and temporary solution is required.
Realizing its potential for filling the "transportation gap"
plaguing Caspian Sea oil and gas projects, Iran has attempted to
court NIS and use its competitive advantage as both a buyer and
exporter of oil and gas. 937 For Tehran the plan is profitable because it
allows it the ability not only to play a crucial role in the Caspian oil
and gas industry, but also to relieve its own domestic energy needs in
a more cost-efficient manner. 935 At present Iran's domestic energy
consumption patterns require it to transport a significant amount of
its Persian Gulf oil to the north of the country in order to meet the
9 39
needs of heavily populated Tehran and other major urban centers.
Under the proposed oil swap models, Caspian oil could replace the
need for diverted Persian Gulf oil to the north and allow Iran to
increase its export capacity in its southern terminals. 940
So far Tehran has attempted to sell its transportation viability
by focusing less on selling itself as an oil swap business partner and
more on trying to strong-arm the NIS into considering it as a
southern MER. 94 1 This misguided diplomacy has led to a noncohesive policy with undefined domestic and regional goals-a policy
that is backward-looking instead of constructivist and forwardlooking. Instead, Iran must identify the advantages of the oil swap
option, pursue it as a means of distinguishing itself from other viable
"early oil" solutions, and actively engage the NIS through diplomatic
lobbying, cooperation, and log-rolling. Perhaps most importantly,
Tehran must realize that its role as a solution to "early oil" transport
problems will not end with the increasing viability of long-term
solutions, because success of its programs could mean increased trust
and ultimately reliance on an Iranian MER option in the future.
3. The Prospects for a Caspian Gas Cartel
An often overlooked or under-emphasized feature of Caspian
94 2
hydrocarbon potential is its importance as a world gas deposit.

937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.
market,

See supraPart II.C.3.c.
See supranotes 360-65, 375-79 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 371-74; Part II.O.3.c and accompanying text.
For a general overview of the importance of natural gas to the world
see
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at

http://www.naturalgas.org/history.htm Gast visited Aug. 13, 2001) (copy on file with the
Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw). Natural gas vill continue to be the fastest
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Russia, Iran, and Turkmenistan represent three of the top four gas
producing nations in the world, although Russia and Iran's gas
producing fields lie well outside the Caspian region. 943
The
concentration of such production potential in one region is a source of
significant concern and worry for Western and Asian industrialized
944
nations dependent on gas imports, including the United States.
So what are the prospects for economic and political cooperation
between Tehran, Moscow, and Ashqabad on the gas front? A cursory
look at the three nations' legal diplomatic history in the Caspian saga
45
would lead to the illusory conclusion that state interests coincide
Russia and Iran have usually been grouped together when discussion
of legal arguments regarding delimitation of the Caspian is analyzed,
but Russia's willingness to engage in bilateral compacts delimiting
the Caspian and its willing flexibility regarding the legal status of the
Sea suggest that Moscow and Tehran have differing long-term
interests. 946 More significantly Moscow views Tehran as a regional
competitor whose potential for resolving the regional transportation
conundrum directly threatens Russia's ability to retain geopolitical
94 7
and geoeconomic control over the NIS.

growing primary energy source in the world for the foreseeable future. Id. at
http://www.naturalgas.org/product.htm; see also Indian Ocean Rim Network, Country
Profile of Iran: Natural Resources: Oil, Natural Gas, Minerals, Forest and Land Use,
at http://www.iornet.org/newiornet/iran3.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2001) (copy on file
with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law) (outlining Iran's natural gas
industry, its increasing reliance on natural gas for domestic consumption, and its
enhanced capacity to export natural gas to the world market).
943.
See UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CASPIAN SEA
REGION, supra note 41.
944.
Sanctions Decisions on South Pars Imminent, supra note 225. The political
problems associated with resolving the collective action and cooperation dilemma,
however, will likely prevent the organization and economic success of such a cartel for
years to come. See Dag Harald Claes, What do Theories of InternationalRegimes
Contribute to the Explanation of Cooperation(and Failure of Cooperation)Among Oil.
Producing Countries, at http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_12.thm, Dec. 1999
(copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw). A cursory look at the
history of OPEC may reveal challenges that a potential Caspian gas cartel may face.
See id. In addition, unlike the world oil market, the market for gas presents different
economic and financial limitations. See NATURAL GAS INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL

RESOURCES, supra note 942, at http://www.naturalgas.orglhistory.htm. Despite the
production and environmental advantages associated with cleaner burning natural gas,
the market for gas is not nearly as lucrative as that for oil since most of the world's
industries are dependent on older technology not yet adapted to using gas as a primary
fuel and energy source.
See id. at http://www.naturalgas.orglenvrion2.htm.
Furthermore, the race for pipeline dominance has added a new and more complex
dimension to the problem of collective action. See supra Part II.C.
945.
See generally supra Part III.
946.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the different
interests of Moscow and Tehran).
947.

See id.
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Then there is the Turkmen factor. With the continuing
competition and enmity between Russia and Turkmenistan regarding
gas exports still an operative reality, it is likely that Ashqabad %-ull
view Tehran as a more reliable export partner. 948 Turkmenistan has
already discussed plans with Iran regarding transportation of its gas
to Turkey. 949 Of course the potential for competitive friction between
the two is also a problem that must be overcome.
Given
Turkmenistan's skepticism regarding Russia, its location with
respective to Iran, and the already existing cooperation between the
two littoral states on other fronts, however, Ashqabad no doubt feels
a natural pull towards economic partnership with Tehran. 950 The
latter should take advantage of this reality. This is especially
important in light of Turkmenistan's increasing significance to the
United States and Turkey within the TCP context. 9 51
Despite the conflicting interests between the three nations,
however, it is highly unlikely that the underdeveloped and untapped
Caspian gas market will be a regional force to be reckoned with if
Tehran does not seek some assistance from Moscow. Without some
level of understanding between Iran and Russia regarding the need to
cooperate and coordinate the production and export of their natural
gas, any attempt at a loose or potentially cohesive regional gas cartel
will surely fail. Yet regardless of the practicality and sustainability
of a true Caspian gas export cartel between Russia, Iran, and
Turkmenistan, Tehran should take the diplomatic initiative to
highlight the potential benefits of cooperation and coordination of gas
export policies between the three nations. This undertaking is
important for two reasons: first, it will open the door regional
dialogue and negotiation regarding the importance of natural gas
production and trade, and second it will allow Iran to use the Caspian
as a springboard to further develop its natural gas production sector,
increase dependence on gas for domestic consumption needs, and seek

948.

For an overview of Iran's gas potential within the context of production and

transportation capacity, see Huge Natural Gas Reserves Central to Capacity Work,
ConstructionPlans in Iran,OIL & GAS J., July 11, 1994, 1994 WL 2856610.
949. Increased involvement of Iran in a Caspian gas trade can also help it
undergo a major revamping of its internal oil and gas management structure. See
Ghorban, infra note 968. Although the NIOC has managed to keep the country's
economy afloat through turbulent years of domestic instability and war, many believe
that it is time for a major restructuring of the Iranian oil and gas sector. Id. Reform
should address the following concerns: 1) downsizing of the over-bloated and inefficient
NIOC conglomerate and opening the door to private domestic and foreign involvement
in the oil and gas sector, 2) an increased role for the National Iranian Gas Company
(NIGC), which up to now has played an insignificant part in the nation's gas energy
policies; 3) an aggressive natural gas policy aimed at increasing reliance on domestic
gas consumption in order to ensure continued efficiency in oil export capacity. Id.
950. See supra notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
951.
See supranotes 219-21, 224 and accompanying text.
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more profitable and efficient means for exporting its gas to world
markets.
4. Iran: A Regional Transportation Hub?
Iran's strategic position between the Caspian and the Persian
95 2
Gulf places it right in the middle of the Caspian geopolitical game.
To be more exact, Iran represents a vital bridge or strategic pivot
95 3
between the north-south and east-west energy transportation axes.
The possibilities that such a geographic advantage can open up for
Tehran are limitless. The emergence of the Caspian as a heightened
region of significance allows Iran the unique opportunity of thrusting
itself in the middle of the "Great Game" and firmly integrating itself
in the international energy scene. 954 More specifically Iran has the
capacity to be viewed as a future transportation hub linking Far
Eastern markets with Western European markets. 955 Indeed, Iran
has already made agreements with India and Pakistan, but the
realization of a more far-sighted policy may potentially allow Iran to
serve as the conduit of Persian Gulf and Caspian oil and gas exports
to Southeast Asia, China, and Japan. 95 6 The economic benefits to be
reaped from such a role are significant enough, but the geopolitical
ramifications of control over such land and tanker shipping routes are
staggering-when linked with the realization that increasing energy
demands in the Far East, especially China, Japan, and Southeast
Asia will and soon outstrip those of the West, the Iranian
957
transportation option becomes an increasingly potent asset.
Then there is the more long-term pipeline solution with Iran as a
viable MER route. Ambitious plans regarding looping of oil pipelines
from Iran to China and the Asian subcontinent have already been
discussed, and have predictably received raised eyebrows from
Washington. 9 58 Of course, the immediate prospects for such plans are

952.

Stuart Parrot, Iran: Why it Holds the Potentialto Divide the West, RADIO

FREE EUROPE-RADIO

LIBERTY,

Nov. 10,

1997, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/

1997/1l/F.RU.971110121845.html (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw).
953.
For the purposes of this section only, the east-west transportation axis
specifically refers to Iran's ability to serve as a hub for the transport of oil and gas from
the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea to Europe and Asia. Likewise the north.south
transportation axis primarily refers to the potential for Iran to serve as a pipeline
conduit to the rest of the world by linking its Persian Gulf facilities to its Caspian ones.
954.
See Fuller, supra note 5; see also supra note 439 and accompanying text.
955.
See supra Part II.C.3.c.
956
See, e.g., Iran Defends Pakistan Choice for Gas Pipeline to India, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 13, 2001, at httpJ/news.sawaal.conml4-Feb-2001/InternationaY7.htm
(copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journalof TransnationalLaw).
957.
See Babak, supra note 109, at 202.
958.
Turkey is against any route that ends up in the Black Sea and requires
tanker transport to the Mediterranean because it argues that increased tanker traffic
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in serious doubt, since the treacherous terrain and political
instability of the Asian interior makes implementation at this stage
nearly impossible. 959 But the integration of Iran in the North-South
and East-West transportation axes for NIS oil and gas is a move that
makes economic sense if the political barriers to Tehran's
960
involvement can be overcome.
Moreover, Tehran has as much to do if not more with ensuring
that its role as a regional transportation hub is fulfilled as
Washington has in preventing its realization. The key to diplomacy
for Tehran in this area is its capacity to understand that its potential
role in the Caspian is a mixed blessing given the United States' and
Europe's hopes that recent oil and gas finds would lead to a
significant diversification of world energy supplies. 961 Legal and
diplomatic lobbying by Tehran should thus involve a dual policy of
showing the appropriate level of concern to Western and Asian
markets regarding guarantees that Iran will do all it can to insure
responsibility as a major energy transporter, while aggressively
pursuing legal and diplomatic policies that will accommodate the
above regional goals.
5. The Caspian and Foreign Direct Investment in Iran's Oil and Gas
Sector
Realizing its potential role as a major Caspian transportation
partner will also help Iran to channel its efforts into securing more
direct foreign investment in its oil and gas sector. To date, the pace
of economic reform in Iran has been slow and inadequate. 962 With
flow in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits has created ultra-hazardous
environmental concerns for the region. Id. Under the Montreaux Convention of 1936,
Turkey is required to allow navigation through the straits. Id. For the text of the
Montreaux Convention of 1936, see Convention Concerning the Regime of the Straits,
Nov. 9, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 213. The Montreaux Convention transferred the functions
of a previously established international commission supervising the free transit of
commercial vessels through the Bosphorus Straits to Turkey. HENKIN ET AL., supra
note 589, at 1260. Thus, Turkey was required to continue free and unlimited
navigation of merchant vessels but retained sovereignty over certain military and
security matters. Id.
959. See Fuller, supranote 5.
960. See id.
961.
This "mixed blessing" refers to the Wests "ambivalence" toward new oil and
gas discoveries in the Caspian-Western firms are eager to dive into the region to
secure lucrative exploration and production agreements while the governments
backing them are more cautious about the prospects of over-reliance on an area
controlled in part by Russia and Iran. See, e.g., Sanctions Decisions on South Pars
Imminent, supranote 225.
962. Under President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran slowly began a period of
economic liberalization and market reform aimed at pulling the country out of its
isolationist era during the turbulent years immediately following the Revolution. CIATHE WORLD FAcTBooK 2000-IRAN, at httpJhwvw.cia.gov/cia/publcationcJfactbookl
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prospects for renewal of the ILSA and other economic sanctions
against Iran from Washington a highly likely scenario, Tehran is
extremely dependent on its ability to successfully encourage
European and Asian investment in its oil and gas sector. This is
especially true since natural resource exports still account for more
than eighty-five percent of the country's annual exports, with a heavy
963
reliance on oil and gas.
Yet Iran's internal political and economic structure makes it
difficult for foreign firms to freely invest in its energy sector. 964 After
the ratification of the new Islamic Constitution legal barriers were
put up in order to ensure that revolutionary Iran would fully control
and manage its own energy sector. 965 The Iranian Constitution
sought to remedy years of foreign domination of the country's oil and
gas industry under British and American hegemony by outlawing
investment relationships based on foreign control. 966 As a result
concessions and foreign management of Iran's petroleum resources
were
rendered constitutionally
illegal.96 7
Foreign
private
involvement was practically phased out, with the state-run NIOC
taking control of all aspects of the industry, from exploration, to

geos/ir.html#Econ (last visited Aug. 13, 2001) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational Law). The general sentiment for reform has continued after
President Khatami's landslide election triumph in 1997 and the more recent
parliamentary triumph of reformers over conservatives. Id.
963.
CIA-THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2000-IRAN, supra note 962. Oil still accounts
for nearly eighty percent of Iran's foreign exchange earnings. Id. For an informative
macro-analysis of Iran's energy policies and their implication for Caspian oil and gas
development, see also Manouchehr Takin, Future Oil and Gas: Can Iran Deliver?, 217
WORLD OIL 11, Nov. 1, 1996, 1996 WL 9739486. Takin points out that Iran must look
to the future price of oil, future demand for its oil in the world market, the volume of oil
produced, domestic consumption patters versus volumes available for export, and
revenue potential from exporting natural gas. Id.
964.
See generally Indian Ocean Rim Network, Country Profile of Iran:
Regulations on Investment, at http://www.iornet.org/newiornet/iranlo.htm (last visited
Aug. 13, 2001) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law)
(providing a brief review of the general legal impediments to foreign investment in Iran
(including a review of the Constitution, labor laws, tax laws, and corporate law) and
arguing that although Iran's commercial laws are complex and have remained
relatively unchanged since the 1950s, post-revolutionary zeal and anti-foreign
sentiments have prevented Tehran from establishing a legal infrastructure conducive
to foreign investment).
965. See ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONST. art. 43, § 8 (calling for the
"prevention of foreign economic domination over the country's economy'); art. 81
(providing that "the granting of concessions to foreigners for the formation of
companies or institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, services or
mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden').
966. See Indian Ocean Rim Network, supra note 964.
967.

Id.
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production and distribution. 968 This has proved to be an extremely
taxing and difficult task.9 69
In 1995, however, the novel "buyback" system passed the wary
eyes of Malis, allowing a way to circumvent the restrictive Iranian
Constitution.9 70 The "buyback" system allows foreign corporations to
invest in Iran's oil and gas sector by pumping investment money into
the hands of the NIOC.9 71 The NIOC then directly manages the
projects, with the foreign corporations retaining no control over the
production and extraction of oil and gas. 972 The proceeds that flow
from successful production efforts are in turn funneled back into the
coffers of these foreign corporations. 9 73 Though this system may have
lured large companies like France's Total, Italy's ENI, and Royal
Dutch Shell to bid for and secure significant tenders put up by the
NIOC, most experts agree that the measure is still too risky for many
974
foreign oil corporations.
Although the structure and nature of Iran's economic reform is
beyond the scope of this study, a shift of focus on Iran's

968.

Narsi Ghorban, The Need for Restructuring Iran's Oil and Gas Industry, 16

IRAN TODAY: ECONOMIC MAGAZINE (Iran), Sept. & Oct. 1997, http-Jivlwv.netiran.com/
Htdocs/ClippingsFeconomy/97100OXXFE05.html (providing a helpful overview of
Iran's inefficient management of its oil and gas sector). Ghorban argues that: 1) the
Ministry of Petroleum must be separated from the NIOC, the NIGC, and the National
petrochemical Company (NPC); 2) the division of labor between the NIOC and NIGC
regarding Iran's gas policy must be reevaluated, and the country must develop a more
flexible and up-to-date Gas Law; 3) the foreign-investment schemes and the buyback
system must be revamped to further encourage direct foreign involvement in Iran's oil
and gas sector, and 4) some aspects of the Iranian oil industry must be privatized. Id.
See also Al Tabataba'i, Iran: The Need for Restructuring of the Oil And Gas Sector, 34
HAIISHAHRI (Iran), Dec. 12, 1997, httpJ/www.netiran.comlhtdocslippingJfeconomyl
78432XXFE001.htm.
969.
See supranote 968 and accompanying text.
Indian Ocean Rim Network, Country Profile of Iran: Regulations on
970.
Investment. In November 1995 the Maflis passed the Law Concerning the Attraction
and Protection of Foreign Investment in Iran that instituted the "buyback" system.
Indian Ocean Rim Network, Country Profile of Iran: ForeignInvestment Legislation, at
http-J/www.iornet.org/newiornet/iranl9.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2001) (copy on file
with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law). For an online version of the
legislation's provisions, see id. The law allows foreign participation in a private
enterprise as long as the level of participation does not exceed forty-nine percent.
Indian Ocean Rim Network, Country Profileof Iran: Regulationson Investment, supra.
Joint ventures with an Iranian government entity do not fall under the purview of the
legislation. Id.
971.
UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, IRAN (Apr. 1999)
This website also provides a helpful
http:Jlwww.eia.doe.govlemeulcabstiran.htm.
overview of Iran's oil and gas potential, performance, and policies. See generally id.
The buyback agreements are deemed constitutional because they are not seen as
concessions but as service agreements. See Indian Ocean Rim Network, Country
Profile of Iran: Regulations on Investment, supra note 970.
972.
See supra note 971 and accompanying text.
973.
Id.
974.
See id.
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transportation potential in the region could provide the impetus for
renewed efforts at revamping the search for creative solutions to open
up the system to foreign investment. For one thing, the prospect of
Iran serving as a regional transportation hub is a major undertaking
that will require foreign involvement. Such a transportation system
would also demand the increased flow of direct foreign investment
into the region in order to ensure the infrastructural, financial, and
technological viability of regional pipeline projects. Iran will no doubt
be the indirect if not direct beneficiary of these funds, which will lead
to its further integration into the world economy and a more radical
opening up of its foreign investment system.
C. An Eye Towards Legal Diplomacy in the Caspian Sea:
Abandoning the "Legal Veto" Strategy
The identification of the above list of Iranian interests and the
role of a shifting paradigm highlighting Iran's potential capacity as
player in the regional and world energy market are important in
determining the geopolitics of the region. But what does all this
mean for the legal status of the Caspian Sea, and what strategies
should Iran employ in order to ensure realization of its primary
regional geopolitical and geoeconomic goals? The key to answering
this question lies in understanding the often overlooked yet critical
interrelationship between any comprehensive legal convention
defining commercial and navigational rights in the Caspian Sea, and
the littoral states' ability to solve the region's long-term
transportation problems. More specifically, Tehran must adopt a farsighted legal diplomacy approach aimed primarily at ensuring that
any legal arrangements regarding ownership and production rights in
the Caspian maximize its bargaining position vis-a-vis the NIS
regarding the political and economic viability of Iran serving as a
major transportation route. This will no doubt promise to be a
difficult endeavor, especially given the country's less than stellar
foreign relations record with Azerbaijan and its allies Turkey and the
United States. Yet the potential for a well-balanced legal diplomatic
approach seeking to ensure that Iran is not frozen out of the Caspian
oil and gas frenzy surely exists.
1. Moving Beyond the Substantive Effects of the Soviet-Iranian
Treaties
Tehran's legal diplomacy to date has left much to be desired.
Essentially, the foundation and viability of its current diplomatic
strategy depends wholly upon the continuing validity of the Soviet-
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Iranian Treaties, which all littoral states, including Russia and Iran,
expressly or impliedly acknowledge to be a relic of the past. 975 For
Iran the "legal veto" strategy of blindly following Russia in disputing
the validity of all NIS joint-venture programs seems to have
backfired, or at the very least done little to affect NIS and corporate
attitudes towards exploitation of the Seas resources.
Tehran's new legal approach must go back to basics. It must
first develop its strategy with respect to an interim set of rules
restricting littoral state activity in the Caspian.9 7 6

It must also

recognize that while legal strategy allows it to use a "legal veto"
challenging certain radical aspects of unilateral littoral state activity
which arguably violate surviving default rules established by the
Soviet-Iranian Treaties, Tehran's one-dimensional use of such a
strategy dilutes the legal validity and effect of the vetoes. More
importantly, the "legal veto" strategy prevents Tehran from looking
beyond the substantive effects of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties and
instead focusing on how a future set of legal rules can most effectively
benefit its long-term geopolitical and geoeconomic goals in the region.
2. Using Interim Default Rules to Force Multilateral Negotiation
Despite the fact that an over-reliance on the substantive effects
of the Soviet-Iranian is a misguided regional policy, Tehran may
nonetheless fall back on the limiting effect of the Treaties in the
absence of an agreed upon comprehensive legal regime for the
Caspian. As mentioned above, the Soviet-Iranian Treaties are at best
a system of default rules that do little to define the substantive rights
of the littoral states in the new geopolitical environment.9 77 Iran,
however, should exercise of the option of continually reminding
Russia and the NIS that, in the least, the Treaties' exclusivity and
common ownership principles currently operate to restrict any littoral
state from engaging in action that is incompatible with the Treaties
provisions.9 78 Though as mentioned before the exact limiting effects
of the Treaties are not determinable, Tehran must nevertheless play
up their continuing validity as a set of default rules in order to
highlight the legal legitimacy of its position and bolster its reputation
as a law abiding member of the international community.

975.
That Iran impliedly acknowledges the long-term futility of relying on a
strategy based on the legal effect of the Soviet-Iranian Treaties is evident from its
continuing calls for a multilateral solution to the Caspian regime problem, its
willingness to entertain an equitable division of the Sea pursuant to its historical
rights, and its willingness to put up several Caspian on and offshore development
basins up for international tender. See generally supra Parts I, V.
976.
See supraPart IV.C.
977.
See id.
978.
See id.
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Furthermore, it is at least arguable that a littoral state's unilateral
declaration of exclusive ownership rights is offensive to the letter and
spirit of the Treaties. 9 79 Tehran may also argue that the same is true
for the series of bilateral agreements signed between the littoral
states regarding de facto delimitation of the Caspian Sea. 98 0
More important than the limiting legal effects of the Treaties is
Tehran's ability to effectively use them as a bargaining chip to force
multilateral negotiation. One of the biggest dangers Iran faces is the
possibility that the series of bilateral agreements between the littoral
states and the Soviet era delimitation boundaries have already
replaced the Treaties as the de facto set of interim default rules. 98 ' In
order to retain the current significance of the Treaties as default
rules, Tehran should refrain from adopting them as its primary
bargaining tool but should always refer to it in order to appeal to a
multilateral solution to the Caspian Sea regime dispute. More
specifically, Tehran should remind all littoral states that the need for
a multilateral solution and cooperation is legally required both as a
practical and a diplomatic matter. 98 2
This strategy, though seemingly limited in scope, will do more
than any 'legal veto" has in putting the NIS on alert and perhaps
slowing down the pace of unilateral development action in the
Caspian.
It will also re-shift the region's focus to the legal
environment of Caspian-something that has been recently lost as
both Iran and Russia have scrambled to protect their own geopolitical
interests in the Caspian by engaging in unilateral and bilateral side
agreements aimed at facilitating exploitation activities. 98 3 It also has
the added benefit of sending a message to international corporations,
reminding them that diplomacy in this area requires legal solutions

979.
See id.
980.
See supra Part IV.B.
981.
See supra Part III.A.
982.
Tehran should carry out such a plan by continually issuing formal notices
to the United Nations similar to the ones it has lodged in the past that address its
specific desire that multilateralism should supplant unilateral and bilateral
agreements. It should also rest its interpretation of any interim set of default rules on
the idea of non-aggression championed by the United Nations by linking the notion of
exclusivity to territorial integrity and security concerns. In other words, Iran should
join Russia in making clear that any official U.S. or foreign presence in the Sea waters,
whether civilian or military, is an express violation of the exclusionary principle of the
Treaties.
Next, Iran must reconcile the contradictory unilateral action it has engaged in so
far with the spirit of its legal strategy of calling for restraint. Notice that abandoning
the "legal veto" will afford it the possibility of embracing the limited but contradictory
policy it has actually engaged in so far. It can argue that it is precisely the unclear
status of legal delimitation rules that has resulted in the feeding frenzy, which Iran
must also participate in (though unwillingly) in order to ensure protection of its
sovereignty and regional interests.
983.
See, e.g., Lloyd, supranote 237.
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and that further action in the Caspian despite the absence of a legal
regime may have long-term destabilizing effects upon foreign
investments. 984 In short, the plan requires continuing notification of
the United Nations on the status of progress on a comprehensive
legal convention, lobbying of Moscow, subtle pressure on the NIS, and
indirect legal reminders to corporate and private interests regarding
the shaky legal status of the Caspian and its possible effects on
regional investments.
In the meanwhile, Iran could facilitate the road toward
multilateralism by adopting a leading role in reviving the
organizational bodies erected to tackle the region's political,
economic, and environmental concerns. These bodies include the
SWGs, the ECO, the CCO, and other official intergovernmental
meetings and conventions set up to discuss the Caspian. 98 5 Even if
these meetings do not initially lead to consensus and agreement on
the status of the Caspian, an increase in the frequency of such
meetings further reinforces the need to rely solely on a multilateral
means of resolving the status of the Sea.
3. Toward Legal Diplomacy at the Negotiating Table: Bargaining for
an Appropriate Legal Regime
Next, Tehran must tackle the more difficult issue of negotiating
for the establishment of a new legal regime. Here, Iran has been
relatively consistent in voicing its concern that exploration and
production must cease until a multilateral legal solution is imposed,
but has done little in the way of actual lobbying and negotiating.95 6 A
more activist and constructivist strategy would do much to enhance
Iran's reputation as a regionally responsible actor and further
legitimize its legal arguments. More importantly, such a strategy
would allow Tehran to adopt a forward-looking posture, focusing on
participation and not isolation as the means by which its interests
can be safeguarded.
Tehran should engage in multilateral bargaining with two
overall goals in mind. First, Tehran should argue for the adoption of
a legal regime that facilitates or triggers its competitive advantage
over transportation of the region's oil and gas to world markets.
Second, lobbying should be pursued with Iran's domestic and foreign
interests in mind. These include: national and regional security
concerns, cultural and economic integration, weakening of economic
sanctions imposed by the United States, satisfying short-term
regional transportation demands, working towards a regional gas

984.
985.
986.

See supraPart III.A.
See supra notes 94-95, 480.81, 921-22 and accompanying text.
See supraParts VI.C.1-2.
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cartel, increasing foreign direct investment, and establishing the
foundations for a regional and global transportation hub linking
98 7
world markets.
For reasons that will become more apparent in the following
sections, Iran's substantive strategy regarding the architecture of a
new legal regime should point towards the adoption of a regime model
that employs a split or "dual-regime." This requires Tehran to focus
its legal diplomatic strategy on variants of regime models seven
through ten as outlined in the previous section. 988 As a purely legal
matter, the foregoing analysis suggests that regional history, the
Caspian's geography, and case law may be drawn upon to support the
adoption of a regime model that integrates elements of common
ownership and delimitation. 98 9 As a diplomatic matter, a split or
"dual regime" system offers a sensible political compromise between
all the littoral states, and most importantly allows Tehran to satisfy
its domestic and regional interests. 990 More specifically, Iran should
use the NIS' calls for the application of the UNCLOS to the Caspian
Sea to its advantage by highlighting the "dual-regime" elements
inherent within the UNCLOS macro-model. 9 91
Despite the above reasons, however, the NIS may validly counter
for a plan calling for the adoption of a regime model which features
either full sectoral division of the Sea or equal-ratio sectoral division
allowing for a commonage area. 9 92 Such a strategy, though arguably
not as sensitive to the history and geography of the Caspian Sea and
certainly not as accommodating to Iranian interests, may nonetheless
offer the most feasible resolution of the ownership and boundary
dispute problem. 99 3 It is also a strategy that is well supported by
international case law. 994 Regardless of the outcome of multilateral
negotiations, the legal diplomatic battle lines will surely center on a
fight between these two sets of regime models-all other models are
wholly impractical for political and economic reasons.
a. Turning the Tables on Washington:
U.S. Sanctions

Challenging the Validity of

In the context of U.S.-Iran relations in the Caspian, any legal
regime that employs elements of common ownership or a "dualregime" structure could seriously hamper U.S. efforts aimed at

987.
988.
989.
990.
991.
992.
993.
994.

See generally id.
See supra Parts V.B.2.g-j.
See supra Parts IV-V.
See supra Parts VI.A-B.
See supra notes 887-93 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts IV-V.
See supra Parts V.B.2.k-1.
See supra Parts V.A.1-2.
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preventing Iran's involvement in the region's oil and gas trade.
Moreover, such a regime could potentially endanger American
participation in any aspect of hydrocarbon exploitation on two fronts.
First, as argued above, common ownership of the waters may limit or
practically render any ownership of seabed resources in the affected
area useless because Tehran could either voice its objection to
undesirable foreign participation through a "legal veto" or act against
such participation by threatening aggressive [military] action.
Secondly, the regime would force the United States and the NIS to
reexamine the practicality of the ILSA because a "dual-regime" would
require some cooperation on the part of Tehran if smooth production
and distribution of the Caspian's hydrocarbon wealth is to take place.
Furthermore, such a regime structure would increase the likelihood
that American corporations would be legally barred from working on
certain projects if the latter substantially benefits Iran's oil and gas
sector. In this sense, Tehran may turn the tables on the United
States, using the ILSA as a means of forcing Washington to abandon
plans for renewal of the sanctions.
b. Linking Ownership Rights to Transportation Capacity: Triggering
Iran's Competitive Advantage
Iran's competitive advantage over the distribution and
transportation of the Caspian's oil and gas to world markets is an
extremely important asset for Tehran. This is so because regardless
of the nature of a legal regime defining ownership rights in the
Caspian Sea, Iran's territory and its infrastructural capacity render it
the most effective agent for distribution of NIS oil and gas to world
markets. The problem, however, lies in the fact that Tehran's
misguided diplomacy and the United States' strong political desire to
isolate Iran in the international arena have combined to make it
difficult for Tehran to rely solely on its geoeconomic competitive
advantage in the transportation sector. Therefore, Iran must either
concede full sectoral division of the Sea's resources in which case it
must shift its efforts to more aggressively integrating itself in the
economy of the region through negotiation, log-rolling, and diplomatic
overture to the NIS, or it must focus on intensive bargaining for the
adoption of a "dual-regime" model. The latter is a better strategy
because its success would allow Tehran to exercise direct and indirect
ownership powers beyond just its allocated share of the Caspian.
In order to maximize its ability to take advantage of its
competitive advantage in distribution and "force" the NIS to take a
more serious look at construction of pipelines through Iranian
territory to the Persian Gulf, Tehran should seek to increase its direct
and indirect ownership share of the Sea's resources, its indirect
ownership share of the Sea's resources, and its transportation
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Interestingly
potential for the Sea's hydrocarbon resources. 995
enough, it is more to Tehran's interest to seek an increase in its
indirect ownership share of the Sea's resources than its direct
ownership rights. There are two reasons for this. First, Iran's
"share" of the Sea has not yielded significant hydrocarbon reserves so
an increase in direct ownership rights does little to help Iran in the
production sector. 996 Secondly, as already mentioned, Iran realizes
that it lacks the funds and resources to allocate significant energy to
its production capacity in the Caspian Sea. 9 97 To the extent that
direct ownership rights are a cost and labor-intensive asset, Iran
would gain little if anything from increasing its direct ownership
share of the Caspian seabed. 998 Indirect ownership rights,
particularly over the surface waters, however, may be exploited
without substantial resource expenditure and allocation. 999 Since
Iran's overall goal is to bargain for a legal regime that triggers and
maximizes its competitive advantage for the transportation and
distribution of oil and gas, indirect ownership rights flowing from a
"dual-regime" arrangement present Tehran with a more valuable

asset than direct ownership rights.

With these goals in mind,

Tehran's overall negotiating strategy should be three-fold:

1) it

should endorse variants of regime models nine and ten; 2) it should
endorse variants of regime models seven and eight; and 3) it should
shift tactics to minimizing the effects of full sectoral division and
focusing on selling itself as a reliable economic partner to the NIS,
especially if the latter are successful in bargaining for variants of
regime models eleven and twelve. 0 00

995.
Direct ownership rights refer to a littoral state's full sovereignty over an
area of the Sea. A littoral state has full sovereignty rights when it has the legal power
to exclude everyone and anyone from its allocated share of the Sea. Indirect ownership
rights, on the other hand, refer either to intangible rights over a particular area of the
Sea, (i.e. veto rights to limit or prohibit development of a certain area), or tangible
rights resulting from condominium or common property rights. An example of indirect
ownership rights would be any area affected by a split or "dual-regime" arrangement,
or a commonage zone.
996.
See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
997.
See supranotes 932-34 and accompanying text.
998.
In order to take full advantage of direct ownership rights over the Caspian
seabed, a littoral state must have the resources and capability to drill for oil and gas or
lure foreign investment to do the dirty work. Iran lacks that capability in both
departments. See generally supra Part VI.B.5.
999.
It costs little to exercise legal veto rights or monitor offshore oil and gas
development through navigation.
1000. The above strategy does not take into account Tehran's option of first
attempting to argue for a condominium regime or, in the alternative, an equal division
of the Sea allowing each littoral state a twenty percent share. As noted above,
however, it is highly unlikely that Tehran will actually negotiate to establish a new
Caspian legal regime that adopts a condominium theory because the latter should
primarily be used as a means to attack the legal validity of unilateral action and force
multilateral negotiation. Also, the prospects for the adoption of such a regime are
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Models seven and eight establish a "dual-regime" system where
there is an unequal ratio parity between sovereignty exercised over
the waters and seabed resources. 100 1 As previously noted, these
regime models allow the littoral states more sovereignty over their
allocated share of the waters than they do for the seabed and subsoil
resources. 10 0 2 The legal effect of these regime models is to create a
split zone within a littoral state's allocated share of the Sea: a zone
abutting the littoral state's coast allows full sovereignty over the
Sea's waters and seabed, and a second zone further from the coast
10 03
only allows the state to exercise full sovereignty over its waters.
The latter zone, therefore, essentially operates as a navigational
buffer for the former zone. For Iran, this arrangement is favorable
because it indirectly increases common ownership the Sea's seabed by
all littoral states and minimizes the full sovereignty rights of the MIS
over the seabed to a reduced area within their allocated share of the
Sea. Depending on the breadth of the NIS' sovereignty zones over the
seabed, however, these models may not be as favorable to Iran
because they still allow the NIS to retain sovereignty over the waters
beyond their seabed sovereignty zones.100 4 Also, note that it is to
Iran's advantage to endorse model seven over model eight because the
former allows for a commonage zone. Other than the environmental
benefits that accrue to all littoral states from the presence of a
commonage area, the latter is doubly beneficial to Iran because it
severely undermines the interests of those seeking to construct a
trans-Caspian pipeline along the seabed.10 05 In short, the "dualregime" arrangement of these regime models and their allocation of
indirect ownership rights in the form of condominium and veto
powers increase Iran's bargaining power with respect to the NIS and
force the latter to more seriously look to Iran as a major
transportation partner.

highly unlikely. With regard to the twenty percent share proposal, Tehran may
bargain for such a regime but should keen in mind that it is not to its advantage to rely
on any regime model that proposes full sectoral division, even if Iran's allocated share
is equal to that of the other littoral states. Instead, Iran should argue for a twenty
percent share of the Caspian seabed while proposing that the Caspian waters be held
in common. Note that this arrangement is similar to regime models seven and eight.
1001. See supraParts V.B.2.g-h.
1002. See i&
1003. See id.
1004. Given the geographic and historical peculiarities of the Caspian Sea, a
"dual-regime" model that allows for indirect ownership rights over the seabed may not
be as valuable an asset as one which allows indirect ownership rights to the waters
above.
1005. See supra notes 426-35 (discussing the legal problems associated with the
construction of the TCP).
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Models nine and ten also establish a "dual-regime" arrangement,
but the ratio between water and seabed sovereignty is inverted.10 0 6
Here, littoral states may exercise sovereignty over their full allocated
share of the seabed but may not exercise the same over a portion of
the waters above their EEZs. 100 7 This arrangement increases Iran's
indirect ownership rights to the waters above the NIS' EEZs. As
such, it may be a more valuable asset than the indirect ownership
rights accruing to Iran in the models seven and eight. More
importantly, Iran may most effectively trigger its competitive
advantage in the distribution and transportation sectors through
these regime models because they increase Iran's ability to voice
objection and perhaps block not only the development of offshore
hydrocarbon projects, but the construction of MERs in and around the
Caspian Sea. This increased involvement, in turn, will force the NIS
to more seriously consider Iran as a strategic transportation partner.
Again, it is to Iran's advantage to call for the establishment of a
commonage area in the middle of the Sea.
As mentioned above, even without the adoption of a "dualregime" structure for the Caspian, Iran arguably represents the most
practical and efficient geoeconomic solution to the region's
distribution problems. Therefore, if Tehran finds itself on the losing
end of bargaining for a "dual-regime" model, it should minimize the
effects of a full sectoral division regime by arguing for a commonage
area and switching tactics to focus solely on lobbying the NIS to run
pipelines through its territory. Essentially, Tehran should look to
this strategy at all times, not only in the event that the above two
proposals fail. This is so because with the exception of Azerbaijan,
both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan's oil and gas deposits are
situated close to their shores. 10 0 8 Therefore, regardless of the regime
model chosen, Astana and Ashqabad will retain full sovereignty over
a significant portion of their hydrocarbon assets. This reality should
force Tehran to continuously pursue negotiation with the NIS
focusing solely on the transportation and pipeline issue because the
benefits flowing from a "dual-regime" model do not directly affect the
NIS' onshore oil and gas basins.
c. Playing the Environmental Card
Last but not least, Iran must pursue the issue of the
environment. Development of international environmental law may
allow Tehran some room to try out innovative legal maneuvering
given the Soviet Union's disproportionate hand at pollution in the

1006.
1007.
1008.

See supra Parts V.B.2.i-j.
See id.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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Caspian. 10 0 9 Although the specifics of international environmental
law are beyond the scope of this study, evidence strongly suggests
that pollution levels are disproportionately impacting the Iranian
coastline. 0 10
Furthermore, despite arguments that full sectoral
division of the Sea's resources will more effectively foster
environmental-friendly policies by the littoral states, Tehran should
point to years of Soviet abuse and neglect of the region's environment
and its disproportionately damaging impact on Iran's economic and
environmental health as evidence that the Caspian presents a single
and unique ecosystem.1 01 1 Given the above, Tehran's environmental
strategy should be to: 1) remind all littoral states that environmental
problems in and around the Sea require regional solutions, 2) take
the lead in establishing multilateral organizations devoted to
addressing environmental concerns, and 3) aggressively negotiate for
some form of condominium or common ownership regime to monitor
and solve the Sea's environmental problems. Furthermore, Iran
should strive to separate its environmental concerns from its
geopolitical and geoeconomic concerns regarding ownership and
transportation rights in the Caspian in order to maximize the impact
of its argument for some for of common ownership. Though the
efficacy of an environmental strategy will no doubt be limited in
impact as an independent legal strategy, its use with the legal tactics
outlined in the previous sections will increase the likelihood that it
10 1 2
will affect the nature and scope of a legal regime for the Caspian.

VII. CONCLUSION: IS THE GAME OVER?
Some scholars believe that resolution of the dispute over
ownership rights in the Caspian is a foregone conclusion-that
sectoral division of the Sea will inevitably take place for political and
practical reasons. Though it is true that the real dispute over the
legal status of the Sea has largely shifted from wether the seabed
should be divided to how such a division might be accomplished, this
study has argued that there is ample room for the use of effective
legal diplomacy to ensure that the architecture of a resulting regime
accommodates Tehran's geopolitical and geoeconomic interest in the
region.

1009. See generally Barry Hart Dubner, On the Interplay of InternationalLaw of
the Sea and the Prevention of Maritime Pollution-How Far Can a State Proceed in
ProtectingItself From Conflicting Norms in InternationalLaw, 14 GEORGETOWN INTL
ENV. L. REV. 851 (1998).
1010. See supranotes 56-60 and accompanying text.
1011. See generally id.
1012. See, e.g., supra note 3 for a model of multilateral environmental cooperation
between the littoral states.

846

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:681

Viewed within this context, this study has argued that the
Soviet-Iranian Treaties allow Tehran room to argue that certain
default rules exist that limit unilateral littoral activity in the
Caspian; and that Tehran should adopt a "middle of the line" policy
that stresses the need for multilateralism, rejects transparent
diplomatic gestures, and abandons a 'legal veto" approach thus
ensuring the realization of its competitive advantage in the
transportation sector. This more balanced legal-diplomatic strategy
will force Tehran to focus its attention on long-term competitive
advantages in the transportation sector and ultimately ensure that it
is not isolated from the Caspian oil and gas game.
Faraz Sanei*

* J.D., 2001, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A., University of California, Los
Angeles. The author wishes to dedicate this work to a people whose warmth and
humility continue to shape his identity, and the land that inspires him to dream.

